INCORE
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International Centre of Excellence for
Conflict and Peace Studies

FROM WARLORDS TO PEACELORDS:
Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes

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'INCORE's vision is of a world with an increased understanding of the causes of conflict; improved methods of resolving conflict without recourse to violent means; and advanced reconciliation processes'

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INCORE REPORT

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INCORE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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'...large scale conflict between groups – like conflict between states – requires the deliberate mobilisation efforts of determined political leaders. Without such leadership, members of ethnic, communal or religious groups who find themselves in adverse circumstances – for example profound socio-economic inequality, political oppression and even deep intergroup animosity – do not spontaneously resort to warfare to retain redress. They tend instead to seek out non-violent means for improving their condition and resolving disputes, yet incendiary leaders can readily subvert such efforts and mobilise their followers for violence and hatred'.
Hamburg, D. Axelander, G. & Ballentine K (1999)[1]

'You can call me a peacelord, not a warlord. Now I am a man of peace. I am against fighting. But I was a warlord when it was necessary to be a warlord... I fought to liberate Afghanistan from foreign invading forces, from foreign puppet regimes. I fought against the Taliban and their collapse began here, in the north, because of me'.
General Abdul Rashid Dostum[2]

'The most powerful weapon that the international community has is aid money. Eventually that aid will have to be given to the Afghan chiefs to distribute. It may even have to go towards bribing warlords to turn them into peacelords'.
Dmitry Trenin, Deputy Director of the Moscow Carnegie Centre[3]

'As we move forward to help Iraqis build a free nation, three are some guidelines that the Coalition is following: first, while our goal is to put functional and political authority in the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible, the Coalition Provisions Authority has the responsibility to fill the vacuum of power in a country that has been under a dictatorship for decades, by asserting temporary authority over the country. The Coalition will do so. It will not tolerate self-appointed 'leaders' '.
Donald Rumsfeld, US Defense Secretary[4]

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

INCORE	International Conflict Research
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	National Democratic Institute of International Affairs
OHRA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian assistance (Iraq)
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Kosovo)
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIK	United Nations Interim administration Mission in Kosovo
UNU	United Nations University

PREFACE

Since this research was first commissioned in 2002, the international landscape has changed very dramatically, not least with the intensification of the 'war against terror' and the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, raising general questions about the leadership capacity in Iraq and specific questions regarding who might eventually become the leader of a 'new' Iraq.

This notion of 'leadership capacity' has been the subject of intense focus for many international organisations. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a Washington based international organisation has paid increasing attention towards the development of leadership capacity in transitional societies. Their International Leaders Forum and the Emerging Democracies Forum both focus on the development of political leadership skills of individuals. NDI, however, are not alone in their drive to promote their particular brand of 'good' leadership. The World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund has recently hosted an event on 'Leadership Capacity Building for Post-Conflict Reconstruction'[5]; USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance implemented a series of political leadership programs in 2002[6]; and the Project on Justice in Times of Transition, in association with the J.F.K School of Government at Harvard University has been engaging with leaders on issues of conflict and peace building since 1992, through conferences and roundtable discussions. Equally, the United Nations University's International Leadership Academy (UNU/ILA) has, too, focused on such issues. A full list of the international NGO's and governmental agencies currently engaged in similar work would be too exhaustive to reproduce for the purposes of this report but those that have been cited demonstrate that policy makers seem to place the role of local political leadership very highly, on their respective agendas.

That such a sheer number of organisations are devoting attention to leadership is significant. However, understanding the rationale behind why leadership is considered important seems rather more opaque. Increasing policy attention has not been sufficiently complemented by academic attention and it is against this particular backdrop that our research has taken place.

Leadership is an intangible and elusive concept. While almost everyone will have their own sense of who leaders are and what they do, honing that into a set of 'off-the shelf' features is a perplexing task. The characteristics of leadership are ambiguous, malleable, contingent upon circumstance and potentially employable for multiple intents. In societies beset with conflict, leadership has been used malevolently to split a populace further. At the same time it can be channeled for more noble purposes: as a force for good and a quickening of reconciliation, co-operation and harmony.

This potential to be both placid and volatile makes leadership a highly prized attribute and perhaps explains why 'appropriate' local leaders are so keenly sought. Iraq presents a telling example of the importance accorded to leaders, while simultaneously illustrating the difficulties in achieving an aptitude of leadership necessary to assume the burden expected from them.

The extent to which a new Iraqi leadership improves on the old is a significant yardstick by which *Operation Iraqi Freedom* will eventually be judged. Although power and sovereignty had been vested in the US-led occupiers following the toppling of Saddam, there was no shortage of Iraqis clamoring for position as 'potential' future leaders. They hailed from a swathe of ethnic, tribal and religious backgrounds that were as diverse as the country itself.

Local elections were held in towns and cities throughout Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the regime; these new leaders assumed the practical deeds of day-to-day administration. In July 2003 an Iraqi Governing Council comprising a diverse range of leaders was appointed. In their titles and portfolios, they mimicked a government. Under an accelerated timetable, authority was transferred to that body in June 2004, which then became known as the interim Iraqi Government (IIG). Many of the members of the Iriaqi Governing Council became Ministers in the IIG. The IIG has been responsible for governing Iraq since that June 2004. However, this is only another interim measure until the elections for a National Assembly which are due to take place in January 2005. This election will allow Iraqi's to vote for a 275 member Transitional National Authority. Beyond the election, the Assembly should be able to choose the government and t make laws for the country, including a draft constitution which will be put to a public referendum towards the end of 2005. At the time of

going to press, the election has not yet been held though it is likely that the various Shia parties will dominate in the election since the Shias make up about 65% of the Iraqi population.

Whether in their capacity as administrators, or figureheads of a new political order, it is clear that the newly leaders will occupy a central role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Their need is particularly acute in a situation heavily stained with traditions of past leadership, where so many central issues are undecided, and the potential for internal disenchantment, criminality and politically motivated violence to wreck the process is huge. It is no task for the faint-hearted. Iraq's new cadre of leaders operates under a trio of pressures: the need for international approval, their lack of capacity and the demonstrated personal danger of politics as a career.

Iraq's new political classes operate within the structures of a political system defined and overseen by their international occupiers. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that has filled the power vacuum following the crumbling of the Saddam regime made it clear that 'it would not tolerate self-appointed 'leaders,'' and in creating the conditions for handover in June 2004, they had also defined the parameters of how Iraq would be led in the future, thus choking off from office many potential claimants to leadership and their constituencies. [7] Those CPA-approved leaders ran the risk of being perceived as flunkies, and consequently risked losing legitimacy and provoking popular unrest. Iraq's new leaders also do not have the luxury of time. Subject to the pressure caused by knowing that they are not the sole - or even dominant - source of authority, these leaders have had no settling in period and had to establish their capabilities immediately, often without the funding, equipment, training or personnel necessary to do a credible job. Their short record has been decidedly mixed so far. Although some have assumed the titles, many others lack either the administrative capacity or desire to make an impact. They are also desperately short of the financial resources with which to carry out an effectual reconstruction program. Oil revenues will not reap enough financial gains to empower the new state. It is also personally hazardous. Some of those touted as alleged leaders had their careers quickly cut short by assassins. Given that, already evidenced public disenchantment is scarcely surprising.

Iraq's post-conflict leadership finds it extremely difficult to meet the burden of expectations weighing down upon it. They are prey to something of a classical catch 22 situation. Effective leadership is essential because of the myriad of problems confronting the country but is difficult to achieve for precisely the same reason. That these leaders often seem not to reach the mark is perhaps less a function of their own failings and every bit as much reflection of the multiplicity of demands coupled with inflated public hope placed on them. Their difficulties are a salutary prologue before our consideration of leadership in other states emerging from conflict.

Gordon Peake, our primary research associate for the project, undertook extensive field research in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, while Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Mari Fitzduff worked alongside him in analyzing and preparing the results. We anticipate that this report will contribute to the debate about local leadership capacity and international intervention in peace processes. We are certain that much more attention needs to be paid by both academics and policy-makers alike in unravelling the potential of a local leader's role, capacity and effect in peace processes, and how this potential is realized or constrained by the influence of international leaders.

INCORE
December 2004

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The starting point for the research upon which the report is based has been our interest in the phenomenon of political leaders in conflict and peace building. In particular, this report has considered leadership in three countries that have attracted infamy for the protracted nature of their brutal conflicts – Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Each country is now considered to have emerged from conflict and to be at formal 'peace'.

The research sought to explain something of a bitter irony that holds true of many conflicts: why many of the local political leaders who played such a central part in perpetuating conflict remain a public feature in the subsequent peace processes. How does such a transformation from 'warlord' to 'peacelord' take place? What influences can be attributed to their apparent changes of heart and willingness to engage in processes of reconciliation and renegotiated constitutional arrangements? Is it the influence of constituents or followers? Is it the influence of other local leaders? Or is the true source of pressure more exogenous in nature?

The study aimed to explore how these leaders emerge, how they are sustained and what sparked their change from a seemingly *negative* to a more seemingly *positive* style of leadership. The research showed that while leaders were adroit at dragging their countries and followers into conflict they were not so adept at pulling them out of it. The key force for change was not so much local leadership per se, but instead international leaders and their states and organisations which are ever increasingly becoming a fixed part of the transition process.

The relationship between local and international leadership is fraught with difficulties – for the international community, there is the desire to stabilize a region (for whatever motive); for the local political leaders there is the desire to hold on to the 'spoils of war' and the benefits accrued through the perpetuation of conflict. This amounts to something of an oxymoron, given that to create much-needed stability in a region, the international leaders need to work with those very actors that were deemed to be the cause of much of the instability of the past.

As the research shows, a feature of many peace agreements is an international presence. It is seldom that peace agreements are not negotiated and mid-wifed by an international actor, whether a state or international organisation such as the UN. Their weight and consequential influence is so extensive that it affords significant levels of influence over both the process and the local leaders. International leaders can utilise their positions of influence to 'encourage' local leaders to accept terms that they might not otherwise do on their own as well as creating mechanisms that reward, sanction and regulate their behaviour. For those who seek to find strategies or the means to effect or change leadership behaviour, the international involvement in pushing forward a peace process affords great potential. Its force can compel 'negative' leaders to be infinitely more positive. Clearly, international interests are never exclusively angelic.[8] However, even so, the intrusion of international behemoths – whether that be the United States, the United Nations, regional organisations of nations, or NGOs – can have positive effects on the behaviours and mannerisms of local leaders.

The study shows that this potential is already being utilised over local leaders but it has yet to be systematized. The three case studies demonstrate that different combinations of carrots and sticks are adopted by the international community towards political leaders. This has yielded three different consequences. In Afghanistan, minimal pressure has been exerted, meaning that leaders continue to behave in as divisive and selfish a manner as before. The international overlords of Kosovo have restricted the powers of local leaders, erecting new political institutions whose powers and responsibilities are tightly tapered. In Sierra Leone, the international community is sanctioning local leaders by creating a special criminal court to prosecute those deemed responsible for crimes during the civil war.

It seems that international leaders at the helm *matter every bit as much* as local leaders: the presence and potential pressure affords a better chance at getting leaders to alter their behaviour than the leaders would ever do on their own. That is not to say that local leaders are not important. They are much more than princelings or satraps in an internationalised order. Although they may not have been the starting motivation in the move toward peace, not least because most leaders are unable and unwilling to transcend the ethnic or national constituencies that they represent, their interest

remains resolutely in their own group. Leaders continue to combine the traits of charm, ruthlessness, and the ability to marshall resources in such a way so that they can preserve their own ascendant position.

The issue of 'motive' is one which holds much resonance for this research. Often held assumptions of the existence of 'transformational' models of leadership – or Mandela like figures – do not always mesh with the reality of violent conflict and the road towards peace. Motives for engaging in peace processes are rarely altruistic, seldom for the greater good of conflict reduction or resolution, and are almost always 'transactional' in nature – a system of give and take with the international community and to a much lesser degree, if at all, with a leader's constituency base.

To summarize, our conclusions therefore are as follows:

1. In looking for 'positive leadership' academics and policy makers may be searching for a chimera and hence will inevitably be disappointed. The reality is, perhaps, that this particular model of leadership rarely exists in this context of violent conflict. That is the reason why a Mandela figure tends to stand out so sharply.

2. In an ever increasingly internationally overseen world, local leaders have actually very little power over grand issues of conflict and peace. Despite innumerable attempts in each of the three case studies, leaders themselves were apparently unable to make progress towards a resolution. Each conflict was punctuated by accords, plans, resolutions, understandings, agreements, ceasefires and yet not one of them was sustainable. The glue that has held them together has been the international interest and pressure to bring the parties to the table. So, although leaders may have played a large part in getting their countries into conflict they are often unable to get their countries out of it. In none of the countries studied did leaders provide the momentum to begin a process; they were either coaxed into settlements, or catapulted along as part of a process over which they have little agency or control. Put simply, too many expectations are put on leaders conjuring up change while nothing in their past experience indicates that they are likely to do so.

3. Local leaders tend to be bereft of both administrative capabilities and administrative capacity. Well versed in the politics of conflict, they are less familiar with the rules of the humdrum practicalities of basic administration. Compounding this, the new administrations of which they are part lack many of the basic building blocks of effective governance. Again, leaders cannot conjure up a new dispensation if their box of tricks is strictly limited.

4. There is, sad to report, little influence that followers have over the actions of their leaders. In large part this is because each of these countries have both unstable histories of democracy as well as a 'distance' between a leader and his followers. Instead there appears to be the glum acceptance by many that they can do little to effect change. To be sure, there may be other case studies in which the international hand is less obvious and the relationship between leaders and followers in terms of the clout that followers actually hold may be different but we are not optimistic about the actual ability of followers to challenge the current orthodoxy, given our research findings.

Consequently, the research findings suggest we should not concentrate exclusively on local leaders as the means to end conflicts and build peace. Instead, we should focus every bit as much on the potential influence of the international leaders and organisations, not least in terms of how to use that potential to effect change and influence local leaders. They have demonstrated their ability to bring about positive change. As one can see, they have done so in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. The question is how their potential can be further harnessed and encouraged. That is an infinitely much more difficult question but we offer a number of possible avenues below.

Some Recommendations

Such is the nebulous nature of this research area, it often provokes more questions than it answers. The relevant literature is somewhat deficient in failing to duly examine the influence of international actors upon local leaders, therefore our recommendations for further research centre upon suggesting further ways of explicating this relationship.

1. Further research should be undertaken into the interplay between local leaders and the international organisations that play a part in conflict resolution and peace building. We have clearly shown that there is some relationship but mapping its exact contours in a greater number of case studies would provide further detail and clarity.

2. International responses towards local leadership has yet to be systematised. All too often international organisations work in a muddled milieu with lack of co-ordination among each other. A detailed audit should be undertaken that will clearly set out approaches, and attitudes among international organisations towards local leaders and the relationships therein.

3. In policy terms, there could be more emphasis and efforts to train a cadre of acceptable and representative leaders in areas that are considered likely for conflict. This should be seen a something of a preventative measure, as opposed to solely accepting the necessity of dealing with the belligerents already in place. Such training should also include technocrats who are vital in the development of appropriate social, economic and governance processes.

4. One feature in many of the post-conflict societies is the return of both an émigré business class and technocrats who left during conflict. These individuals tend to have more of the basic building block skills that are necessary to turn a post-conflict society around, skills that many of the 'big name' leaders in these societies manifestly lack. Efforts should be concentrated upon harnessing this particular cadre of relatively untapped potential.

1.   THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP IN CONFLICTED SOCIETIES

1.1   Introduction

The international community is growing more intimately involved in both trying to resolve conflicts and steer those affected societies towards peaceful futures. Outside states and international organisations bring political weight, financial influence and technical capacity that dwarf their local equivalents; this comparative advantage affords them considerable potential to influence the trajectory of events. Some scholars assert that the outcome of a peace agreement is 'linked to the quality and level of support given by third parties to the peace process, especially during implementation of the agreement.'[9]

The literature on 'conflict resolution' and 'post conflict peacebuilding' have generated a towering body of research that has examined this international role from a multiplicity of angles. Surprisingly absent, however, has been an examination of their engagement and interplay with local political leaders. This omission is somewhat surprising given that these leaders - often the most recognisable personifications of the conflict themselves – appear crucial to piecing together a durable form of politics and ensuring that the aftermath to one conflict is more than a prelude to another. Local leaders, therefore, bear an important role in determining whether these internationally supported endeavours will be judged as successes or failures. Thus, it is imperative for international actors to have as thorough an understanding of these leaders as possible.

This study builds on previous research conducted by INCORE into leadership and conflict.[10] Specifically, it looks at three cases—Afghanistan, Kosovo and Sierra Leone—and examines how leaders emerged in each of these societies, traces their role in the transition away from conflict, and assesses the strategies adopted by international actors towards the leaders in question. In doing so it hopes to draw lessons for future instances of co-operation when intervening international organisations co-operate with local leaders as part of peacebuilding efforts, as well as raising possible issues that may come between them.

In each case examined in this study, international actors work with leaders more associated with inflaming conflict than with ending it; some have even garnered the unwelcome alias of 'warlords'. Neither that particular label nor their lack of involvement in peace processes readily inspires confidence about their wish to engage in and their ability to sustain a conflict resolution process. Although these leaders had agreed to ceasefires and initialed accords in the past, their actions (and those of their followers) ran contrary to the conciliatory words spoken at signing ceremonies. Given their past records in failed peace initiatives, it could be regarded as somewhat comic to hear some of these former 'warlords' describe themselves as 'peacelords' and talk in the idioms and language of 'peace'.

A significant international political and military influence appears to be a major factor in propelling this linguistic makeover. The formal end to conflict in each place was, in large part, wrought by international interveners. Subsequent peacebuilding has taken place under a watchful international gaze. On the surface, this international influence appears to have compelled leaders to accept political architectures that it is hard to imagine they would have adopted on their own. Following the US-led ouster of the Taliban in 2001, traditionally cantankerous Afghan leaders were coaxed into trying a more co-operative form of politics. It has been a process overseen by a wide range of international actors, most significantly the United States and The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Leaders from Kosovo's different ethnic traditions share increments of power devolved from a UN transitional administration (UNMIK) that has governed the province since a NATO-led war against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. Sierra Leonean leaders built upon an opportunity hewed by a British military intervention in 2001 to end a brutal civil war. It is an effort supported by a large UN peacekeeping operation (UNAMSIL). Leaders also work under threat of prosecution from an internationally sponsored criminal court empowered to investigate offences during the civil war.

Three uniquely calibrated combinations of carrots and sticks have been used over Afghan, Kosovar and Sierra Leonean leaders, yielding three different outcomes. Each poses potential peril for the sustainability of these embryonic political entities. A consequence of the somewhat soft approach taken towards local leaders in

Afghanistan has meant politics remains fragmented and internecine. With the entity's future status still blurry, the sluggish devolution of authority to Kosovar leaders risks retarding political development and extending international administration for longer than may be considered healthy. Meanwhile, the selective prosecution of Sierra Leonean leaders is potentially divisive, and the factors which could jeopardize any prospects of exiting from conflict are the absence of sufficient administrative capacity and the continuance of poor leadership traits that mired the country in the first place.

1.2 Literature Review : Leadership and Conflict, International Influence and Warlords

1.2.1 Leadership and Conflict

The literature on leadership and conflict is surprisingly light. There has been little head-on exploration of the motivations and calculations underpinning leadership decision-making in such circumstances. The literature has also failed to keep pace and acknowledge the ever-increasing role played by politically significant states and international organisations in conflict resolution and peace building. Little attention has been devoted to how their presence impacts on their relationships and connections with local leaders.

Scholars do recognise leadership as a significant factor in stoking trouble. A 'negative' brand of leadership has a combustible capacity to create violent conflict in a deeply divided society as noted by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict

> '…large scale conflict between groups – like conflict between states – requires the deliberate mobilisation efforts of determined political leaders. Without such leadership, members of ethnic, communal or religious groups who find themselves in adverse circumstances – for example profound socio-economic inequality, political oppression and even deep intergroup animosity – do not spontaneously resort to warfare to retain redress. They tend instead to seek out non-violent means for improving their condition and resolving disputes, yet incendiary leaders can readily subvert such efforts and mobilise their followers for violence and hate'.[11]

Despite (or perhaps because) it is so seemingly obvious, academics have devoted little attention to the role of leadership in conflict. An extensive trawl of leadership literature by INCORE in 2001, for example, revealed that surprisingly little has been

written on the topic. Similarly, slim pickings are to be retrieved from a search through the literature on post conflict reconstruction: '…at most political leadership is referred to in scant detail as one of the many variables at play when deciphering why conflicts escalate, de-escalate and transform'.[12] There appears a curious reluctance to address the topic. For leadership author Barbera Kellerman this disinclination is attributed to an implicit assumption espoused by scholars 'that to lead is to do right, and those outside this narrow band make no such assumption….the divide that we have created between leaders who do good and those who do not will, if not narrowed, constitute a fatal flaw'.[13] In other words the subject has not been broached because the implications of the relationship between leadership and conflict do not want to be acknowledged.

What literature there is offers useful analytic and practical nuggets, suggesting fertile ground for further research. Often it breaks down common assumptions about leadership and peacemaking. Chiozza and Choi showed there to be little obvious corollary between democratically elected leaders and peacemaking.[14] Indeed, they found that non-elected leaders are slightly more inclined towards finding a peaceful solution whereas their elected equivalents are slightly more likely to opt for a military solution. 'Good' leaders are not necessarily elected ones.

A useful dichotomy of leadership was offered by James McGregor Burns. He boxed leaders into two categories: transformational and transactional. [15] The former are leaders able to transcend the confines of their own community and act positively in the interests of a wider community. The latter have a less selfless decision-making calculus. They come to their political choices based upon whether it will reap benefits and achievements for themselves and their followers.

A small number of historical leaders whose individual actions enabled the transition from conflict (or possible conflict) to peace have been dubbed 'transformational leaders'. Nelson Mandela is often held out as a prime example of this philanthropic band along with Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King.[16] Their leadership is recognized as having significantly altered conflict dynamics. Some scholars regard the transformative leader as an essential part of the jigsaw of necessities required to make a peace. The overall transformation of a conflict is sometime said to require a

'change of character, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader or adoption of its goals, values or beliefs'.[17]

Understandably, the reason why these figures stand out so starkly is because they are so atypical. Few 'transformational' leaders could be identified in any of the numerous states afflicted by conflict in the last decade. Perhaps the reason why they have garnered a great deal of attention is because, extending Kellerman's point, that this is the type of optimal leadership desired/yearned by some leadership researchers. The reality differs however. The modus operandi of many leaders is predicated on more pragmatic concerns of political survival and maximum positioning than altruism. Most leaders, therefore, conform much closer to the 'transactional' model than transformational. Decisions are made, and their potential implications weighed, by reflection through a prism of political, organisational, cultural, historical, personal and interactional factors. Understanding their strategies and behaviour – and the logic that underpins it- duly requires thorough knowledge of both current context and the historical circumstances that shaped it.[18]

Previous research by INCORE researchers indicates far more transactional attributes than transformational aspirations among leaders in conflict-ridden societies. John Darby and Roger MacGinty suggest that 'during peace negotiations the primary function of leaders is to deliver their own people' in a peace process; assisting opponents in the process becomes a secondary condition.[23] Leaders are usually more concerned about cementing their own positions than in any altruistic aspiration. Cathy Gormley-Heenan found that leaders are much less flexible in their core positions than is often imagined or desired. Occasional demonstrations of pragmatic political behavior do not necessarily effect any diminution of core political beliefs, she discovered.[19]

1.2.2 International Influence and Warlords

Largely missing from the literature is a comprehensive examination of the relationship between international actors and local leaders. This absence is peculiar given the extent to which international actors are involved in everything from the midwifery of an accord to steering its development. Their involvement has increased exponentially in the last fifteen years to the point where they assume full reins of