"Thou too shalt groan at heart that all thy spending - Cannot
repay the dead, the hungry dead"
From Generation
to Generation, Henry Newbolt
This paper
moves from the premise that when countries are attempting to overcome
a violent past it is better to deal with the past through investigation,
truth recovery, justice and support for victims or survivors of
violence than to ignore it. The paper is geared toward countries
that are undergoing processes of social and political transformation.
Specifically it is targeted at countries that are coming out of
protracted periods of political violence.
For example,
the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement reached on the 10th of April
1998, outlines the need for the establishment of a number of commissions
(e.g. Commission on Policing, review of the criminal justice system,
etc.) to help facilitate change in the society. The Northern Ireland
Victims Commission, under the Sir Kenneth Bloomfield1 also released
its report in April 1998. Furthermore, a new inquiry into the killings
that took place at 'Bloody Sunday' in 1972 has also been set-up.
The paper
should be read in light of these changes, as well as within the
growing international trend toward seeing 'truth commissions' and
other commissions as useful mechanisms for dealing with a violent
past. In this regard, the paper provides some general comparative
arguments that can be applied to varying contexts. The paper gives
considerable weight to some of the lessons learned from the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. It begins by
briefly outlining some of the debates about whether a country should
investigate or 'remember' its past. Thereafter, it outlines five
issues that need to be considered if a process of dealing with the
past is to be undertaken.
Should
we remember? There are many arguments as to why the past should
not be explored, investigated or uncovered. It could be argued that
uncovering past can de-rail peace initiatives and cause further
violence. One could also claim that, if unmanaged, the realisation
of uncovering the past can be more psychologically painful than
leaving it undisturbed. There is also value in the argument that
for the youth (who were not part of past conflict) it is favourable
that the past is 'forgotten' so as to allow them to distance themselves
from the past abuses and old mindsets. In this way they can create
a new future unpolluted by the past. Furthermore, the arguments
that the past can be manipulated and reinterpreted so that it can
be used as a weapon warrant serious consideration.
Nonetheless,
these arguments are, for the most part, outweighed by reasons as
to why the past should be investigated, remembered and 'worked with'
by the people of any society coming out of violence. There are four
primary reasons why strategies for dealing with the past should
be considered.
Firstly, there
is a basic psychological justifications for undertaking a process
of remembering the past. Psychologically, "sleeping dogs do not
lie"; past traumas do not simply pass or disappear with the passage
of time. The past can never just be ignored and past traumas can
always be expected to have emotional consequences for an individual
(Hamber, 1995; 1996; 1998) and the society at some later stage.
Psychological restoration and healing can only occur through providing
the space for survivors of violence to feel heard and for every
detail of the traumatic event to be re-experienced in a safe environment
(Hamber, 1998).
Secondly,
it is probably true that "whoever controls the past controls the
future" as George Orwell asserted, and that the uncovering of the
past allows for its manipulation to meet present political and social
agendas and interests. As Thelen (1989) has said, "The struggle
for possession and interpretation of memory is rooted among the
conflict and interplay of social, political, and cultural interests
and values in the present" (p. 1127 cited in Middleton & Edwards,
1994). However, he goes on to add that constructive remembering
is "not made in isolation but in conversation with others that occur
in the contexts of community, broader politics, and social dynamics"
(Thelen, 1989, p. 1127 cited in Middleton & Edwards, 1994). In sum,
remembering and its use (and abuse) cannot be separated from the
present social and political concerns, and could serve the interests
of one sector of the society. However, it is for this very reason
that as many voices as possible should engage in the process of
remembering. Only through engaging in the process of 'remembering'
can we enter into the socially contested field of the past. In so
doing, we open the only possibility of developing creative and constructive
collective memories that are functional to as many people within
the society as possible.
Thirdly, within
the literature on truth commissions, many authors have asserted
the importance of focusing on the past. The setting-up of truth
recovery processes and their ability to contribute to reconciliation
with the past have been ubiquitously asserted (Asmal, 1992; Asmal,
Asmal & Roberts, 1996; Boraine, Levy & Scheffer, 1994; Hamber, 1995;
Hayner, 1996; Rolston, 1996; Simpson, 1994; Simpson & van Zyl, 1995;
Zalaquett, 1993).
Hayner (1996)
is of the opinion that a truth commission (as one example of truth
recovery process) can promote reconciliation, outline needed reform,
allow victims to air their pain, provide acknowledgement of a long-suppressed
past and hopefully keep such horrors from being repeated. Drawing
on the experience of Latin American efforts to recover from decades
of military dictatorship, Human Rights Watch also concludes that
"if any country is to come to terms with its past and successfully
turn its attention to the future, it is essential that the truth
of the past be officially established. It is impossible to expect
'reconciliation' if part of the population refuses to accept that
anything was ever wrong, and the other part has never received any
acknowledgement of the suffering it has undergone or of the ultimate
responsibility for that suffering" (Africa Watch, 1992, p.2).
Finally, the
importance of acknowledgement of wrong-doing and the uncovering
of 'truth' (and justice in most cases) is also commonly expressed
as healing for victims or survivors. By creating a realistic perspective
of past human rights abuses, individual and collective cognitive
recovery could be aided by allowing survivors to accept what happened
to them and deal with their resultant emotional responses.
In Northern
Ireland, the need for 'truth' and its links to healing have also
been made. Smyth (1998) comments, "For some people who have lost
family members, there are strong feelings of injustice in cases
where there are unresolved issues, missing bodies, unanswered questions...resolution
or healing is often impossible in the absence of knowing more about
the circumstances of what happened to their loved ones" (p.3). Similarly,
in South Africa, despite the existence of the TRC many victims still
feel that more truth (and justice in some cases) is necessary for
reconciliation or healing to take place (cf. Hamber, Maepa, Mofokeng,
van der Merwe & the Khulumani Support Group, 1998).
How should
we remember?
The next section of the paper focuses on several ways that countries
could remember. It outlines broad guidelines and raises some debates
within the field of collective and individual remembering. It does
not delve into the pragmatics of strategies for remembering or advocate
specific methods for dealing with the past (i.e. it does not enter
the debates as to whether countries coming out of violence should
embark on a formal truth commission process, a commission of inquiry,
a war crimes tribunal, a purging or 'lustration' process or grass-roots
non-governmental processes). Rather the paper debates some of the
issues a country may need to consider prior to the establishment
of any formal body or commission that may be set-up to deal with
the past. This section draws heavily from the South African experience
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and other countries
coming out of conflict.
This section
advocates five, albeit not exhaustive maxims, that may be useful
when dealing with past or setting up structures such as commissions
of inquiry. These are:
- Remember
in a contextual, creative and official way
- Remember
in a diverse and representative way
- Remember
in a legitimising way
- Remember
in a complex way
- Remember
in a forward looking way
1. Remember
in a contextual, creative and official way
In the same way we can only understand the past through the prism
of the present, we need to be aware that the strategies that we
adopt for dealing with past will inevitably be shaped by the current
political and social context. In South Africa, the balance of forces
at the time of transition played a significant role in shaping the
'remembering' process that came afterwards. Given the nature of
the negotiated settlement it was impossible to undertake large scale
prosecutions. Within this context, amnesty can be seen as a necessary
and unavoidable precondition to the negotiated peace settlement
(Asmal, Asmal & Roberts, 1996 and Simpson & van Zyl, 1995). In turn,
the amnesty 'deal' shaped and gave birth to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Within the South African context the ANC had insufficient
power at the negotiations table to enforce prosecution, but had
sufficient power to demand truth in exchange for amnesty2 - this
exchange, along with giving victims space to tell their stories,
is the bare essence of the South African TRC.
The relative
merits (and demerits) of the South African amnesty process are beyond
the present focus, but some lessons are clear. Firstly, the context
helped shaped the final shape of South Africa's attempts to deal
with the past. Secondly, those involved in the process, managed
to develop a new method for dealing with the past, i.e. to follow
a middle-road between the polemics of prosecutions and blanket amnesty.
This creativity allowed debates, and strategies, for dealing with
past to thrust forward both locally and internationally.
In light of
this South Africa did attempt to deal with the past in a creative
way. However, it could also be said to have simply added a dimension
to already established models. One argument is that this may have,
in fact, made the TRC acontextual in its approach even if its origin
was a particularly contextual one. Mamdani (1998) criticises the
South African TRC for defining victims too narrowly. He says that
because South Africa borrowed from the Latin American experiences
it weighed the notion of perpetrators and victims too heavily and
ignored the unique structural issues related to victimisation in
South Africa. The result was, in his opinion, that there has been
insufficient focus on the so-called beneficiaries of the 'apartheid'
system.
Other commentators
have also made similar points. It has been argued elsewhere (Hamber,
forthcoming) that the majority of victims or survivors who appear
before the TRC were victimised not only because of their political
affiliation and activities, but because of their structural circumstances
including: their gender, their poverty, their race and their general
social marginalisation. Similarly, Statman (1995) is concerned that
the construction of the "truth" from testimony of individual human
rights victims and abusers, threatens to obscure a larger truth
of systematic subjugation, enslavement, oppression and exploitation
over the centuries. Goldblatt and Meintjies (1996) add a gender
dimension to the argument, and comment that the TRC's narrow interpretation
of 'gross violations of human rights' has meant that women who bore
the brunt of oppression through forced removals, pass arrests and
other acts of systematic 'apartheid' violence have not been identified
as victims.
These criticisms
of the TRC are debatable within the context of the mandate of the
TRC, and perhaps focusing on the broader structural oppression of
apartheid would have made the work of the TRC unmanageable. However,
the arguments, do serve to illustrate that often processes which
are billed as creative can have 'hidden' social and political consequences.
The so-called uncovering of the truth can, perhaps inevitably and
even unconsciously, serve to obscured a number of other truths.
For this reason,
it could be argued, that it is important to embark on 'remembering
processes' that produce versions of the truth that are broadly accepted
by as many people as possible. To this end to seek an official record
(the official truth) is an important, albeit inevitably fraught,
step. In this regard the South African attempts are important because
they are thrust toward establishing an "official" record based on
broad consensus and are sanctioned by a majority government.
Informal 'truth
commissions' and other investigations such as the documentation
process carried out by the Archbishop's Human Rights Office Guatemala,
are vital and essential to uncovering the truth. However, if these
processes are made 'official' and backed by the government (and
its people) they are inevitably more effective. Brazil is a useful
example in this regard.
In Brazil
it could be argued that due primarily to the publication of the
book Brazil: Nunca Mais3 a large part of the truth is in fact known
about the atrocities of the Brazilian dictatorship that spanned
the years 1964-1985 (Hamber, 1997; Rolston, 1997; Weschler, 1990).
The book has received "semi-official status" through its extensive
sales (Bronkhorst, 1995). However, the argument could be made that
perhaps if Brazil had a more 'official' truth recovery process steered
by the government, the demands for justice would not still reverberate
through the society and the present day police would not be so brutal,
and infringe upon human rights as much as they do (cf. Hamber, 1997).
Equally it
could be argued, that it was not only the "unofficial" nature of
the investigations into the past that resulted in a limited impact
on changing institutions in Brazil, but rather that the political
trajectory taken by the country was already entrenched before the
election of a civilian government in 1985 or the publication of
the book (Weschler, 1990). This trajectory was typified by the granting
of amnesty and an attitude which allowed those responsible to continue
to operate freely. In essence, as has been witnessed in so many
countries, a context of impunity has continued to dominate the government
after the transition to so-called democratic governance.
Clearly, to
reveal the truth and make future recommendations about how to redress
the past, and meet the needs of victims, is not enough. This process
has to be integrated into strategies for real institutional change.
Truth for truth's sake can be pointless. In addition, creative initiatives
are needed that grow out of the political context under consideration.
It would be a mistake for any country to begin with the South African
model (as that is the most contemporary) and structure their 'truth
recovery' process around that. Rather, one should first explore
indigenous and contextual methods, which may or may not, be built
on other experiences. Differing methods for dealing with the past
are in a constant state of flux and under experimentation. One method
should not be heralded as an icon, although important lessons can
be learned through comparative study.
Dealing with
the past needs to be done creatively. We need to be looking beyond
'testimony' as the only way that victims can deal with trauma, and
monetary and symbolic (e.g. monuments) forms of reparation as the
only way we can make amends. We also need to study countries that
have not undertaken 'truth recovery' processes with as much we scrutiny
as those who have. However, above all else, extensive preparation
and consultative workshops with all sectors of society who have
an investment in the past and its reconstruction (particularly victims,
but also including the so-called perpetrators) is essential before
any strategy for dealing with past is undertaken.
2. Remember
in a diverse and representative way
One of the
impacts of violence on a population is high levels of mistrust of
those who are seen as 'the other', and particularly those who are
seen as the aggressor. The impact of these perceptions cannot be
underestimated and they infiltrate various sectors of the population's
views of social and governmental institutions.
For example,
in South Africa, the credibility of the police was so undermined
over the 'apartheid' years that it would have been unthinkable and
unacceptable, in the eyes of the black majority, for the National
Party to have internally 'reformed' the service. In fact, in South
Africa today, despite extensive transformation in the police services
and the careful scrutiny of the TRC, many victims of police violence
still feel that "police officials have not made any meaningful contribution
to transforming their role from sustaining apartheid to becoming
protectors of individuals' rights" (Hamber, Maepa, Mofokeng, van
der Merwe & the Khulumani Support Group, 1998, p. 11).
Similarly,
for many Nationalists in Northern Ireland, the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) is seen as the most visible line of defence of a State which
they have difficulty accepting as legitimate (MacGinty, forthcoming).
In addition, the RUC is seen as an 'ethnic police force' due to
its overwhelming Protestant membership, and within Republican consciousness
the RUC is linked to a number of incidents in the 1980s like the
'shoot to kill policy' and the 'supergrass trials' (MacGinty, forthcoming).
Given this it seems likely that, from a Nationalist perspective,
anything short of a radical overhaul of the RUC would not suffice4.
These type
of perceptions (that exist in almost all countries that are in transition)
require careful cognisance when strategies or commissions for dealing
with the past are being considered or conceptualised. Although it
is fair criticism to point out that any 'truth recovery' process,
investigation or commission may serve political ends5, this is an
insufficient reason to hold-up the process. To counter perceptions
that processes (and institutions) are biased, investigations or
commissions should be encouraged. However, unlike so many other
commissions around the world, it is critical that such bodies are
widely representative and acceptable to the population under examination.
It is recommended
that any appointment procedure be as public and diverse as possible6.
This can ensure credibility for those selected and undermine political
arguments that certain sectors interests have been overlooked. In
South Africa, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act of 1995 that created the TRC, stipulated that the appointment
of Truth Commissioners was to be made by President Mandela in consultation
with his cabinet. The process for selecting Commissioners was an
extremely consultative one that included public nominations and
an invitation to the public to submit questions to be asked of the
short-listed nominees. Each candidate was interviewed publicly.
This process certainly won credibility for the Commissioners from
the outset. Despite claims in South Africa by the National Party
of the TRC's partiality, it is likely that the situation would have
been worsened (if not resulted in a collapse of the process) if
from the outset a sufficiently inclusive and public process had
not been adopted.
It is inevitable
that a body like the TRC (or any structure which is set-up to deal
with past conflict whether about policing, victims or human rights)
will be pressured from different perspectives. Within this context,
diversity and credibility of appointment is one method of ensuring
that pressures and political posturing can be dealt with constructively
and result in acceptable outcomes.
3. Remember
in a legitimising way
For relatives
of the murdered and 'disappeared' their loved ones can never be
replaced. This creates a core problem that confronts any country,
or commission, that attempts to deal with past violence. Although
acknowledgement, apology, recognition and even compensation can
be useful these, acts - no matter how well meaning - can never bring
back the dead or meet all the levels of psychological pain suffered
by the families and victims. In essence, one is dealing with an
intractable problem.
Furthermore,
and perhaps obviously, it also has to be realised that one is dealing
with immeasurable amounts of distress and anger that the victims
and survivors are struggling to come to terms with. Within this
context, and if we are committed to addressing the needs of victims,
we have to understand their sense of outrage at those they see as
responsible. An extreme example is the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
in Argentina, who have refused any form of reparation or compensation.
They will not participate in any official investigations. They insist
that "you took them away alive we want them back alive". Perhaps
part of their refusal may involve wanting others to experience the
frustration they have felt. They are determined to offer constant
reminders that, in reality, there is nothing that can ever be done
to replace their "missing" loved ones.
On a purely
psychological level, to expect a person to react in any other way
(e.g. to be overly forgiving, or to simply let 'bygones be bygones',
etc.) would be highly problematic. This runs counter to most personal
processes of coming to terms with traumatic events. It is critical
that victims (no matter what the state of a peace process in a country)
are not expected, either implicitly or explicitly, to forgive the
perpetrators. The anger of family members, or other emotional responses
like refusing to participate in processes set-up by the state (e.g.
Commissions), has to be legitimised and space provided for people
to express their feelings of sadness and rage.
The unfortunate
reality of this process is that victims/survivors responses can
often frustrate official government attempts to deal with past violence.
It is not uncommon for survivors to refuse to participate in so-called
victim orientated processes or for them to continually accuse most
established processes of being biased and not serving their interests.
Again it is worth mentioning the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina
who still refuse compensation7. Similarly, the Brazilian Comiss‹o
de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos Pol’ticos (Commission for
the Family Members of the Persons Killed or Disappeared for Political
Reasons), sees the 1995 attempts to compensate the families of the
murdered and "disappeared" during the Brazilian dictatorship as
the government's final attempt to buy their silence and close the
book on the past without revealing the true facts of what happened
(Hamber, 1997).
Similarly,
in Northern Ireland some relatives of state violence have accused
the Northern Ireland Victims Commission that was established in
October 1997 of being, "A cosmetic exercise, commissioned by a government
whose human rights record is the worst in Western Europe...the only
fitting monument that will serve to commemorate our loss and which
will allow us to put the past behind us is truth and justice" (Press
Statement, Relatives for Justice, 1 April 1998). In South Africa,
despite the work of the TRC, some victims will accuse the TRC of
undertaking a 'false reconciliation' process in which they were
forced to reconcile or forgive the perpetrators (Hamber, Maepa,
Mofokeng, van der Merwe & the Khulumani Support Group, 1998).
It is not
the purpose of this paper to analyse the veracity of any of these
claims, but the point is made to illustrate that their is a degree
of consistency between victim's views of official bodies after societies
have experienced large-scale political violence. If government commissions
and official truth commissions are to take their role seriously
then it is not only the claims of victims that need to be taken
seriously, but their perceptions need to be treated as a critical
and accepted reality of the situation. Whether their perceptions
of government bodies as not serving their interests, are incorrect
or correct (and in most cases they are correct), policy makers need
to take all victim's perceptions into account when claiming to be
addressing victim's needs.
This means
having to be hyper-vigilant about the appointment process of individuals
who are going to have the responsibility of heading commissions
or representing victim's needs. Similarly, the onus should fall
on appointed government bodies to follow-up victim cases, rather
than waiting for survivors to approach them. In essence, commissions
need to be seen to be 'bending over backwards' to meet the needs
of all victims.
These points
are heavily weighed upon by the pragmatic nature of the task that
may be at hand. For example, in South Africa the fact that over
20 000 statements were made by victims to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) made it extremely difficult for the Commission
to report back or to be seen to be following up each case individually.
Nonetheless, one has to ask the question, whether it would have
appeased victim's criticisms of the TRC if a more substantial reporting
back process was set-up (i.e. a routine reportback to victims even
if the reportback was to say that no progress had been made thus
far).
In sum, any
commission set-up to meet the needs of victims should: firstly,
continually and actively demonstrate their commitment (certainly
not claim it) to the needs of victims - this is how victims will
assess their commitment and utility. Secondly, they need to constantly
remain vigilant to victim and survivor's perceptions of them and
the body they represent. Thirdly, commissions need to address all
victim's perceptions (and their legitimate claims) as real. Finally,
bodies and commissions need to accept that their role is one in
which they are there to absorb the anger of those wronged in the
past. Irrespective of political persuasion a victim's anger is always
justified.
Remember
in a complex way
When analysing
a countries past what is apparent is that conflict is generally
more complex than it would first appear. South Africa, for example,
witnessed a number of different types of violence. These included,
amongst many others: pervasive structural violence8 and oppression;
extensive state abuses like torture, assassinations and detention
without trial; the use of paid vigilantes and 'third force' operatives
to carry out assassinations and terror attacks; large-scale inter-community
conflict; armed resistance from the so-called liberation forces;
and abuses committed by the liberation forces against those within
its own ranks who were suspected of being informers or traitors.
In essence, the violence in South Africa, like in most countries,
was multi-dimensional and diverse in nature.
For pragmatic
reasons, the South Africa TRC's mandate was narrowed to what was
termed the gross violations of human rights (i.e. torture or severe-ill
treatment, murder, attempted murder and abduction or 'disappearance')
that were committed between the periods March 1960 and May 1994.
This mandate was broader than others, like that of the Chilean Commission
that focused only on 'disappearances'. However, it was narrower
than, for example, others such as the El Salvadorean Commission
that had a very broad mandate. The El Salvadorean Commission could
investigate "serious acts of violence... [whose] impact on society
urgently demands that the public should know the truth" (cited in
Hayner, 1994).
These points
are made not to debate the issue of the mandate of commissions and
investigation bodies, but rather to highlight the fact that violence
in most countries is generally a complex phenomenon. At the same
time, certain types of violence (e.g. 'disappearances') may dominate
and therefore require specific investigation. It has already been
raised that focusing on gross violations in South Africa may have
obscured the structural forms of violence in the country (see p.5).
However, equally so, commissions and strategies which investigate
the past can be - if the issues are not approached sensitively -
prone to emphasising or under-emphasising certain aspects of the
conflict. Three main areas where this can occur have been identified.
Firstly, certain
types of conflict or situations can be under-emphasised due to their
nature and the political sensitivities attached to them. For example,
in South Africa it could be argued, that the 1990-1994 period that
was marked by unprecedented levels of inter and intra-community
violence between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)9, a
conflict that resulted in over 10 000 deaths, has been under-emphasised
by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This is probably due
to the fact that the wounds of the conflict are fresh and that all
parties involved still hold sufficient power to re-start the violence.
In this regard the TRC has been criticised in some quarters for
being afraid "to rock the boat"10. A further reason for the under-emphasis
may be that most truth commissions were initially designed to exploring
'vertical' acts of violence (e.g. state repression), rather than
the complex nature of 'horizontal' conflict (e.g. inter-community
conflict).
Under-emphases
for political reasons is common when specific actors or groups in
the conflict are covering-up their involvement in illegal activities,
and have the power to orchestrate such cover-ups. For example, the
term 'terrorist' is frequently used in Algeria to describe the Muslim
Fundamentalists in the country. Although these groups have undoubtedly
been involved in brutal 'terror' attacks and the massacres, reports
from Amnesty International11 suggest that the security forces are
also likely to be involved. As with so many conflicts in the world,
the continual and vocal protests about 'terrorists' serves as a
convenient smoke-screen for state complicity or violence. This was
certainly the case in South Africa during the National Party government.
Secondly,
certain types of violations or violence may be emphasised over others.
It is easier to consider the number of deaths that took place during
a period of conflict than the injuries, both psychological and physical,
that have been endured by a community. Although deaths can be a
good barometer of the amount of injury sustained by a community,
they do not tell the intricate story of living in a repressive environment
typified by extensive military patrols and constant surveillance.
Similarly, deaths (particularly of so-called high profile individuals)
tend to mask the victimisation of the families and children of those
individuals. Thus, the world over, stories are told of the brutal
assassination of individuals, but the violence metered out to their
families, both directly and indirectly, is often overlooked. These
would include, in most cases, the harassment (and sometimes torture)
of family members, the invasion of their privacy through raids into
the home and generally what are consider minor violations [sic]
committed against family members like slapping, insulting or pushing
them when security personal or paramilitary groups are searching
for their adversaries.
This obscuring
often takes on a gendered perspective. The stories of the wives,
mothers or partners of a victims of state or paramilitary attacks
are seldom told12. Often these woman (and their children) directly
experience victimisation due to their association with certain individuals.
However, because their experiences are considered minor and their
male loved one is considered to be the primary actor (and due to
the general marginalisation of woman) their stories remain untold.
Finally, the
role of the so-called 'victims' and 'perpetrators' is often emphasised
or de-emphasised depending on the political context. However, as
one delves deeper into most conflicts, what soon becomes apparent
is that many actors in a conflict have long and variant histories
in which they have had multiple roles. Simply put, they have been
both victim and perpetrator. One of the sharpest lessons of the
South African TRC has been that it was a mistake to narrowly define
individuals. Many amnesty applicants, particularly those involved
in paramilitary groups, like the ANC Self-Defence Units and the
IFP Self-Protection Units, have revealed a complex web in which
they have played the dual role of victim and perpetrator. If a country
is to adequately explain and understand a violent past, then these
complex stories have to be told.
However, these
statements should not be read to imply that 'we are all victims'
after a conflict. In all conflicts some parties are clearly more
to blame for the suffering than others, but we should not fall into
the trap (as countries do during times of war and violence) of seeing
the picture in a purely linear fashion. In South Africa, for example,
the argument has been made that the state was the most responsible
for the violence committed during the 'apartheid' years because
it had a moral duty to protect its citizens (Asmal, Asmal & Roberts,
1997).
Further, although
the entire population who have lived through violence would have
been affected or 'victimised' in one way or another, the experience
of direct victimisation and suffering is strikingly different across
communities. In South Africa, it would absurd to equate the experience
of most white South Africans of being placed under the stress of
acts of sabotage at the hands of the ANC and the 'liberation movement',
with the experiences of the majority of black South Africans who
lived in dangerous, impoverished and tightly policed townships.
5. Remember
in a forward looking way
Strategies
for dealing with the past are, in essence, as much about peering
into the past, as they are about shaping and looking into the future.
If one analyses the aims of most official bodies and commissions
that have been set-up, the forward looking nature of them is generally
emphasised. Most will emphasise the importance of making recommendations
to protect human rights and/or address the needs of a specific constituencies
(e.g. victims of violence); and/or ensure social reform of a particular
institution or body. To this end, strategies for dealing with the
past (e.g. truth commissions, victim's commissions, etc.) can play
a vital forward-looking role.
In addition,
they can symbolically represent a collective willingness to deal
with and part from the past. Furthermore, if such a body also makes
concrete recommendations and is able to implement such recommendations,
then this can represent - both symbolically and concretely - a process
of "becoming something new". This can be essential for emerging
democracies and countries coming out of conflict that are trying
to shape a collective national identity.
Nonetheless,
at the same time real change is a difficult task and commissions
and investigations are not the only strategy for achieving change.
Roht-Arriaza (1995) states that transitional governments [and perhaps
peace processes, author's emphasis] that face the paradox of having
to institute changes before they lose widespread credibility and
are overwhelmed by intractable social and economic problems, tend
to first turn to institutions that they can create from scratch.
These would include investigatory commissions, ad-hoc groups and
statutory commissions which require little extra infrastructure
to begin functioning. The problem is that these bodies often fail
to contribute to fundamental change or do not substantially guarantee
the prevention of future violence. There is always the potential
for such bodies to become little more than stability tools of the
transitional government and to "whitewash" issues, or for them to
become bureaucratically and politically defunct no matter how well
intentioned they initially were. To prevent this, civil society
vigilance is required, as well as large scale public participation.
It is simply
not adequate to assume that disclosure of past human rights abuses,
or the investigation into the reform of a specific institution,
will necessarily result in a culture of transparency, accountability
and the protection of human rights. Education programmes, human
rights awareness campaigns, victim support and reconciliation work
should be undertaken simultaneously with any investigation into
the past, 'truth recovery' process or commission. These should be
run in sectors of society such as schools, civil society, security
institutions, the judiciary and the military, to mention a few.
There needs to be a pervasive focus on transformation across the
society. Strong and vibrant civil organisations and groupings based
at the community level are the key 'forward-looking' structures
that are necessary for building a human rights culture, and overcoming
the ravishes of violence.
Conclusion
Dealing with
the past is a difficult and long-term task. In conclusion it is
wise to heed the sobering words of JosŽ Zalaquett: "The political
stakes involved in settling accounts with the past are so extraordinarily
high, that a fully satisfactory outcome can hardly be expected,
and that the social tensions brought about by the legacy of human
rights violations linger on for a long time" (1993, p. xxiii).
This paper
has attempted to outline some ways to ease to the process based
on the experiences of different countries that have attempted to
deal with the past. In sum, these include the establishment of 'official',
socially recognised and creatively composed bodies for dealing with
the past. It was also advocated that any attempt to deal with the
past needs to learn from, but not be reliant upon, other countries
experiences. It was noted that any structure formed should also
be as diverse as possible in its consultative process and composition.
A warning was also issued which could be summed up by saying that
any structure, or recommendation, is only as good as its implementation
strategy. The risks of commissions, 'truth recovery' processes and
investigations becoming a 'white-wash' are always there.
The paper
dwelled at length on the needs of victims, and particularly their
suffering. It was noted that countries coming out of conflict need
to accept that what has happened to victims cannot be reversed.
The challenge for the society is not only to deal with the hurt
in the most constructive way possible, but also learn to cope with,
and accept as legitimate, the ongoing anger and even impossible
demands of victims who will continue their struggle for an ever
elusive truth.
This process
does not occur within a political vacuum and a danger exists that
the needs of victims, and any process that is set-up to deal with
past, may be preyed upon by dominant political powers for their
own ends. In this regard, the words of Smyth (1998) should be noted,
"It is of crucial importance that all discussions about 'victims'
or people affected is shifted onto a humanitarian basis, based on
an inclusive concern about the human needs and resources required
to meet them" (p.1-2).
However, when
dealing with past violence, we cannot escape the fact that victimisation
was not random but political in its nature. Violence during times
of political conflict is by definition a political action fraught
with the hidden hands of political agendas and posturing. It is
for this very reason that consensual strategies for dealing with
past should be sought. It is only through taking control of the
apparatus of 'memory and history' that societies coming out of violence
can begin to engage with and develop constructive collective memories
of the conflict.
Endnotes
1 cf. Bloomfield, K. (1998). We will Remember them. Report of the
Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner. Printed by the The Stationery
Office Northern Ireland. April 1998.
2 It is important
to note, that the decision to grant amnesty has to be considered
in light of the motive of the person who committed the act, the
context in which the act was committed, the legal and factual nature
of the act (including the gravity of the offence), the object and
objective of the act, and whether the act was carried out by order
or approval of a political body, institution or individual. The
relationship of the act to a political objective and the proportionality
of the act also needs to be considered. In effect, this means that
amnesty is not automatic in South Africa, but if the criteria for
amnesty are met the TRC will substitute or trade retributive justice
for the full truth. This process is also coupled with victim hearings
and a reparation's process for those, or their relatives, found
to be victim's of murder, attempted murder, disappearance, torture
or severe ill-treatment. It is intended that the information made
available through this process will assist in leaving an undisputed
account of history and document how violations occurred. This theoretically
opens up the possibility to learn from the past and in so doing
ensure that future violence does not occur. At the end of its full
term of office the TRC will have to submit its findings to Parliament
in a comprehensive report, hand over its reparations policy to government
and make recommendations aimed at preventing such large scale abuse
from ever occurring again.
3 This unofficial
documentation of history and brutality in Brazil was the national
best-seller and retained that position for twenty-five weeks. There
are 200 000 copies of the book in circulation and it has become
the single best-selling non-fiction book in Brazilian literary history
(Weschler, 1990).
4 It should
be noted that Nationalist and Unionist perceptions of policing are
not monolithic, subgroups and varying attitudes do exist within
each community (Weitzer, 1995 cited in MacGinty, forthcoming).
5 Within Northern
Ireland an example of such a political argument, from a Unionists
perspective, would be that a focus on reform in the RUC was a way
of bowing to the Nationalist community and further undermining the
security of the Union.
6 If it is
likely that consensus will not be reached inside the country, appointments
from international bodies, as was the case in El Salvador Truth
Commission (where Commissioners were from the United Nations) could
be considered. International appointments are often necessary, especially
when internal conflicts are particularly strained or levels of distrust
high.
7 The group
is split into two. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo-L’nea Fundadora
do accept government reparation.
8 Structural
violence implies the "violence" perpetrated through the South African
state by the use of structural forms of racism that amounted to
inequalities of resource and life chances.
9 It would
be erroneous to portray the conflict as only between the ANC and
IFP as community conflict was also often fanned by so-called "third
force" activity sponsored by the state. For a more detailed analyss
of the 1990-1994 violence in South Africa see Hamber, forthcoming
and Simpson & Rauch, 1991.
10 Some broad
comments to this effect were made "From Truth to Transformation
Conference". Convened by the Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, The Parktonian Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa.
21-22 April 1998. See Minutes of the "From Truth to Transformation
Conference". Minutes published by the Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa.
11 See (http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press/sep22_alg.html)
and (http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/52802198.htm) for more details
and copies of Amnesty International statements.
12 This point
is not made to imply that women do not play major roles as primary
actors in many conflicts and struggles, for they do. These women's
stories and hardships (for example, the experience of gender related
crimes or being imprisoned by themselves as their are a limited
number of woman prisoners) are equally under-emphasised in most
countries.
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Dealing
with the Past
