

# From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition

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**From Protagonist to Pragmatist 1**

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Political Leadership in Societies in Transition  
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First published March 2001  
by INCORE (University of Ulster and United Nations  
University)  
Aberfoyle House, Northland Road, Derry/Londonderry,  
Northern Ireland. Tel: +44 (0)28 71375500.

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Printed by Browne Printers Ltd, Letterkenny

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ISBN 0 9540406 0 0

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## Acknowledgements

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The research for *From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition* and this final report were funded by the Community Relations Unit, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Additional funding was provided by the Community Relations Council towards the INCORE hosted conference, *From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Divided Societies* on 10 April 2000 and the INCORE/International Leadership Academy co-hosted conference, *Leadership in Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, from 2-13 November 2000. The support of these organisations is most gratefully acknowledged.

Thanks also to the Center for the Advanced Study of Leadership (CASL) at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership, University of Maryland for a Research Scholarship in April 2000, which allowed for a sharing of experience and knowledge with the staff there.

Special thanks to the Steering Group of the project, Mari Fitzduff, Paul Arthur, Gillian Robinson and Denis McCoy, for their support, attention to detail, and suggestions for the report. Gillian Robinson, Research Director at INCORE, provided me with help, guidance, and advice at every stage of the research. To Gillian especially, I am truly grateful.

Thank you also to Roger MacGinty for making comments and suggestions at various stages. To the staff at INCORE, many thanks for all your help, especially to Lyn Moffett in helping to prepare the report.

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## **Glossary of Key Terms**

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<b>ALL</b>	Alliance Party
<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>DP</b>	Democratic Party
<b>DUP</b>	Democratic Unionist Party
<b>FF</b>	Freedom Front
<b>IFP</b>	Inkatha Freedom Party
<b>INCORE</b>	Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity
<b>MLA</b>	Member of the Legislative Assembly
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>NIWC</b>	Northern Ireland Women's Coalition
<b>NNP</b>	New National Party
<b>NP</b>	National Party
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority
<b>PCC</b>	Palestinian Central Council
<b>PLO</b>	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
<b>PUP</b>	Progressive Unionist Party
<b>SDLP</b>	Social Democratic and Labour Party
<b>SF</b>	Sinn Fein
<b>UDM</b>	United Democratic Movement
<b>UDP</b>	Ulster Democratic Party
<b>UNU</b>	United Nations University
<b>UUP</b>	Ulster Unionist Party



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## **Executive Summary**

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### **Brief Background to the Research**

The contribution of political leaders in societies in transition is an obvious but little discussed phenomenon. As part of its programme of research into countries in transition, INCORE has addressed the issue of political leadership through the project *From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition*. From January 2000 to December 2000, the 'Protagonist to Pragmatist' project (funded by the Central Community Relations Unit and the Community Relations Council) focused on the changing nature and challenges facing political leaders in societies in transition. The research was comparative in nature in the hope that lessons learned from other jurisdictions could provide insights into the situation in Northern Ireland, and that the lessons learned from Northern Ireland would strike a chord elsewhere. Primary case studies focused on Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine. The specific research aims were to:

- (a) highlight the role that political leaders play
- (b) examine how leaders' roles change in societies in transition
- (c) analyse their adaptations, perceived problems and perspectives for the future.

A total of 25 interviews were conducted with senior political leaders in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Together these form the primary empirical data of the study, supplemented by many other informal discussions, media monitoring over the time period, and library based research. In April 2000, an opening conference was held in Parliament Buildings at Stormont in Northern Ireland to highlight some of the issues that the project would focus on. Political representatives from all of the major political parties within the Assembly attended the conference, which was officially sponsored by the First and Deputy First

Ministers of the Assembly, David Trimble MP, MLA and Seamus Mallon MP, MLA. Guest speakers from Israel and South Africa provided an international perspective. A second conference was held in November 2000 in conjunction with the United Nations University's International Leadership Academy in Amman, Jordan to further explore the issues at an international level.<sup>1</sup>

### **Why Leadership?**

While the main interest of the research was *political* leadership, INCORE is fully cognisant of the important role other leaders play in divided societies and societies in transition, whether they are cultural, religious, community or business leaders. However, political leadership is especially important because,

- 1) many political processes and peace processes are essentially elite driven, with a relatively small number of people responsible for making final decisions and implementing policy,<sup>2</sup>
- 2) many violent societies are prone to political leaders who are willing to manipulate a delicate situation, who do not necessarily behave in an altruistic fashion and who actively canvass against a peaceful settlement of conflict if such a settlement collides with their own interests,
- 3) many other variables are dependent on political leadership in the transformation of a conflict. For example, structural and issue transformations in a conflict can really only occur when promoted by the leadership of conflictual positions.

Based upon this rationale, the research sought to examine how political leadership has been directly related to the conflicts, the peace processes and the transitions in each of the three case studies.

### **Case Studies - An Overview of Findings**

**Northern Ireland** - In an overview of the peace process thus far, the question is whether the pragmatic attitudes, behaviours and

actions espoused by the political leadership in Northern Ireland through the Agreement will become reflected in more permanent pragmatic principles. To date, the research results show some contradictions. The ‘spirit’ of the Agreement with pragmatism at its core has, in many cases, been replaced by court cases, judicial reviews, and legal wranglings. This is more than just the nature of adversarial politics at work and does not reflect a concretisation of pragmatic principles among the leadership. Conversely though, a sense of pragmatism has continued to prevail in committees and on the Assembly Executive with individuals consistently seen as working across party lines rather than to their party agendas. The contradiction is only to be expected since the public persona rarely reflects the private in politics.

An analysis of political leadership in Northern Ireland shows that its main success during the peace process has been the 1998 Agreement. It has had numerous failings since then. A failure to manage expectations among constituents has contributed to the continuing unease with certain issues in the Agreement. A failure to recognise and acknowledge the changes that have taken place, both internally and on the part of others, has accentuated the problem of trust among the key players. Dealing with constituents and dealing with other party leaders are two key dimensions of leadership in this society as it transcends from violence to politics. Attention will need to be given to this to ensure that previous failings are not repeated.

**Israel/Palestine** - A number of conclusions have already been made about the relationship between political leadership and the stalling peace process in the region. Firstly, the views of the political leaders have not always corresponded with the views of the constituency when making agreements. Indeed, while the leaders were ready for agreement, constituents were sometimes not. The result has been that political leaders have found it increasingly difficult to mobilise support for the continuing process. Secondly, the political leadership has failed in conveying to its own constituency the significance of

the concessions made by the other side to date. Rather, each side has actually minimised the significance of the concessions made by the other. Thirdly, failing to understand the constituency and failing to convey the concessions made has played into the hands of anti-peace elites who have then manipulated the constituents for their own purposes.<sup>3</sup>

An analysis of the role of leadership in Israel/Palestine thus far suggests that the main success has been that the peace process has been on a continuum since Oslo, despite many setbacks. The pace of the process has been very varied but the process itself has always continued, albeit with changes in leadership on the Israeli side and increasing internal dissent on the Palestinian side. The key transformation has been that both sides did, in fact, recognise each other as legitimate partners for peace, and despite current tensions continue to work on the basis of that recognition. A failure to manage views of constituents has continued to hamper the process, and it will be a reworking of this vital issue which may hold the key to a successful implementation of the agreements made in the future.

**South Africa -** The initial pragmatic attitudes, behaviours and actions espoused by the political leadership in South Africa continue to be reflected. Some have argued that the transition from Mandela to Mbeki has been difficult and has changed the political dynamic in South Africa. Others have complained that the new government has been very quick to take on the bad habits of the old. In rationalising such despondence, one could argue that the ‘transition’ itself is essentially over and South Africa, as a state, is now facing the cold and hard realities of adversarial politics rather than a much hoped for ‘rainbow coalition’.

In a final analysis of political leadership in South Africa, a change in leadership was one of the main catalysts for reform. Had P.W Botha not fallen ill in 1989 and been succeeded by de Klerk, the apartheid system may have continued for at least another decade. The main success of political leadership has been with the cultivation

of relationships between some key players which led to the new constitutional arrangements.

What the future of political leadership in South Africa will be remains unknown. The existing opposition parties pose no real threat to the ANC's control of government nor are they likely to in the near future. The opposition's only option is to become masters of policy issues and mobilise people around such issues. However, it is certain that a fragmented opposition is a major weakness for South Africa's new situation.

### **Key Issues Emerging From Research**

Although the case studies of Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa present societies at different stages in their various transitions, there are a number of key issues which are common to all and which highlight the changing nature and challenges facing political leaders in such societies. Most of these were highlighted during research interviews with senior political leaders in the three regions. The research suggests that, unless dealt with adequately, these key issues may present potential pitfalls for transition processes.

- ***The use and abuse of political power:*** the use of political power and the sensitivities which surround the use of power are important issues. If a leader acts with an awareness of such sensitivities, and uses the new found political power to further the rights of all constituents, it suggests that the pragmatism of peace accords is upheld. When a leader fails to acknowledge the sensitivities of power and acts only in the interest of one or other community, it suggests that a change towards pragmatism may have occurred in principle only, and not in practice.
- ***Leading one's own party:*** a clear lesson that emerges from the case studies is that leadership skills are needed more *within* parties than between parties.<sup>4</sup> This is as important in the post-violent phase of the process as it is during the negotiations

themselves. Finding a definitive balance between ‘executive leadership’ and ‘collective leadership’ continues to prove difficult.

- ***Delivering constituents:*** while leadership skills are important within the parties they are also a vital part of dealing with one’s constituents. The concept of ‘elastic-band leadership’ perhaps explains this best. The leadership is expected to ‘stretch’ its constituents in the interests of peace, all the while remembering that if the elastic is stretched just a little too far there is always the danger of the elastic snapping. The subsequent dislocation between the leadership and constituents could have long term implications for the process, perhaps leaving the leadership without a mandate.
- ***Relating to other party leaders:*** some leaders acknowledged that political leadership in societies in transition ‘is like the poles of a wigwam – take one leader away and they all fall down’. Since leadership is dependent on others within the process, dealing with other party leaders in all case studies appears to have been a necessary but difficult task. Adding to such difficulties is the fact that most relationship building opportunities and peer-learning sessions between leaders either stop or suffer from a lack of coherence immediately after an agreement has been reached.
- ***Working with the civil service:*** the cultivation of relationships between the top echelons of the civil service and the political leadership is important. While the notion exists that the civil service will work under whatever political entity is agreed upon, there were fears within some political circles that the civil service would not want to relinquish the control which it had maintained over certain departments and areas.
- ***Imminent elections:*** leadership challenges, by-elections and votes of no-confidence are common in societies in transition.

They have a tendency to promote political inter-group tensions and even the threat of an election can force the leadership to take a less conciliatory approach than sometimes expected.

- **Realignment of party politics:** while this particular issue holds little importance in the early stages of the transition from violence to politics, it can take on more validity as the process continues. Nearly all of the political parties studied have been formed with policies and ideals based on the conflict and not on general social or economic issues. The leadership has to prepare itself for a possible realignment of party politics in the post violent phase of the process.
- **Dealing with change:** political change involves risks and leaders may be reticent to admit to changes in their own position lest it be interpreted as weakness among their core support. Leaders may also deny the changes undertaken by others. While change is a much less easily defined issue than some of the others, it is perhaps one of the most crucial.
- **Process management:** process management is an essential element of any agreement to ensure that the responsibilities, challenges, and relationships are not forgotten or damaged during crises. In reasoning why there have been transition difficulties, some have pointed to a lack of ‘process management’ at leadership level during crises.

## Key Recommendations

While it is ‘political’ with a small ‘p’ to focus on the success of a process and agreement, procedures and protocol also need to be put in place to help leaders cope with possible set backs, suspensions, and failures. The key issues mentioned in this research summary need to be taken into further consideration at the initial stages of any future peace processes. Consequently, policy recommendations relating to the key issues are suggested:

- ***Political power:*** maintaining a sense of balance when dealing with political power is necessary to preserve the process. An ‘Implementation Committee’ could be established as part of future or supplementary agreements to examine whether the implementation of disputed issues is in accordance with the initial agreement. The establishment of such a committee could prevent recourse to legal avenues.
- ***Leading the party:*** while trying to encourage opinion, argument, debate and discussion throughout the party, it is still important for the leadership to maintain control through some degree of ‘executive leadership’.
- ***Delivering constituents:*** the dislocation of leadership-constituent relations could be prevented through the active endorsement (where possible) of an open and transparent public consultative process. This would occur prior to and following formal negotiations to ensure that constituents are aware of the problem issues and concessions that may have to be made.
- ***Relating to other party leaders:*** crisis management protocol and the continuation if not acceleration of relationship building opportunities between leaders is vital in the post violent phase.
- ***Civil service:*** a programme of transition could be developed to promote a joint understanding of the civil service and its roles and structures for the political players, and vice-versa.
- ***Imminent elections:*** the possible destabilising influence of ‘electoral politics’ at critical junctures in a peace process should be recognised. With this in mind, by-elections and other local elections could, perhaps, be circumvented by a prior agreed policy of co-option or delay for a determined period of time following the initial agreement.

### **Some Conclusions**

- The key issues which the political leadership faces in the settlement phase, whether individually or collectively, have the potential to derail the process.
- An awareness of these issues and the potential problems which the leadership may face as the society moves from violence to politics may diminish the potential for derailment.
- Thus far, the leadership has tended to conduct a strategy of fire-fighting, dealing with problems as they arise, rather than engaging in any type of preventative strategy.
- There is a need for further research into how political power, party leadership, constituents, other party leaders, the civil service, elections, possible party realignment and the acknowledgment of change may impact on peace processes and settlements.

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## **1. Introduction**

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When a peace agreement is made in a divided society it is made between the political leaders of the various political parties within that society. While the general public may or may not endorse it, and while community groups, business groups, and civil society may claim that reaching agreement would have been impossible without them, it can be argued that the onus lies solely with the political leaders to formalise and implement an agreement. While much has been written about the role of civil society and peace processes, there has been little has been published about the important role of political leadership.

The contribution of political leaders is an obvious but little discussed phenomenon in societies in transition. As part of its programme of research<sup>5</sup> into countries in transition, INCORE has addressed the issue of political leadership through the project **From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition**.

From January 2000 to December 2000, the ‘Protagonist to Pragmatist’ project (funded by the Central Community Relations Unit and the Community Relations Council) focused on the changing nature and challenges facing political leaders in societies in transition. The research was comparative in nature in the hope that lessons learned from other jurisdictions could provide insights into the situation in Northern Ireland, and that the lessons learned from Northern Ireland would strike a chord elsewhere. Primary case studies focused on Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine. The specific research aims were to:

- (a) highlight the role that political leaders play
- (b) examine how leaders’ roles change in societies in transition
- (c) analyse their adaptations, perceived problems and perspectives for the future.

A total of 25 interviews were conducted with senior political leaders in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel and the Palestinian

Territories. Together these form the primary empirical data of the study, supplemented by many other informal discussions, media monitoring over the time period, and library based research. In April 2000, an opening conference was held in Parliament Buildings at Stormont in Northern Ireland to highlight some of the issues that the project would focus on. Political representatives from all of the major political parties within the Assembly attended the conference, which was officially sponsored by the First and Deputy First Ministers of the Assembly, David Trimble MP, MLA and Seamus Mallon MP, MLA. Guest speakers from Israel and South Africa provided an international perspective. A second conference was held in November 2000, in conjunction with the United Nations University's International Leadership Academy in Amman, Jordan to further explore the issues further at an international level.<sup>1</sup>

### **Why Leadership?**

While the main interest of the research was *political* leadership, INCORE was fully cognisant of the important role other leaders play in divided societies and societies in transition, whether they are cultural, religious, community or business leaders not least because ‘they can have a moderating effect on unwise political leaders’.<sup>8</sup> However, political leadership is especially important not least because,

- (a) many political processes and peace processes are essentially elite driven, with a relatively small number of people responsible for making final decisions and implementing policy,<sup>9</sup>
- (b) many violent societies are prone to political leaders who are willing to manipulate a delicate situation, who do not necessarily behave in an altruistic fashion and who actively canvass against a peaceful settlement of conflict if such a settlement collides with their own interests, and
- (c) many other variables are dependent on political leadership in the transformation of a conflict. For example, structural and issue transformations in a conflict can really only occur when promoted by the leadership of conflictual positions.

Based upon this rationale, the research sought to examine how political leadership has been directly related to the conflicts, the peace processes and the transitions in the three case studies.

### **Why ‘From Protagonist to Pragmatist’ ?**

To place the concepts of protagonism and pragmatism in a context, Crick (1990) argues that normal politics breaks down when the political protagonists begin to pursue policies that contain no element of compromise or conciliation and which appear to be ‘totally exclusive and mutually contradictory’.<sup>10</sup> This pursuit creates the context for a divided and often violent society. When leaders continue to pursue ‘protagonistic’ roles in such societies, they tend to cause and entrench further divisions. When they begin to focus on action for general needs, they can run the risk of losing the support of their own constituency, and thus their power base. In other words, once ‘normal politics’ has become fractured and political protagonism becomes the norm, the political leaders of divided societies appear to exacerbate the societal problems rather than help to resolve them.

During such periods, those who have attempted to become more moderate or more pragmatic in their outlook and opinions have often failed. The contradiction is that it is this very ‘sense’ of moderation that is needed in abundance in peace processes. Therefore, the political leaders in divided societies who advocate a peaceful settlement to disputes are required to play a delicate balancing act between the need for moderation, and the need to simultaneously retain the support of their communities. Pragmatism stems from such an act.

The question remains, as to whether such pragmatism can become a ‘long-term’ trait of political leadership as societies move beyond peace processes towards settlement. Reflecting on the perceived behaviour of relevant political leaders, analysing changes from pre to post settlement periods and reviewing how such changes can lead to other challenges may illustrate such shifts between protagonism and pragmatism. Ultimately, this can only serve to provide a better understanding of those now holding political power.

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## **2. The Study of Political Leadership**

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*“In sum, the importance that one attaches to individual leadership in the analysis of political development depends on one’s perspective. In so far as it is thought to matter at all, the question is not whether but how much such leadership makes a difference.”<sup>11</sup>*

Current scholarship on ‘political leadership’ does not focus on any of the questions which this research is interested in. Most literature focuses heavily on individual leaders, and specific periods of history. There are a few studies that have moved from the particular towards the general in the analysis of political leadership, but these tend to be too narrow in their focus. Nonetheless authors such as Jean Blondel, in *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis* (1987), Barbara Kellerman, in *Political leadership: A Source Book* (1986), Bryan.D.Jones, in *Leadership and Politics: New Perspectives in Political Science* (1989), and Gabriel Sheffer who edited *Innovative Leadership in International Politics* (1993) present a strong theoretical background for the research. Current research on conflicts and contemporary conflict resolution do offer some insights into the role of political leadership in conflicts and in societies in transition.<sup>12</sup> At most, however, political leadership is referred to in scant detail, as one of the many variables at play when deciphering why conflicts, escalate, de-escalate, and transform.

### **Political Leadership and Conflict**

While the literature is quite weak in detailing the role played by elites and leaders in instigating violence, there is at least one model in the literature which defines the relationship between political leadership and conflict. Known as the ‘warrior’ model of leadership<sup>13</sup>, it describes those involved in conflict and pre-settlement periods both inside and outside of the political infrastructure. Despite being based on concepts of military leadership, many of the central principles are used by those in non-military positions of leadership, and most are applicable to the leadership styles shown in divided societies. Principles of this

‘warrior’ model are based on a) conflict and overcoming the opposition, b) information control, c) results being more important than the methods used to achieve them, d) knowing the people with whom the leaders seek to lead or defeat, e) choosing battles carefully, and f) the use of intermediaries as buffers. Case study analysis indicates that such ‘warrior’ principles are not exclusively affiliated to leadership and conflict. Many leaders have continued to illustrate such characteristics during peace processes and ensuing settlements.

### **Political Leadership and Conflict Management<sup>14</sup>**

Much of the early conflict related literature focused on the *containment* or the *management* of conflict within societies. Nordlinger’s (1972) work on conflict regulation in divided societies paid much attention to the ‘critical role of conflict group leaders’ in the conflict regulation context<sup>15</sup> and argued that in the conflict regulating practices noted, it was the leaders who took the initiative in working out the practices and implementing them. He commented that ‘...it is obvious that they, and they alone, were in a position to do so. Clearly the conflict group members (or non-elites) are too numerous, too scattered, too fragmented, too weak, and too unskilled to be able to work out and operate any of the six conflict-regulating practices’.<sup>16</sup>

Nordlinger acknowledged though, that leaders need a motive to regulate conflict, and emphasised four rationales – an external threat or danger that would submerge internal conflicts, the belief that intense conflict and its actual or possible consequences would detract from the economic well being of leaders, segment or conflict group, the acquisition or retention of political power and avoidance of bloodshed and suffering within their own communities<sup>17</sup> - as the rationale for leadership intervention.

However, Nordlinger also noted that taking risks to regulate a conflict instead of letting it smoulder could weaken the position of the leaders if their attempts failed thereby explaining the likelihood for leaders to fall onto their hard-line positions.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, he concluded

that '*the presence of conflict-regulating motives, in combination with conciliatory attitudes and the top leaders' political security constitutes a sufficient explanation for elite conflict-regulating behavior*'.<sup>19</sup>

### **Political Leadership and Conflict Transformation**<sup>20</sup>

Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) see the transformation of a conflict through a five point generic framework which includes a context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation and personal and group transformation. Actor transformation can come about through '*a change of character, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader or adoption of its goals, values, or beliefs*'.<sup>21</sup>

While their overall argument is that leadership change is just one of a series of changes that need to occur in order for conflicts to successfully transform from violence to non-violence, the authors of the framework readily recognise that it is actor transformation, and the role of the actors (i.e. the political leadership) that impinges directly onto the other various transformations. They argue that '*changes of position are closely related to changes of interest and changes of goals, and hence to actor transformation, and also to the context and structure of the conflict*'.<sup>22</sup>

Take, for example, a structural transformation which denotes possible change in the relationship between the dominant and weaker parties. This relationship is obviously affected by the leadership in power at the time. Indeed, the relationship changes *only* as a direct result of the behaviours and interactions of the party leaders. The same concept can be implied to issue transformations. When parties change their positions or when issues lose their salience, the transformation can only come into effect with the support, if not the direct input and guidance of the party leadership.

## **Political Leadership and Political Agreements**

In focusing on the reality of making agreement between conflicting sides, Waterman (1993) argues that expectations will have to be disappointed, leaders will have to climb down from the heights of earlier rhetoric and coalition members will have to be satisfied. Reasonable concerns for the minimum conditions of the losers will run up against the anger and fears of the winners. Aggravated by the conflict now ending, each of the parties to an agreement will have to satisfy a constituency, but each will have to make a deal less favourable than at least part of that constituency will want to accept. The leader has, however, to make a deal, and has to be willing and able to insulate himself or herself from the repercussions.<sup>23</sup>

Rothstein (1999) maintains that if both sides have strong leadership then agreements are more likely to survive, but may take a while to get off the ground because views of the masses and extremists tend to lag behind leaders' views on the need to compromise. '*Moreover, even if the leaders arrive at a settlement, it may be inherently unstable because one or both leaders may have to oversell what has been achieved, promise that ultimate goals have not been sacrificed, and read too much between the lines, thus guaranteeing disappointed expectations and escalation frustrations - especially if external promises of aid do not materialise or are badly used as happened in the West Bank and Gaza after the Oslo Agreements*'.<sup>24</sup>

If both sides have weak leadership which is unsure of its power base then making agreements becomes less likely. Both will be happy to maintain the conflict status quo, because they will lose nothing. Both will agree to the concepts of peace processes in theory because it shows some kind of movement on their part, but don't agree with peace agreements per se because it could require significant concessions down the road. As Rothstein notes, '*...this scenario of weak leaders confronting weak leaders is something of a paradigm for protracted conflict, and breaking out of its constraints may be a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for peace*'.<sup>25</sup>

One relatively weak and one relatively strong leader may require mediation by an outsider influence since the weak leader will not want to negotiate a peace agreement from weakness, and the strong leader may not feel the need to make any concessions in such negotiations.

In his conclusions he says that all of the academics will agree that the politics of accommodation is the only way forward for these leaders. Mandela and de Klerk succeeded, Arafat and Netanyahu didn't. However, the main variable that will need to be considered is whether '*the elites within a community and between two communities are deeply divided, or whether their views are converging and compatible. Sharp elite divisions within a community imply that policy proposals become political footballs, and that compromise with external enemies becomes increasingly difficult because dissenting elites will threaten to undermine agreements and arouse domestic constituencies against any compromise, any “sell-out”*'. The point which he makes is that the way that policy is implemented in the post agreement period will be determined by the degree of internal and external elite consensus.

Finally, Darby and MacGinty (2000) argue that 'during peace negotiations the primary function of leaders is to deliver their own people'. Assisting their opponents in the process becomes secondary since the potential loss of their followers is, almost certainly, a greater threat to party leaders than the collapse of the process.<sup>26</sup>

## 2. Summary of Key Points

- Political leadership risk-taking can seriously undermine and weaken the position of a leader should an initiative fail. This explains the common reluctance to take risks for peace in divided societies. (Nordlinger, 1972)
- Nonetheless, the transformation of conflict is directly relational to the transformation of the actors involved. Such transformations may take the form of '*a change of character, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader or adoption of its goals, values, or beliefs*'. (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999)
- Societies with strong leadership on both sides are more likely to make agreement which will be sustainable. (Rothstein, 1999)
- Societies with weak leadership on both sides are more likely to continue to maintain the status quo within their society since their own political positions continue to be assured. (Rothstein, 1999)
- Societies with strong leadership on one side and weak leadership on the other will probably need intervention by strong outside influences, since weak leadership will not want to negotiate from a position of weakness, and strong leadership may be unwilling to make concessions. (Rothstein, 1999)
- Internal and external elite consensus is necessary to prevent issues from becoming political footballs. (Rothstein, 1999)
- The primary function of leaders has been to deliver their own constituents. Assisting opponents has only been secondary to this. (Darby & MacGinty, 2000)

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### **3. ‘From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition’ Project Details**

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#### **Background and Aims**

‘From Protagonist to Pragmatist: Political Leadership in Societies in Transition’ set out to explore and understand the transformation of political leadership in societies in transition. It focused on the *development* of political leadership in societies that are moving away from a history of violence toward that of politics, and sought to analyse their adaptation to power, and problems and perspectives for the future. Through the research, the project aimed to highlight the role that political leaders play in countries moving from situations of intense violence, to countries undergoing the pains of reconciliation and confidence building. The main objective, as well as providing a valuable insight into the thinking and rationale behind the individuals charged with running political affairs was to provide policy makers and practitioners with the insights needed to deal with political leaders on a day to day basis. For those societies who have not yet taken ‘the road less travelled’ and embarked on a process of peace making and building, it was also intended to act as an indicator of what to expect from their parties, politicians, and leaders.

#### **The Approach**

Using political autobiography as a main research method, a total of 25 interviews were conducted with senior political leaders in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories and these form the primary empirical data of the study. They took place from January 2000 - December 2000. Field research was conducted in Israel/Palestine in July 2000 for a period of two weeks, and in South Africa in September 2000 for ten days.

<b>Table 1: Participating Parties in Research</b>		
<u>Northern Ireland</u>	<u>South Africa</u>	<u>Israel/Palestine<sup>27</sup></u>
Ulster Unionist Party ( <i>UUP</i> )	African National Congress ( <i>ANC</i> )	Labour
Social Democratic and Labour Party ( <i>SDLP</i> )	Inkatha Freedom Party ( <i>IFP</i> )	Meretz
Democratic Unionist Party ( <i>DUP</i> )	New National Party ( <i>NNP</i> )	Fateh
Sinn Fein ( <i>SF</i> )	Democratic Party ( <i>DP</i> )	Independents
Alliance Party ( <i>ALL</i> )	United Democratic Party ( <i>UDM</i> )	
Progressive Unionist Party ( <i>PUP</i> )	Freedom Front ( <i>FF</i> )	
Women's Coalition ( <i>NIWC</i> )		

It was agreed that all interviews given would be on an anonymous basis to allow those interviewed to speak more freely about sensitive issues. The interviews were open-ended as opposed to structured as this allowed for the interviewees to express their ideas, thoughts, and memories in their own words (Robson 1993).<sup>28</sup> The interviews were supplemented by many other informal discussions with those involved in the political process, along with consistent monitoring of the media over the time period and library based research. The interview material was thematically analysed and is defined in the following section. An opening conference was held April 2000, in Parliament Buildings at Stormont in Northern Ireland, to highlight some of the issues that the project would focus on. It was attended by more than 60 delegates, which included representatives of all the major political parties within the Assembly, and was jointly sponsored by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, David Trimble MP, MLA, and Seamus Mallon, MP, MLA. Guest speakers from Israel and South Africa provided an international perspective.<sup>29</sup> A second conference was held in November 2000 in conjunction with the United Nations University's International Leadership Academy in Amman, Jordan to explore the issues further at

international level.<sup>30</sup> It was attended by four young political leaders from Northern Ireland, representing the UUP, SDLP, SF and PUP. Young political leaders from South Africa, Indonesia/East Timor, and Jordan were also in attendance. Political tensions in Israel/Palestine at the time prevented the Israeli and Palestinian participants from attending.

### **Research Themes**

Rather than examine a specific number of themes defined prior to the field work, it was agreed that the themes should be allowed to emerge during the course of the project. However, from the literature review a number of key questions were identified which guided the structure of the interviews and subsequent analysis:

- How far removed from original political objectives is the politician?
- How have political leaders coped with the practicality of moving from a society of ‘armed revolution’ to one of ‘bureaucratic behaviour’?
- How have leaders maintained the support of their ‘hard-liners’ while simultaneously having to move into a more central location during transition?
- How has the international experience, in terms of study visits and peer learning exercises affected styles of leadership?
- Were there any quantifiable differences between political leaders in societies in transitions and other less fragmented societies?
- Did successful transition processes require a change in political leadership?
- Were the leaders securing the peace by what they did in the political arena? Did any try to make it unstable?

- How have the political leaders dealt with the changes afoot?

The interview material, in some instances, did not provide direct answers to the questions. The answers to many of these questions emerged as a series of key issues which the political leaders still have to contend with as the societies move in transition. These key issues have been highlighted in the individual case studies, and in collective analysis. A series of related recommendations has been prepared which may be useful for other societies engaged in peace processes.

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## **4. Case Studies - Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa**

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### **(a) Northern Ireland**

In 1998 the British and Irish governments signed up to the Good Friday Agreement, an agreement endorsed by the majority of political parties in Northern Ireland. The Agreement was the result of a prolonged peace process, in a formal capacity from 1996-1998 but with its origins dating back to the 1980's. During this period many of the key political actors involved in the Northern Ireland conflict engaged in a re-assessment of their positions, policies and preferences. In practical terms it meant that republicans devised a 'totally unarmed strategy' (TUAS), and that unionists decided to re-engage in politics after a period of abstentionism following the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, and to accept the involvement of political extremes in such engagement. Other important actors, both militant and civic, re-assessed their own positions and also entered the political arena.<sup>31</sup>

Crucially, such a re-assessment of position, policies and preferences did not require a change of leadership in Northern Ireland. Political leadership, in terms of individual leaders, remained mostly consistent during this re-assessment period. Of the current four largest parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (SF), the leadership of the latter three has remained unchanged for nearly twenty years. The fact that some of the key players have remained the same and yet the political situation has dramatically changed is highly significant. The question is, what has allowed the political changes to take place, if it has not been a significant change of leadership within the main parties?

An examination of the transition of political leadership from 1921 until the post Good Friday Agreement period underscores the argument that leadership was indeed a central component of the conflict, the peace process and the eventual settlement in Northern

Ireland. Defining the causes of this conflict has been the subject of much research over the last thirty years. For the most part, it has been attributed to a complex construct of identity, religious, economic and social factors. An addition to this complex construct could be political leadership itself. The transition of the conflict has been attributed to a series of environmental and structural changes and it could be argued that the same political leadership which was so central to the perpetuation of the conflict, became a driving force in creating the environmental and structural changes needed which led to the peace process and eventual agreement. Yet one can ask, how exactly did a society with many of the same political leaders in place from the 1970's and 1980's come to make a peaceful agreement in the 1990's? How did these 'political protagonists'<sup>32</sup> of the 1970's and 1980's become the 'political pragmatists' of the 1990's? Furthermore, has the pragmatic behaviour espoused by the political leadership in Northern Ireland through the agreement become reflected in more permanent pragmatic principles? What are the issues and challenges which face Northern Ireland's political leadership as it comes to terms with the new political entity which now exists?

### **Traditional Culture of Leadership**

Arthur (1990 & 1999) lists four primary characteristics of political leadership in Northern Ireland to define the period from 1921 to 1972 – intimidatory, under-developed, factional and demotic. Each contributing characteristic played its own part in the conflict. Political under-development stemmed from a controlled political system with one party rule, reliance on external guarantors during crisis and a fatalistic outlook.<sup>33</sup> The result of such under-development at a leadership level led to an inability to negotiate. An inability to negotiate led to a perpetuation of the conflict. Factionalism was rife both between and within the two main communities. Broadly speaking, nationalists were represented by political leaders who advocated a constitutional solution to the problems and those who advocated a military solution. Unionists were divided among various religious groupings and on their views of what a constitutional solution might entail. The implication of

this, argued Arthur, quoting Cynthia Enloe, was that each community was unable to put forward leaders that were wholly representative of their communities' viewpoints.<sup>34</sup> The demotic nature of Northern Ireland, whereby power was said to emanate from bottom up, rather than top down had an additional impact on the conflict. '*Political leadership has been lacking and politicians have taken their lead from their perception of how much the market will bear. This has led to an absence of risk taking and the promotion of procrastination*'.<sup>35</sup>

### **Conflict and the Culture of Leadership**

The more recent political period in Northern Ireland from the late 1960's and early 1970's until the beginnings of the peace process illustrated at least four other specific traits that have been noted about leadership. In addition to the intimidatory, under-developed, factional and demotic nature of leadership, a culture of leaders emerged which lacked formal power and authority, was heavily reliant on outside influences, rarely changed its leadership personnel and was as a profession, viewed with growing disdain.

Firstly, from 1972 until 1998, political leadership generally lacked the formal power or authority to actually do things in Northern Ireland. Of course there are a number of notable exceptions to this generalisation in the direct rule period since 1972. In 1974, there was a period of five months when the main constitutional parties were part of a new Executive set up to rule Northern Ireland, and in 1982 another Assembly was established, on the premise that power could be devolved to it on a gradual basis. However, the SDLP would not participate in the 1982 Assembly. Power was not devolved, and the Assembly was then closed in 1986. With the exception of those five months in 1974, power had essentially eluded the political leaders.

In explaining the implications of this, Hazelton (1995) contended that '*...Northern Ireland's politicians, regardless of party, can support any cause their constituents demand. They are not forced to consider*

*options, make hard decisions, or weigh financial implications; all of that is largely done for them by ministries and quangos' whose budgets dwarf those of local councils. Direct rule has created a system where elected officials promote grievances, be they of local constituents, or those of the unionist and nationalist communities'.<sup>36</sup>* Kellerman (1984) pointed out that '*ordinary political leadership*' (author's emphasis) refers to control over public policy decisions. Political leaders derive their authority from the fact that they occupy high office in a legally sanctioned government, which by virtue of its legitimacy, has the power and authority to choose between alternative goals and courses of action'.<sup>37</sup> The logic then follows that it was a case of '*extraordinary political leadership*' which existed in Northern Ireland, since control over public policy decision making was generally lacking among key political players.

Secondly, this lack of power or authority outside of their own party structures, led the leadership to become highly dependent on external/outside influences, as a way of gaining further legitimacy for their various political positions. For example, the nationalist community courted the Irish-American constituency from the 1970's. John Hume may not have wielded much formal power in Northern Ireland, but in the corridors of Washington, he was seen as something of a icon. Consequently, the dependency on others allowed the leadership to further abdicate responsibility on certain issues and problems.

Thirdly, since the leadership had abdicated much of its civic and political responsibility through its reliance on outsider influences, the leadership personnel did not seem to change very often, and if it did, the changes were rarely radical.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, by claiming that most political events were beyond their control the leadership further assured their own party positions since the electorate would be less likely to oust a leader who hadn't been perceived to be culpable of any wrongdoing.

Finally, politics in Northern Ireland became viewed with such disrespect over the last thirty years, that many capable potential

leaders had shunned participation in public life thus significantly diminishing the likelihood of having strong dynamic leaders in position, capable of resolving a conflict.<sup>39</sup> The ‘brain-drain’ of young, educated and dynamic leaders-types to England and the US further compounded this problem.

Perhaps inadvertently, it was a combination of cultural leadership intimidation, under-development, factionalisms and despotis that concretised the sense of protagonism which existed for much of the conflict in Northern Ireland., This was augmented in the latter years by a lack of power, heavy reliance on ‘external influences’, a stagnant leadership and widespread disdain of the political process at leadership level This sense of protagonism manifested itself in a perpetuation of the conflict from 1921 and for much of the 1970’s and 80’s. A pragmatic shift of the entire leadership culture in Northern Ireland was necessary to change such sentiments, and while such a shift did eventually take place, it did not occur overnight.

### **Changes in Leadership through the Peace Process**

A shift in leadership traits and characteristics can be traced back to the mid to late 1980’s, to the point when the key actors were engaged in a re-assessment of their positions, policies and preferences. Five key shifts can be noted.

Firstly, since power had eluded many of the key political players in the conflict, the concept of political power became used as a carrot with which to engage these players. The Hume–Adams dialogue examined the ‘efficacy of constitutional politics’.<sup>40</sup> The British and Irish government outlined one of their objectives in the peace process as being ‘*to return greater power, authority and responsibility to all the Northern Ireland people*’.<sup>41</sup> As the process developed, political leadership became re-defined as a leadership with a desire to hold power.

Secondly, the external influences upon which the leadership had been so heavily reliant applied their influence in a distinctly positive way by encouraging and facilitating training programmes and

relationship building sessions, both in Northern Ireland and abroad. The impact of a series of peer learning sessions, tailored to bring the politicians together and learn from each others experiences, while difficult to quantify, did play its part in furthering the process.<sup>42</sup> The role of the US, and in particular Bill Clinton and George Mitchell in the years from 1995-1998, the multiple visits by the parties to South Africa, and the frequency of visits to Northern Ireland from South African counter-parts and others, have been well documented. Political leadership became articulate in the knowledge and experience of best and worst practice from other case studies.

Thirdly, the issue of stagnant leadership within the parties became less of a dilemma since one of the key themes to emerge from the training sessions mentioned above was that the political leader of a party should not necessarily become the key negotiator in any future processes.<sup>43</sup> So while the political leadership in terms of the head of the political parties may have remained unchanged, the role of others within the leadership strata took on more resonance. Political leadership became more broadly defined, and more inclusive. The leadership was no longer equated with one particular party leader.

Fourthly, the previously parochial nature of politics and leadership was overturned with the emergence of a number of new actors into the process. The arrival of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) onto the political scene brought a new dimension to the process, and may have been one of the most influential catalysts for change - reference to the PUP, one leading Northern Ireland politician said, 'When that voice came to the table in terms of having read widely, having studied the situation, and having engaged with other people, they came to the table with a different analysis, and they were very courageous individuals because they were contesting their own tribe, and that's a real sign of a leader'.<sup>44</sup> Political leadership was no longer seen as a 'closed shop' with select membership and selective representation. All constituents were now represented by leaders.

Finally, politics and political leadership in Northern Ireland began to be seen less with disdain. Formal recognition of some political leaders by the US, as was the case with Gerry Adams and the granting of his American visa in 1994, and through incidents at home such as the infamous hand shake between Adams and the President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, were indicative of such changes. The increase in popularity of the annual St. Patrick's Day event at the White House meant that more politicians, of both unionist and nationalist traditions, were spotted in the US than in Belfast at that time. Politics and leadership slowly became a profession which more people began to embrace.

It was a combination of these slight shifts, that is a leadership with a desire to hold power, a leadership articulate in the knowledge and experience of best and worst practice from other countries, the widening of the leadership strata to include more people at the top including the voices of women and ex-political prisoners, and the internationalisation of the situation in Northern Ireland which changed the image of politics itself. These factors that created a sense of pragmatism among the key players in the conflict, a sense of pragmatism which allowed for rapidly changing policies within the parties and ultimately, acceptance of the Agreement.

### **Political Leadership and the Agreement**

These developments are interesting given the nature of the Agreement and the manner in which it had been formulated. The April 1998 Agreement had been devised, almost in totality, by the British and Irish Governments. It was not an internal agreement. Rather, it was presented under the guise of a document prepared by Senator George Mitchell, the Chairperson of the Talks Process from 1996-1998. It took much work on the part of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, in the final 48 hours of negotiations to encourage the political leadership in Northern Ireland to accept the document. Not only was the role of the British and Irish governments central to the success of the process, but numerous phone-calls from President Clinton to the

British and Irish leaders and the leaders of all the political parties in Northern Ireland at this crucial stage, was also seen as pivotal.

The May 1998 Referendum, to gauge public support for the Agreement, was reckoned as the appropriate time for the political leadership of Northern Ireland to retake ownership of the ongoing process and to begin to ‘internalise’ it. However, due to much internal wrangling within some of the pro-agreement parties such an internalisation did not take place. The political leadership of Northern Ireland could not convince the collective electorate to vote ‘yes’ in the Referendum, such were their own divisions. Fearful that the Referendum would not show the support of the Agreement needed to continue, alternative forces came to the fore in appealing to the population to vote ‘yes’. Much like the Agreement itself, the Referendum became less and less an ‘internal political process’.

The voluntary sector devised a ‘Yes Campaign’ to drum up the interest and support that the political leaders seemed unable to deliver alone. Launched in April 1998 just four weeks prior to the referendum itself, the campaign had hoped that the various political parties would come on board with the campaign and collectively endorse it. This proved not to be the case.<sup>45</sup> The pro-agreement political parties, for the most part, tried to convince only their own constituents of the need for peace. They did little to reach across the political spectrum and rarely appeared on collective panels. In fact, it took the Irish rock band, U2, to bring the leaders of the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP together in their first joint appeal for a ‘yes’ vote, a mere three days before the decisive vote.<sup>46</sup> The British Prime Minister made a number of visits to Northern Ireland, during which time he made written pledges in a final attempt to convince those unionist voters still undecided.<sup>47</sup> He did much to strengthen Trimble’s appeal to the undecided unionist electorate, making reference to his skill as a political leader and speculating that he ‘...*has shown the courage, tenacity and leadership that has been missing from the politics of Northern Ireland for so long*’.<sup>48</sup> Ultimately, it appeared that the Referendum outcome of 71.12% in favour of the

Agreement owed as much to U2, the ‘Yes Campaign’, the British and Irish Prime Ministers as it did to the work of the local political leadership.

The Referendum was quickly followed with preparations for the June 1998 Assembly election. It was this election which heralded the first and only truly internal process during the short period from the initial Agreement. However, as is the nature of most elections, the various campaigns did little more than push the leadership back into the arms of their respective parties, and catapulted the adversarial nature of politics back to centre-stage. The newly found ‘consensus’ between the parties was absent once again. Ironically, despite the fact that the majority of the political parties in Northern Ireland were campaigning for Assembly seats on a pro-agreement ticket, voters were not generally encouraged by their parties to transfer their votes across sectarian boundaries in favour of other pro-agreement parties, after initially voting for the preferred candidate of their choice.<sup>49</sup> Such an adversarial approach to the elections was in direct contrast to the supposed ‘spirit of partnership’ within the Agreement. In strictly analytical terms, such an approach may have contributed to the total number of anti-agreement seats within the Assembly, given that the transfer system of voting was not used to its fullest potential by some of the pro-agreement parties. The first truly internal process since the initial Agreement did little to inspire confidence in the future, since it continued to conform to the usual tribal politics.

The lack of confidence was well-founded. The establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in the post election period was systematically hampered by issues of implementation. The Assembly Shadow Executive was not established until one year later in July 1999, and it lasted only minutes. July 15<sup>th</sup> was dubbed ‘Blair’s absolute deadline’ when the D’Hondt Process had to be implemented in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Unhappy about various issues of implementation, David Trimble and his party did not turn up to the Assembly on that day, hence they did not take up their ministerial

positions. The DUP refused to elect anyone, as did the Alliance, and the UKUP. This effectively meant that the Executive would be a nationalist-republican Executive, unacceptable and unworkable under the terms of the Agreement. Consequently, the Assembly had to be immediately suspended.

Concerns about the deterioration of the process led to calls for Senator George Mitchell to return to Northern Ireland to conduct a review of the Agreement. The ‘internal process’ of working through the Agreement was fraught with difficulties. The local political leadership could see no path through the impasse, and were keen to reintroduce the external influences so pivotal in the initial talks process. The Mitchell Review began in September 1999, with Mitchell vowing to stay no longer than three weeks. The Review eventually wound up after eleven weeks, producing a package which would lead to both the establishment of an Assembly Executive and arms decommissioning, thereby stymieing the implementation fears of both the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein. The Assembly finally elected its Executive on 29th November 1999 in less than an hour, 601 days after the initial Agreement.<sup>50</sup> With so much influence wielded on the entire process by exogenous influences, concerns were justified in wondering how the local leadership would and could conduct itself in this new era. Was it capable of facing up to the changes and challenges afoot?

### **Political Leadership Beyond the Agreement**

Perhaps one of the most important questions in this case study is whether the pragmatic behaviour espoused by many during the peace process and through the Agreement has led to a concretisation of such behaviour and has become reflected in more permanent pragmatic principles. As one senior leader suggested ‘...we had the Agreement and the legislation which provided certain things but there is a big difference between the physics of something and the sort of chemistry that you need in politics....’<sup>51</sup>

Since the signing of the Agreement in 1998, and the establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999 much has changed in the political landscape of Northern Ireland. Political power has been devolved, suspended and again devolved from Westminster to Stormont. Previous political adversaries share regular coffee mornings.<sup>52</sup> Sinn Fein and the DUP sit together on Assembly Committees. Informal coalitions between pro and anti agreement parties have been established. Such examples are representative of a shift from the old to the new. Such a transformation in behaviour by political leaders is typical according to one generic framework which details the transformers of a conflict<sup>53</sup> and argues that '*...parties may have to redefine directions, abandon modest or cherished goals and adopt radically different perspectives. This may come about through a change of actor, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader or adoption of new goals, values or beliefs*'.<sup>54</sup> However, transformations of such magnitude are not without their own problems.

### **Individual Party Changes and Challenges**

It is not uncommon to hear of potential leadership challenges, resignations, defections, internal party strife, internal criticisms, and external manipulation as societies move from violence toward politics. Northern Ireland has been no exception to this. For example, since the signing of the Agreement, David Trimble has been formally challenged in a leadership contest on two occasions. Seamus Mallon resigned from his position as Deputy First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly in July 1999 (although was later re-instated to his position). Internal party strife was played out in a public forum for the SDLP with Eddie McGrady's refusal to accept a Ministerial position in 1999. Internal criticisms were regular and consistent within the Ulster Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Council, particularly of David Trimble, with a significant number of his own party actively campaigning and canvassing against him. During the course of the research, interviewee's discussed openly the challenges facing themselves, as well as the challenges facing others.

### **The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)**

*“Leading the Ulster Unionist Party is the hardest job in British politics” said Mr. Taylor who came second to Mr. Trimble in the 1995 leadership context. “I actually felt a weight lifted off my shoulders when I lost. Anyone who wants to be leader needs their head examined....’<sup>55</sup>*

The Ulster Unionist Party has been exposed to a series of leadership crises since Jeffrey Donaldson’s exit from Castle Buildings minutes before the Agreement went public. From that time David Trimble has been confronted with a succession of direct and indirect challenges to his leadership. Of most significance, was the direct leadership challenge against Trimble by Martin Smyth in March 2000. Seen by many in Northern Ireland’s political scene as a ‘stalking horse’, his challenge was never expected to have the outcome of unseating David Trimble. While the political analysts were proved right, and David Trimble did retain the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party, his contender polled much better than was expected. Trimble’s 56.8% to Smyth’s 43.2% share of the Council votes was evidence enough of the serious discontent within the Council at how Trimble had handled the process and gave substantial credence to the arguments that there were significant weaknesses within the party’s leadership. The Ulster Unionist Council has continued to act as a force to contend with for the leadership of the UUP. Since the Agreement the Council has convened no less than six times,<sup>56</sup> prompting speculation each time about other possible leadership challenges. Maintaining pro-agreement support among the leadership strata of the party has continued to prove difficult. More than half of Trimble’s Westminster MP’s have declared themselves anti-agreement and some have called for his resignation. Two key members of the pro-agreement leadership team, Ken Maginnis MP and John Taylor MP, have already made it clear that they will not stand for re-election in the next general election. Losing key political players in such unstable times continues to be difficult. Dealing with his Assembly MLAs has proved no less difficult - the April 2000 resignation of the Chief Assembly Whip of the party being a case in point.<sup>57</sup>

### The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

Unlike David Trimble, John Hume's leadership has not been formally challenged. Despite this, the SDLP have still had to deal with some issues similar to those faced in the UUP. Criticisms of the leadership have come from within the party, if not in word then at least in deed. This internal party wrangling was at its most explicit in July 1999 when Eddie McGrady refused to accept the position of Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, after being publicly nominated by John Hume.<sup>58</sup> Other party leadership relationships are also known to be fraught. The relationship between John Hume and Seamus Mallon is said to be somewhat similar to Mallon and Trimble's - they tend to rise above their differences to get the work done. Questions surrounding the future leadership of the party have begun to arise. John Hume has already stepped down from his Assembly position and there is speculation that he may not contest his Westminster seat in the next election. Analysts are wondering if he will step down from the leadership of the party as well, and if so, who will follow - Seamus Mallon or Mark Durkan?<sup>59</sup> It has been claimed by the media that the SDLP will be confronted with its biggest challenge yet, if the party loses votes to Sinn Féin in the next election.<sup>60</sup> The pragmatism of John Hume in wanting to bring Sinn Féin along in the peace process could well have been a costly strategy, since it has been argued that it may no longer be the largest nationalist party in the North, after the next elections.<sup>61</sup> While it may be argued that this is little more than futuristic speculation, it has not gone unnoticed within the party.

### The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

As the main anti-agreement party of the Northern Ireland Assembly the DUP often present a wholly uncompromising position. However, the leadership of the party faces the difficulty of maintaining an effective anti-agreement campaign and strategy while at the same time acting within the confines of an Assembly to which they are opposed. They have articulated that they are only in the business of being in opposition, yet have accepted the ministerial positions to which they are entitled, leading their detractors to conclude that

they are indeed working *within* the system and *for* the system. They have argued that they will not have any contacts nor dealings with Sinn Fein, yet the Hansard minutes of the Assembly meetings detail how DUP members do indeed sit on a variety of committees with Sinn Fein. Claims have been made by the Ulster Unionists that the DUP are guilty of ‘double-standards’ since it had attended at least 181 committee meetings with Sinn Fein, while not sitting in on the Assembly Executive meetings. The challenge for the DUP continues to be how to reconcile their uncompromising claims with their more concessionary practices.

#### Sinn Fein (SF)

Three developing ‘issues’ characterise the crux of the Sinn Fein leadership’s challenges - firstly the opening of a Republican Sinn Fein office in the heart of West Belfast, traditionally a provisional Sinn Fein stronghold; secondly, the growing criticisms of the Republican movement, including Sinn Fein, which has come from within Republican quarters and finally a boisterous rank and file. Accusations from Republican Sinn Fein that Sinn Fein has ‘betrayed’ its constituency and ‘sold out’ through the Agreement were only to be expected. Initially, Sinn Fein did not seem to have problems dealing with these criticisms. This was in part because Republican Sinn Fein appeared to be an aloof organisation, with its offices in Dublin and no central supported office system in Northern Ireland. Their move to offices in the heart of West Belfast in 2000 has provided a sounding board for other republicans who were also disgruntled by the process. As a party whose only other contender in West Belfast was the SDLP, the Sinn Fein leadership may have cause for concern with their arrival. Criticisms of the Republican leadership have also come from within their own ranks, and appear to be gathering momentum.<sup>62</sup> One senior republican critic has said, *‘Leadership culpability is not in doubt. For long enough it reinforced a power disparity within republicanism. The leadership was determined to wield power to the exclusion of everyone else. While the British were striving to include republicans without republicanism, the republican leadership was seeking to exclude republicans from the internal decision making process’*.<sup>63</sup> The

challenge for Sinn Fein is how to fend off the criticisms of erstwhile supporters, and how to manage the rank and file of the party<sup>64</sup> while continuing to engage in the politics of pragmatism within the Assembly.

#### The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (ALL)

The Alliance Party has suffered at the hands of ‘career politics’. This, and a subsequent post Agreement ‘fall out’ within the leadership has been its biggest challenge in the post Agreement period. Lord Alderdice resigned as party leader in June 1998, after the party had failed to win any executive seats in the first Assembly elections. In stepping down as leader of the party, he contended that he would like to be Speaker of the Assembly. The Secretary of State duly obliged and offered him the position. Claims from the deputy leader of the party, Seamus Close, that he in fact had already been offered the Speaker’s post seemed to form the basis of the dispute within the party.<sup>65</sup> The ensuing dispute was played out in a public arena, thus damaging the party’s credibility.

Moreover, while traditionally seen as the ultimate pragmatic party, such pragmatism has presented difficulties for the leadership. The terms of the Agreement, which specifies cross-community support or ‘sufficient consensus’ for policies, meant that all politicians had to designate themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’ for purposes of measuring such support. Obviously, at the initial stages at least, ‘other/centre’ votes would not count.<sup>66</sup> A senior Alliance Assembly member articulated the concerns of the party leadership that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had ‘lumped’ them with the Women’s Coalition and the PUP for purposes of holding meetings with them, on the grounds that all three were ‘fringe’ parties and added that they were very wary of being too closely identified with the PUP because of their paramilitary connections, and with the Women’s Coalition because they had a different agenda from the Alliance.<sup>67</sup> Long term pragmatism has, in effect, been rewarded with little at all in the post Agreement period, causing the leadership to rethink their role and strategy in the Assembly.

### The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)

The PUP leadership has faced many threats from dissident loyalists within their own community.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, David Ervine himself estimates that 29 out of 31 death threats made against him have come from within ‘loyalism’.<sup>69</sup> The major problem facing the party has been the loyalist feud that emanated from the Shankill Road, in West Belfast during the summer of 2000, and has now spread further afield. With seven people dead, and a large number made homeless as a result of the prolonged feuding there were concerns that this issue was stretching the party to its limits within the community. Newspaper speculation that the party leaders could even be suspended from the Assembly as a result of the feuding did not go unnoticed.<sup>70</sup>

### The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC)

As a cross-community coalition, the Women’s Coalition continue to face the challenge of speaking across community identities, and like the Alliance party, the challenge of carving out a niche for the Women’s Coalition on the floor of the Assembly rather than in the Executive. Maintaining and building on support in the forthcoming elections will be crucial in determining their role as long-term players in the post-Agreement process.

### The Ulster Democratic Party (UDP)

The Ulster Democratic Party was confronted with its most serious challenge in the days after the June 1998 Assembly elections, after failing to have a representative elected to the Assembly. David Trimble, in more recent times, has tried to re-integrate the party leader into the process by nominating the UDP leader, Gary McMichael, onto the Northern Ireland Civic Forum. It remains to be seen how well the leadership will manage to do in the next election, but the failure to be elected initially will surely have damaged leadership morale. As the flip side of the coin in the loyalist feud, they too are facing the challenge of stretching the party and constituents to their limits.

## **Collective Leadership Changes and Challenges**

While the individual nature of the issues facing the leadership of the various political parties is important, it would seem that the main changes and challenges facing the political leadership of Northern Ireland in the post Agreement phase have been of a more collective nature and have generally only manifested themselves since the actual establishment of the Assembly itself. Indeed, despite the turbulence surrounding the salient issues which have stalled the process time and again such as RUC reform and decommissioning, a variety of subtle issues have emerged from interviews undertaken, as being of concern for the leadership and these may reveal why the process has continued to be hampered by problems in the post-Agreement phase.

### The use and abuse of political power

Political power was officially devolved to Northern Ireland on 4th December 1999. Power was suspended from 11th February 2000 and then reinstated again on 30th May 2000 but aside from this short interlude the Northern Ireland Assembly was to have '*full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters previously within the remit of six Northern Ireland government departments*'.<sup>71</sup> Opinions and views on 'leadership in power' has been something central in the author's interviews conducted with some of the political leaders in Northern Ireland, however it was not an issue on which views conform.

When one has a position of power in a newly elected Assembly how does one use that power? Is it seen by others as a constructive or destructive use of power? There are a multitude of examples from the Assembly which could be used as illustrative answers to these questions. There is no doubt that the Barbara de Bruin (Sinn Fein), Minister of Health and Social Services and Martin McGuinness (Sinn Fein), Minister of Education who instructed that the British flag was not to be flown from their respective official departmental buildings on 2 May 2000 and beyond, felt that they had acted within their remit as Assembly Ministers. However, their

actions caused such divisions within the Assembly itself that the Assembly Executive were unable to come to a compromise on the issue, resulting in the enactment of a new law which would regulate the flying of flags on government buildings. While Sinn Fein's argument was based on the Agreement which stated that symbols and emblems should be used in a manner which promoted mutual respect rather than division, and the while Sinn Fein Ministers' decision may have been seen as a constructive use of power within their own constituency base, it was certainly seen as a destructive use of power with the broadly unionist constituency.

Similarly, David Trimble felt that the use of power in his capacity as First Minister to place a ban in on the two Sinn Fein Ministers from attending North-South Ministerial meetings from November 2000 may have been within his remit. However, Sinn Fein have argued that such a ban contravenes the Agreement and mounted a legal challenge which resulted in a judicial review of the situation. The use of power in this case was deemed 'unlawful' in the conclusions of the judicial review.<sup>72</sup> In addition to these two illustrative examples, some of the smaller parties have admitted a sense of dismay at how political power in Northern Ireland has been 'carved up' among the two largest parties in the Assembly, with accusations of patronage and an oblivious attitude to the smaller parties needs and concerns.<sup>73</sup>

#### Leading one's own party

Relating to one's own party has proved difficult for many of the leaders in Northern Ireland. Indicative of this is the fact that David Trimble is in the process of attempting to abolish formal ties between his party and two hard-line groups within its ruling council – the youth wing and the Orange Order, since votes against him in council meetings are said to come mostly from this bloc of voters. For the SDLP, a leaked document of an internal review in April 2000 which challenged both the party structure and the leadership appeared to have been taken seriously by the party's leaders.<sup>74</sup> Amid accusations that the leadership did not treat its party members with enough

respect, it would seem that the leadership will be looking carefully at reorganizing the party structures.

One senior unionist leader lamented over the fact that democracy can sometimes get in the way when dealing with the party, and wished that ‘executive leadership’ was more of an option at party level, while still trying to encourage opinion, argument, debate and discussion through the party.<sup>75</sup> Such ‘executive leadership’ is in direct contrast to the style valued by Sinn Fein – that of ‘collective leadership’. A senior Sinn Fein political leader commented that it was simply a ‘republican way of doing things’ since two heads were better than one. Finding a medium between the ‘executive’ and the ‘collective’ continues to prove difficult.

#### Delivering constituents

Since it is said that leaders are never as much in charge of the situation as they are pictured to be, and constituents are almost never as submissive as one might imagine them to be,<sup>76</sup> dealing with constituents in a Northern Ireland has been of concern. One key player on the political scene referred to the concept of ‘elastic band’ leadership as the best explanation of how the leadership has to stretch forward and stretch its constituents. Using the analogy again, the leadership is constantly aware that the elastic can snap if it is stretched too far or too much.<sup>77</sup>

Darby and MacGinty (2000) contend that ‘during negotiations the primary function of leaders is to deliver their own people’.<sup>78</sup> A volatile constituency can make such a delivery difficult. Analysts agree that supporters/constituents have rarely been told the harsh truths about the process in Northern Ireland. This has been one method used for coping with constituents although such a method has not been without its problems. The Agreement did not provide for a united Ireland nor a stronger Union despite claims to the contrary. By failing to manage the expectations of their constituents in relation to the changes afoot both sides had laid the foundations for future problems. Instead of appealing to the reality of the

situation many played to their constituents best hopes which in effect was the other communities worst fears.

Another cause for concern has been the changing constituency base in the post-Agreement phase. This difficulty may stem from the fact that prior to the agreement Ministers were non-elected Ministers from outside Northern Ireland. So their constituency problems were geographically separate from their Ministerial problems and now they are geographically inter-related.

#### Relating to other leaders/parties

When asked about the dynamic among the leaders themselves, again opinions varied. For some it would seem that relationships between leaders are as strained as they were during the negotiation period. When asked whether there was a good leadership dynamic behind closed doors in contrast to the public images sometimes given, one party leader said, '*No there's not. First of all, there's no opportunities for people to actually exchange and to meet and that's a huge difficulty, and those who now are getting on well are the people who have really worked hard at engaging, and others have chosen not to*'.<sup>79</sup> Relations between the First and Deputy First Minister are said to be strained. In contrast, the relationship between their junior counterparts are not. Overall, it would seem that the leadership has yet to come to terms with the mutual dependency aspect of the agreement. Much like the poles of a wigwam, if one leader falls, then they will probably all fall.<sup>80</sup> Although while lamenting that relationships were still under strain, a senior SDLP member claimed that '*...we're not talking about trying to raise an environment in which politicians can go around acting as if they are air-line cabin crew, just being nice to everybody all the time, perfect total smiles, and reacting unflappably to any difficult situation or crises*'.<sup>81</sup> One significant development thus far has been the informal and voluntary coalition between the Women's Coalition, the PUP, the Alliance and the Northern Ireland Unionist Party. This coalition between a diverse array of political parties was established out of necessity and practical need, to allow themselves to be represented at all committee meetings

and debates. A coalition member is on each committee and feeds back to the other coalition members, on a regular basis, the information from the committees. Recognising the importance of a relationship that allowed all of the parties involved a better opportunity within the Assembly has been a logical and rational step forward in terms of relating to other leaders/parties.<sup>82</sup>

#### Working with the civil service

The dynamic of the inter-relationship between the civil service and the political leaders changed dramatically with the establishment of the Assembly. None of those interviewed saw the transition of power as resting easily with the civil service claiming that they had originally thought that the '*civil service didn't want a politician about the place*' although '*in fairness to them, some but not all civil servants recognised that there were clear limits on their own legitimacy...*'<sup>83</sup>. Some mentioned the probability of a culture shock for the senior civil service , previously accustomed to dealing with Ministers whose involvement in Northern Ireland was quite peripheral. This was one area in which anti-agreement unionists were in total agreement with pro-agreement parties, claiming that unlike the other collective challenges and issues, the challenge of working with the civil service was not a politically contentious issue, but remained a challenge nonetheless.<sup>84</sup> Managing the relationships between the civil service and the key political players will probably continue to be tense unless steps are taken to promote an understanding between the two. Attempts were made to do this through the Northern Ireland Transition Programme, for new Assembly members and civil servants , which was initiated by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Dr Marjorie Mowlam in 1998, although the programme failed to attract sufficient numbers to be worthwhile.

#### Imminent elections

While Northern Ireland is no stranger to a constant reaffirmation of public opinion through the multitude of elections; the peace process, the Agreement and the post-Agreement period has been accompanied

by a series of elections. This has created certain challenges in the post-Agreement context. The May 1998 Referendum was quickly overshadowed by the Assembly Elections in June which pushed the parties towards their old adversarial and tribal positions. The death of Clifford Forsythe MP (UUP) in April 2000, and the subsequent by-election in his constituency in September 2000 resulted in the loss of a Westminster seat from the UUP to the DUP. Newspaper analysts claimed that this by-election result may have affected Trimble's leadership.<sup>85</sup> In the case of sudden death of a member of the Assembly or resignation of a member of the Assembly, a policy of co-option has been employed thereby ensuring that the electoral make-up of the Assembly itself does not shift from sitting to sitting. However, attention is now focused on the possible forthcoming general election and once again hard-line strategies will be employed in a desire to woo constituents. The 'Jekyll and Hyde' approach to politics in Northern Ireland, spurred on by election fever, is proving not only challenging for the leadership itself, but also for the electorate.

#### Dealing with change

One of the most difficult aspects of any political change is the actual acknowledgment of it, and the post Agreement period has played host to a very quick reversion of people denying change on the part of others and denying the degree to which they had changed themselves.<sup>86</sup> While one senior politician claimed that '*...change is like old age, you don't notice it creeping up on you*'<sup>87</sup>, accepting the changes as they have happened continues to challenge all.

#### Process management

During the suspension of the Assembly in 2000, Sinn Fein had attempted to arrange a meeting to talk about the peace process between themselves and five of the pro agreement parties. The UUP, SDLP, and PUP did not attend. The Women's Coalition and Alliance did. In defending their decision, the UUP claimed that they would

meet anyone but that it had to be under the proper auspices. The SDLP claimed that it was a meeting of party leaders and since Trimble wasn't going to be there, there was no point in attending. The PUP argued that the process had to be properly managed and that Gerry Adams was not the man to manage it.<sup>88</sup> This particular incident exemplifies one of the key challenges facing leaders in the post-Agreement period in Northern Ireland. The Agreement itself did not focus on the possibility of delays, failures and suspensions, and did not detail processes for action should such problems have occurred. The subsequent lack of process management appears to be of concern to all and comparisons were made to the situation in South Africa and discussions with South Africans and how 'they'll talk about managing the process and crisis management'.<sup>89</sup> The challenge of continuing to work through the full implementation of the Agreement without any degree of process management faces all leaders.

#### Realignment of party politics

The realisation that the political parties are not actually implementing their party policies through the Programme for Government has begun to impact upon the parties. One senior player commented that '*...it's going to be like a kaleidoscope, constantly changing, from issue to issue the realignments and the coalitions are going to change and I'm not sure how well people have thought of all of that in terms of the type of politics that there is here, and the type of politics that is going to matter to policy...*'<sup>90</sup> Again, another challenge to be confronted.

#### **An Analysis of Political Leadership in Northern Ireland**

In focusing on political leadership in Northern Ireland's transition from the period of the Agreement until the present, some key political players have been frank in detailing what they perceive to be the successes and failures of the leadership. On reflection it would appear that the most significant shortcomings to date have been its failure to manage a) the expectations of constituents, b) to recognise the referendum results, and c) to recognise the changes that had taken place in themselves and others.<sup>91</sup> While anti-agreement

unionism may believe that the implementation problems encountered thus far stem from a flawed agreement,<sup>92</sup> some of the pro-agreement leadership argues that the onus lies more with a flawed leadership.<sup>93</sup>

### **Relating to the Themes**

Research has shown that nearly all leaders have moved far beyond their original political objectives in accepting the agreement and working within the new political structures. This applies as much to the anti-agreement parties as it does to those in favour of the agreement. Recognising such changes within themselves and on the part of others did not emerge so clearly from the research. In practical terms, all appeared to have coped well with the practicality of moving from a society of ‘armed revolution’ to one of more mundane ‘bureaucratic behaviour’ taking their responsibilities with the new political arrangements very seriously. However, given the long and difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland prior to devolution it is only natural that some relationships between party leaders have remained fraught. Less time has been given to developing such relationships with most preferring to focus on maintaining the support of ‘hard-liners’ than garnering support and understanding from their political adversaries. There is little speculation about how the process would be affected by a change in leadership in one, some or all of the political parties. General consensus would appear to be that the personality does not matter, rather it is the policy that is important. This is somewhat strange given that changes in leadership at various junctures of the process to date, have had a profound impact in retrospect. The change in leadership in the Republic to Albert Reynolds, Trimble’s election as leader of the UUP in 1995, and Blair’s electoral success in 1997 are just a few cases in point.

### **Conclusions**

Northern Ireland, as a society with many of the same political leaders in place from the 1970s and 1980s came to formulate a peaceful agreement in the 1990’s as a result of a series of shifts in the culture of leadership, wherein policies, positions and preferences had been

re-assessed. The pragmatic behaviour espoused by the political leadership in Northern Ireland in reaching the Agreement has yet to become reflected in more permanent pragmatic principles, owing to the challenges of political power, election fever, and volatile constituencies among other things. However, it is only more recently that leaders themselves have begun to focus on the vital nature of their role in this process. Some have tried to focus on what the leadership needs to do, and what this involves, articulating that ‘political leadership involves taking huge risks to achieve political goals’<sup>94</sup> and ‘political leadership has to mean something more than taking the easy option just to please your home crowd.’<sup>95</sup>

#### **4 (a). Summary of Key Points**

- From 1921-1972, the culture of leadership which existed in Northern Ireland was essentially intimidatory, under-developed, factional and demotic. (Arthur 1990 & 1999)
- From the 1970's until the period of the peace process political leadership was further defined as lacking in formal power and authority, over reliant on outside and 'external' influences, stagnant and lacking in quality participation.
- The peace process allowed for numerous shifts in the culture of leadership – leadership became re-defined as one with a desire to hold power, articulate in the knowledge and experience of best and worst practice from other case studies, with more people at the top including the voices of women and ex-political prisoners, and a profession treated with diminishing disdain.
- Ultimately, the actual Agreement owed as much to the work of the British and Irish governments, the US, the voluntary sector and civil society as it did to the internal political leadership of Northern Ireland itself, sparking concerns about the ability of leadership in the post-agreement phase.
- Beyond the agreement, political leadership has been confronted with a series of challenges both in individual parties, and collectively which have played their own role in hampering progress within the process. These include challenges of political power, party leadership, delivering constituents, relating to other party leaders, relationships with the civil service, imminent elections, realignment of party politics, acknowledgements of change, and a lack of process management.
- There are differences of opinion about whether previous

and current impasses are due to a flawed agreement or a flawed leadership. Anti-agreement unionists tend to claim that the problem lies with the agreement, pro-agreement unionists and nationalists maintain that flawed leadership is more responsible.

- The pragmatic behaviour espoused by the leadership in reaching Agreement has yet to become reflected in more permanent pragmatic principles.

### **(b) Israel/Palestine**

An analysis of the role of leadership in the current peace process in Israel/Palestine and the challenges which face the political leadership as the society transforms is likely to be somewhat stunted in nature, given the current political scenario which exists.

However, there have been a series of Agreements which focus on the resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Oslo Accord, signed in September 1993, is viewed as the ‘major ground-breaking agreement’ of the conflict.<sup>96</sup> One renowned academic in the field said that the agreement ‘*was made possible by the consummate pragmatism of the leaders on both sides; indeed, Oslo could stand as a virtual monument to pragmatism*’.<sup>97</sup> Referred to as Oslo A, this accord was followed by Oslo B (September 1995), the Hebron Protocol (1997), the Wye Agreement (1998) and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (1999), although each of these subsequent agreements should probably be viewed in the context of the Oslo process.<sup>98</sup> At present, further negotiations on the full implementation of agreements made have been put on hold due to the February 2001 Israeli election which ousted previous Labour Prime Minister Ehud Barak in favour of the Likud candidate, Ariel Sharon. The Israeli domestic politics of forming a government of national unity have taken precedence over further negotiations with the Palestinians.

Within the time-frame of 1993 until the present, the political leadership within Israel, responsible for negotiating and implementing such agreements, has changed repeatedly. Both Oslo A and B Accords were signed between Arafat (Palestinian leader) and Rabin (Israeli Prime Minister - Labour). Hebron and Wye were signed by Arafat and Netanyahu (Israeli Prime Minister - Likud). Sharm el-Sheikh was signed by Arafat and Barak (Israeli Prime Minister - Labour). Implementation of the various agreements has not yet been completed and it appears that with the Israeli elections results, future agreements on issues of implementation may be signed with Ariel Sharon (Likud).

Some parallels may be made between the constantly changing leadership personnel in Israeli politics and the pace of the current peace process. How can a society with a constantly changing leadership make agreements and ensure the implementation of agreements? Do new leaders feel compelled to implement agreements made by their predecessors? Do they feel that such agreements hold no validity under the new administrations? How do such leaders continue to steer a course between hard-line and conciliatory attitudes, given that one may be required to keep constituents on board and the other is a necessity for creating peace? And what are the issues and challenges which face the political leadership as it continues to navigate itself through the current peace process? For the Palestinian leadership, how difficult is it to cultivate long-standing relationships with political adversaries in Israel if such adversaries are in a constant state of flux? Is the cultivation of such relationships central to the development of the process? Perhaps the most important question is, what has allowed the political changes to take place in the region, given that a significant change of leadership has only been apparent with Israeli society, but not so within Palestinian society?

### **Culture of Leadership**

There are three aspects of political leadership in Israel worth noting as possible explanations for a stalling peace process - the culture of leadership at national level is defined as one with a) a constantly changing leadership, b) a high percentage of former military personnel involved at the leadership level of politics, and c) a highly factional nature. A constantly changing leadership has meant commitment to agreements made by one's predecessor has been somewhat negligible and building up relationships with Palestinians' counter-parts has been difficult. Conflict has been the norm for the former military personnel involved in politics, and those without extensive political experience have tended to maintain the status quo rather than make life-changing decisions. Factionalism has continued to weaken and erode the power of the leadership. Indeed, changes in the Israeli electoral law in 1996, designed to strengthen

the position of the Prime Minister, have had the reverse affect. The electoral changes allowed for two main votes, one for the Prime Minister and one for the party of one's choice, the former seen as a strategic vote and the latter seen as a vote for one's own parochial interests. The result of the electoral changes, as displayed in the 1999 and 2001 elections has severely weakened the position of the Prime Minister, since to be able to actually form a government the Prime Minister had to make a government with a coalition of opposites. This has only served to increase the influence of sectarian politics within Israel.

Issues of leadership within the Palestinian side have also impacted on the peace process. Palestinian political leadership, for the most part, has always been synonymous with Yasser Arafat. Since the 1960's he has been seen as the definitive leader of the Palestinian population. However, as part of a leadership in exile, Arafat's ability to relate to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza had begun to diminish by the 1980's. A shift in leadership came with the Intifada which began in the late 80's, away from Arafat and towards the high profile status gained by Hanan Ashrawi and other 'internal' or West Bank/Gaza based leaders at that time. This created an 'inside-outside divide' among leaders.<sup>99</sup> After Oslo, and Arafat's return to the Palestinian Territories with the exiled leadership, leadership supremacy shifted again from the internal to the 'un-exiled'. The post-Oslo shift has had the potential to create its own conflicts with accusations of favouritism, nepotism and an inactive leadership in opposition which has failed to transform its political discourse into practical and material actions.<sup>100</sup>

### **Leadership and the Peace Process**

In an overview of the process thus far, a number of conclusions have already been made about the relationship between political leadership and the stalling peace process in the region. Firstly, the views of the political leaders have not always corresponded with the views of the constituency when making agreements.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, it is argued that while the leaders were ready for agreement, the

constituents were not. The result has been that political leaders have found it increasingly difficult to mobilise support for the continuing process. Following on from that, the process is seen increasingly as ‘bottom-up’ as opposed to ‘top-down’ in nature. Secondly, the political leadership has failed to understand and to convey to its own constituency the significance of the concessions made by the other side to date. Rather, each side has minimised the significance of the concessions made by the other.<sup>102</sup> Thirdly, failing to understand the constituency and failing to convey the concessions made has played into the hands of anti-peace elites who have then manipulated the constituents for their own purposes.

### **Leadership Changes and Challenges**

There is a fundamental problem with discussing the challenges that political leaders face when peace agreements previously made have not yet been fully implemented. Those interviewed tended to focus on the larger picture of ‘reaching agreement’ rather than examining the individual issues that have come up during the process.<sup>103</sup> However, some of the potential challenges mentioned have been detailed here.

#### Leading the party through splits and factions

The increasingly factional nature of Israeli politics will make nearly any incoming government weaker than before since both Labour and Likud will need to make coalition governments with smaller parties. The Israeli leadership is aware that any splits and factions within the government will lead to domestic unrest, and such unrest sits uneasily with the continuing peace process. One Palestinian leader claimed that ‘weak’ agreements would increase the chances of a split in the national movement for the Palestinians.<sup>104</sup> Ultimately, such splits and factions will weaken the political leadership. Returning to Rothstein’s (1999) earlier analysis that societies with weak leadership on both sides are more likely to continue to maintain the status quo within their society since their own political positions continue to be assured, the prognosis for a settlement is not good while the likelihood of splits and factions remains.<sup>105</sup>

### Imminent elections

The Israeli Prime-Ministerial election, held on 6 February 2001, illustrates the impact that imminent elections have had on the peace process in the region. Progress in the peace process has been negligible since December 2000, when elections were called. A return to the process in the post election period has been slow, since most attention is now focused on the establishment of a Government of National Unity in Israel.

### Volatile constituency

There is a growing feeling at grassroots level that the man in the street can affect political outcomes, hence, the vote for Netanyahu in 1996, the vote for Barak in 1999, and the vote for Sharon in 2001. One senior Israeli academic explains this as '*...growing pragmatic political attitudes, reduced loyalties to parties, and the enhanced power to select between leaders leads Israeli's to shift their support from one leader to another*'.<sup>106</sup> Another Israeli academic regards the root of the problem with the Israeli constituency as being intimately connected with 'a lack of respect for authority, for leaders, for leadership and for politicians'.<sup>107</sup> Coupled with this is the social demographic changes which have taken place within Israeli society in the last number of years leading to an increase in Russian immigrants, who may have no attachment to a Jewish culture and Jewish values but definitely do share the Israeli mistrust of political elites.<sup>108</sup> While the volatility of the Palestinian constituency is not expressed so vocally through elections, it has been most apparent on the streets of the West Bank and Gaza since August 2000. For both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, garnering and maintaining support from such a constituency is paramount to a successful process.

### Realignment of party politics

The division around the peace process has been the main division in Israeli politics for over thirty years, therefore should a final status agreement be reached with the Palestinians there will be a systematic re-alignment of party politics within the Knesset, according to one

senior leader<sup>109</sup> since there are ideological capitalists in Labour and in Likud, and social democrats in Labour and in Likud. Once divisions among the parties are no longer based on conflict, it is only natural to assume that there will be tremendous re-alignment along more ideologically based lines. The challenge that this will present to the existing parties should not be underestimated.

#### Relating to other leaders

One would imagine that relations between other leaders would be somewhat problematic, given that since the Oslo process began in 1993, the Palestinian leadership has dealt with five different Prime Ministers, and four different administrations. Interviews with senior Palestinian figures indicate differently, with claims that they did not mind dealing with any government in Israel as long as they fulfilled their commitments and they had the power to do that.<sup>110</sup> However, a long standing relationship would appear to have developed with at least two of the long-standing key players in the process, Arafat and Peres. As one Israeli academic noted '*...Peres visits Arafat every week, in Ramallah and elsewhere, and its not something that is quite unique anymore, it is something that is quite routine, and that wasn't the case several years ago*'.<sup>111</sup> The challenge for both sides is to continue to build on such foundations.

#### **Relating to Themes**

Research has shown that while an agreement has not yet been implemented in totality in Israel/Palestine, political leaders have already moved far beyond their original political objectives. Recent examples include the Palestinian Central Council's (PCC) decision to remove the stated objective of the 'total destruction of Israel' from the PLO's 1968 Palestinian Charter and reaffirm that clauses in the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel were now null and void.<sup>112</sup> The initial Oslo process itself was a clear departure from Rabin's proclaimed policy not to deal with the PLO. With reference to coping with the practicalities of moving from violence toward politics and bureaucratic behaviour, some problems have emerged in the areas under Palestinian Autonomy. Corruption

appears to be endemic, and the PA has been accused of using arbitrary methods to silence its opponents. The autocratic style of government shows the difficulty in this region moving from armed revolutionary (PLO) to bureaucrat (PA).<sup>113</sup> The leadership on both sides have failed to maintain the support of their hard-liners. This has hampered further moves to more central and moderate locations politically. Changes in leadership have not necessarily been of benefit to this particular process, despite academic claims that a change in leadership can be positive since new leaders are less likely to be constrained by old policies. The unfortunate fact is that new leaders, within the Israeli side, feel little or no attachment to agreements made by a previous administration and therefore do not feel an obligation to implement them, preferring instead to engage in re-negotiation.

### **Conclusion**

In a final analysis of the role of leadership thus far, the main success has been that the peace process has been on a continuum since Oslo. The pace of the process has been very varied but the process itself has always continued despite changes in leadership on the Israeli side, and internal dissent on the Palestinian. The key transformation was that both sides did, in fact, recognise each other as legitimate partners for peace, and despite current tensions continue to work on the basis of that recognition. A failure to manage views of constituents has continued to obstruct the process, and it will be a reworking of this vital issue which may hold the key to a successful implementation of the agreements made in the future. In the longer term, analysts argue that it will not make a great deal of difference if the political leadership in the region continues to change, since constituents and leaders have now become used to certain realities - the reality of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians becoming more sustainable as time moves forward.<sup>114</sup> One wonders how the recent election of Ariel Sharon will impact upon such an analysis.

#### **4 (b). Summary of Key Points**

- Links may be made between the stalling Israeli/Palestinian peace process and the dynamic of a constantly changing leadership in Israel.
- Other aspects of a ‘culture of leadership’ may have affected the process – in addition to a constantly changing leadership, Israeli leadership is characterised by its highly factional nature and the large percentage of former military personnel involved in politics. Palestinian leadership is primarily characterised through the internal/external divide.
- Challenges facing the political leadership in Israel and Palestine as the process continues includes leading the party through splits and factions, imminent elections, a volatile constituency, possible re-alignment of party politics, relating to other party leaders, and the question of succession (in the case of Arafat).<sup>115</sup>
- While departures have been made from previous political objectives, much more progress is needed among the leadership to solidify a shift from protagonism to pragmatism.
- The key leadership success to date has been keeping the process on a continuum despite the slow pace.
- The key leadership failing to date has been failing to manage the relationship with constituents.

### **(c) South Africa**

The Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), the Pretoria Minute (August 1990), the D.F. Malan Accord (February 1991), the National Peace Accord (September 1991), and the Interim Constitution (1993) were the initial agreements which constituted the basis of the South African peace process. Key political players in the formulation and articulation of these agreements were the leader of the National Party (NP), F.W. de Klerk, and the leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela. Leadership duets, such as Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) and Roelf Meyer (NP), and Mac Maharaj (ANC) and Fanie van der Merwe (NP) massaged the process towards making agreement in times of difficulty. Ramaphosa and Meyer provided the only channel which existed between their two political parties after formal negotiation had broken down in 1992.<sup>116</sup> Of Maharaj and van der Merwe, one academic said that '*...the deadlock-breaking skills of these two individual became so renowned that, as the process evolved, it became virtually standard practice to ‘channel’ divisive or contentious issues to them*'.<sup>117</sup>

In the post agreement transition period, some fundamental changes in the leadership arena have occurred. For example, in 1996 de Klerk withdrew the National Party from the Government of National Unity and became leader of the Opposition, retiring from the party and from politics in 1997.<sup>118</sup> Meyer resigned from the National Party in 1997, joining forces with General Holomisa, a former ANC elected representative, to build a joint political party named the United Democratic Movement (UDM).<sup>119</sup> He subsequently resigned from the UDM in 1999. Mandela stepped down as leader of the party and president of the South African government. Ramaphosa side-stepped out of politics and into business.

How have such changes affected the transition process, if at all, in South Africa? Is it a necessity that those who make the peace need to be the same people to implement agreements made in the longer term? Do the issues and challenges affecting leadership change as the society in transition progresses towards settlement? Does the

South African leadership see the transition as the success story that appears to outsiders? Has the ‘pragmatism’ of leadership continued?

### **Culture of Leadership**

Contemporary political leadership in South Africa is for many often equated with two words - Nelson Mandela. While acknowledging that Mandela was a pivotal leader in South Africa’s recent transition, the role of political leadership in South Africa is both long and complicated, based on a perpetuation of a system of apartheid by the white leadership of the time. The culture of leadership was stunted and factional for much of the apartheid history. Stunted since many of the leading members of the ANC had been imprisoned indefinitely or were in exile, and factioned between the white Afrikaner leadership, the ANC, other black political organisations and the traditional leadership which was seen as being associated with apartheid and tribalism. The South African peace process was set to change this culture through a series of challenges. The challenge facing the white Afrikaner leadership was in creating a mind shift on the policy of apartheid. The challenge facing the ANC was achieving uniformity on tactics and strategies among the black political parties and the traditional leadership.

### **Leadership Transformations**

A leadership transformation which occurred in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s was the preface to an eventual settlement between the various factions. Much like the Northern Ireland case, the key transformation came with the mutual acknowledgment that an impasse existed. Again, as in Northern Ireland, this transformation did not take place in tandem between the key players. Mandela had muted as early as 1985 that *‘a military victory was a distant if not an impossible dream’<sup>120</sup>* while it was only in 1991 that de Klerk referred to a similar impasse. Nor did the leadership transformation occur in isolation. It emerged as a result of a weak and fragmenting state, as a result of international pressure and as a result of a mass movement. The political leadership in the shape of the National Party and the ANC were able to turn the initial transformation into

a fully fledged peace process, aided by most of the smaller South African political parties. It is to their credit that they managed to keep their respective constituencies on board during the ensuing turbulence with de Klerk even calling a referendum of white voters in February 1992 to ensure their support for the imminent reforms.

### **Leadership and the Peace Process**

Hailed as the success story for societies in transition, the South African experience offers much in the way of hindsight with reference to the role of political leaders during the South African peace process. Padraig O’Malley, who has worked with the political leadership in South Africa and in Northern Ireland, produced a series of denominators relating to leadership, which could be taken from the South African experience.<sup>121</sup> On the notion of leadership and trust, O’Malley (2000) argued that ‘...when one party addresses another, especially in a bilateral, it must do so with particular sensitivity to the other party’s politics and the difficulties it may be having with its own community – or even within the party’s own ranks.’<sup>122</sup> While accepting that delivering one’s own constituents was important, O’Malley goes further by suggesting that the peace process in South Africa was only successful because the leaders helped their counter-parts in the delivery of constituents through respect for each others position.<sup>123</sup> One key political player during the period of the peace process, recently noted that one of the overall differences between the South African situation in comparison with both Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine was that the South African leadership ultimately engaged in a paradigm shift while the other did not.<sup>124</sup> However, such a shift did not necessarily mean that the leadership would be excused from facing the transitional changes and challenges mentioned in the other case studies.

### **Leadership Changes and Challenges**

Political leaders in South Africa have had more time for reflection on the changes and challenges which affected them during the transition period and continue to affect them. This may have influenced the issues which those interviewed chose to focus on.

### Changes in leadership personnel

Arguments were made that it was important to try and have continuity of leadership for at least a decade or so, to establish an identity of one nation. The departure of key actors to the process, Mandela, Ramaphosa and Meyer, has been lamented, especially by the opposition parties.<sup>125</sup>

### Working with the civil service

It was almost exclusively the opposition parties in South Africa who mentioned working with the civil service as a challenge. Perhaps based somewhat on a romantic notion of the past, some argued that up until the change in government civil servants were not allowed to be actively involved in politics, thereby resulting in an ‘apolitical’ service. Concerns were raised and accusations levied that many senior civil service posts were now appointed on a party political basis.<sup>126</sup>

### Relating to constituents

Some claimed that the biggest challenge facing the opposition leadership, was not in terms of bringing both supporters and hard-line constituents along in the process, but rather in garnering the support of other communities. The fact that members of parliament were not elected according to specific constituency areas was also of serious concern to some of the smaller parties. It was argued that the National Party decided that it didn’t want constituencies ‘*because over the years they had always rigged them so they were scared now that someone else was coming into power that they would think to rig them.*’<sup>127</sup>

### Leadership in opposition

Those in opposition to the ANC claimed that they had engaged in a ‘Westminster’ model among the opposition parties in the initial transition period. Realising that this was, perhaps, not the best way to move forward, political alliances have subsequently been formed. Maintaining such alliances over the long term will prove challenging. The fact that if one ceases to be a member of a party in the assembly,

then one ceases to be a Member of Parliament has also caused concern for the opposition, claiming that it enables the parties to hold ‘vice-like grips’ over their members.<sup>128</sup>

#### Political power

Some within the smaller parties lamented the fact that the National Party had used its negotiating power, not to further the welfare of all South Africans in terms of a Bill of Rights but to make submissions ‘on the perks of office to be given to the Deputy President who was the leader of their Party’.<sup>129</sup>

#### **Relating to Themes**

Research has shown that the leadership has coped well with the practicality of moving a society from one of ‘armed revolution’ to one characterised by more bureaucratic behaviour. However, given that the South African process was almost entirely an ‘internal initiative’, the international experience in terms of study visits and peer-learning exercises did not profoundly influence the leadership. The leadership’s role in the international arena served more so as an example/illustration to other societies involved in peace processes. Overall, it would seem that a successful transition process did require a change in political leadership. The change in leadership from Botha to de Klerk was instrumental in placing an eventual settlement on the agenda. The change in leadership from Mandela to Mbeki was probably necessary to coincide with the transition of society from one focused on aspects of reconciliation to one which needs to become more focused on the bureaucratic, and perhaps more boring, nature of political life. There has been some evidence of changes in political objectives by the leadership, perhaps most notably in the ANC in terms of the economy. Widely seen as advocating a socialist agenda during the period of apartheid, and the early transition period, the ANC has embraced many of the basic principles of capitalism while in government. In defending such changes, Mandela had said that *‘We look at problems objectively: it is not a question of changing from a socialist to a capitalist approach; it is a question of*

*pragmatism, to say this problem can be solved in this particular way*.<sup>130</sup>

### **Conclusions**

The initial pragmatic attitudes, behaviours and actions espoused by the political leadership in South Africa does seem to have become reflected in more permanence. Some have argued that the transition from Mandela to Mbeki has been difficult and has changed the political dynamic in South Africa. Others have complained that that the new government has been very quick to take on the bad habits of the old. In rationalising such despondence, one could argue that the ‘transition’ itself is essentially over and South Africa, as a state, is now facing the cold and hard realities of adversarial politics rather than a much hoped for ‘rainbow coalition’. In a final analysis of political leadership in South Africa, a change in leadership was one of the main catalysts for reform. Had P.W Botha not fallen ill in 1989 and been succeeded by de Klerk, the apartheid system may have continued for at least another decade. The main success of political leadership has been with the cultivation of relationships between some key players<sup>131</sup> which led to the new constitutional arrangements.

What the future of political leadership in South Africa will be remains unknown. The existing opposition parties pose no real threat to the ANC’s control of government nor are they likely to in the near future. The opposition’s only option is to become masters of policy issues and mobilise people around such issues. However, it is certain that a fragmented opposition is a major weakness for South Africa’s new situation.

#### **4 (c). Summary of Key Points**

- The culture of leadership in South Africa was stunted and factional for much of its Apartheid history.
- A leadership transformation occurred in the late 1980's and early 1990's at least between the two main protagonists – the National Party (NP) and the ANC.
- The transformation led to the South African peace process – a process during which a leadership 'paradigm shift' occurred. The process became less about pragmatism than about absolute principle.
- Some of the key political players, responsible for the design and implementation of the agreements in South Africa, stepped out of political life during the subsequent transition.
- Their departure from politics has meant that the incoming leadership has had to deal with a series of issues and challenges which have affected them during the transition process.
- Such issues included a changing leadership personnel, working with the civil service, relating to constituents, the role of the opposition, and aspects of political power.
- Departures made from previous party policy etc, would indicate that the pragmatic behaviour of leadership in South Africa has become solidified, and in many cases, has become more principled.

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## **6. Conclusions: Key Issues, Key Recommendations, Future Research**

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Hermann (1995) has suggested four images or definitions of leadership to consider - crusaders, salesmen, agents and firefighters.<sup>132</sup> She argues that crusaders have a vision and seek to make such visions a reality, salesmen use persuasion to get their constituents to ‘buy’ an idea, agents act only as delegates for those whom they represent, and firefighters respond to the emergencies which may affect their constituents. There is much evidence to suggest that such definitions of leadership are applicable to divided societies and societies in transition, depending on the audience and the context of a given situation. ‘Crusaders’ may define the various protagonists in the pre-negotiation periods, each with their own particular stance, and vision of a future society. ‘Salesmen’ defines the leadership during peace processes. Constituents are persuaded that the process is the most appropriate path to take, and that any agreements made are in their own best interests. When peace processes face uncertainties and turbulence, the leadership can begin to act in an ‘agent’ capacity, tending to act only as a delegate for what constituents want from the process. At other stages of peace processes, and as societies begins to move through a post-conflict transitory phase, the leadership’s ‘fire-fighting’ strategy takes precedence, with the leadership reacting to the problems that the processes may throw up.

Defining the leadership in terms of protagonists and pragmatists has also been useful. As the case studies illustrate, evidence exists to show that a shift towards pragmatism helped make peace-processes possible. The potential longevity of such pragmatic attitudes has proved more difficult to illustrate. For example, pragmatic behaviour does not necessarily equate with pragmatic principles. In Northern Ireland, while the leadership may behave

pragmatically in the Assembly, some principles have remained unchanged. In the post-agreement phase Trimble argued that the Union had never been stronger.<sup>133</sup> Adams argued that the Union was inherently weaker<sup>134</sup> and in recent times told a Press Conference in the US that he could foresee a united Ireland by 2016 and could see no reason why ‘... why we cannot celebrate the 1916 Rising in 2016 in a free and united Ireland’.<sup>135</sup>

### **International Comparisons**

John McGarry (1998) argues that, in the case of South Africa and Northern Ireland, ‘comparisons insufficiently acknowledge the many differences between the two case studies’.<sup>136</sup> While acknowledging the significant contextual differences between the conflicts, peace processes, and agreements in Northern Ireland, South Africa and Israel/Palestine, this research maintains that many of the political changes and challenges facing the political leadership are indeed comparable. Comparisons of the actual leadership itself, is perhaps less so. As McGarry rightly points out, in Northern Ireland calls from nationalists for a unionist de Klerk stem from a partisan analogy of the situation which unionism does not readily accept, and have led to unionist calls for a republican de Klerk.<sup>137</sup>

In general comparative terms, the *profile* of leadership has seemed to remain consistently high in all case studies, with more emphasis on the role of elites in peace processes, than of civil society. The *politics* of leadership continues to alternate between a hard-line and soft-line approach, depending on the political situation at the time. There is no evidence to suggest that the pragmatism needed to make agreements has become copper-fastened in the post-agreement phase. In terms of *personality*, coping with the practicalities of transition has been smooth. Relationship within one’s own *party* and with other party leaders has not been so effortless.

### **Key Issues**

While the case studies of Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa are at very different stages in their various transitions, there are a number of key issues which are common to all and which

highlight the changing nature and challenges facing political leaders in such societies. The research suggests that, unless dealt with adequately these key issues may present potential pitfalls for transition processes.

- ***The use and abuse of political power:*** the use of political power and the sensitivities which surround the use of power is important. If a leader acts with an awareness of such sensitivities, and uses the new found political power to further the rights of all constituents, it suggests that the pragmatism of peace accords is upheld. If a leader fails to acknowledge the sensitivities of power and acts only in the interest of one or other community then it suggests that a change towards pragmatism may have occurred in principle only, and not in practice.
- ***Leading one's own party:*** a clear lesson that emerges from the case studies is that leadership skills are needed more within parties than between parties.<sup>138</sup> This is as important in the post-violent phase of the process as it is during the negotiations themselves. Finding a definitive balance between 'executive leadership' and 'collective leadership' continues to prove difficult.
- ***Delivering constituents:*** while leadership skills are important within the parties they are also a vital part of dealing with one's constituents. The concept of 'elastic-band leadership' perhaps explains this best. The leadership is expected to 'stretch' constituents in the interests of peace, all the while remembering that if the elastic is stretched just a little too far there is always the danger of the elastic snapping. The subsequent dislocation between the leadership and constituents could have long term implications for the process, perhaps even leaving the leadership without a mandate.
- ***Relating to other party leaders:*** some leaders acknowledged that political leadership in societies in transition 'is like the poles

of a wigwam – take one leader away and they all fall down’. Since the leadership is dependent on others within the process, dealing with other party leaders in all case studies appears to have been a necessary but difficult task. The fact that most relationship building opportunities and peer-learning sessions between leaders either stop or suffer from a lack of coherence immediately after an agreement has been reached, has added to such difficulties.

- ***Working with the civil service:*** the cultivation of relationships between the top echelons of the civil service and the political leadership is important. While the notion exists that the civil service will work under whatever political entity is agreed upon, there were fears within some political circles that the civil service would not want to relinquish the control which it had maintained over certain departments and areas.
- ***Imminent elections:*** leadership challenges, by-elections and votes of no-confidence are common in societies in transition. They have a tendency to promote political inter-group tensions and even the threat of an election can force the leadership to take a less conciliatory approach than sometimes expected.
- ***Realignment of party politics:*** while this particular issue holds little importance in the early stages of the transition from violence to politics, it can take on more validity as the process continues. Nearly all of the political parties studied have been formed with policies and ideals based on the conflict and not on more general social or economic issues. The leadership has to prepare itself for a possible realignment of party politics in the post violent phase of the process.
- ***Dealing with change:*** political change involves risks and leaders may be reticent to admit to changes in their own position lest it be interpreted as weakness among their core support. Leaders may also deny the changes undertaken by others. While change

is a much less easily defined issue than some of the others, it is perhaps one of the most crucial.

- **Process management:** process management is a crucial element of any agreement to ensure that the responsibilities, challenges, and relationships are not forgotten or damaged during crises. In reasoning why there have been transition difficulties, some have pointed to a lack of ‘process management’ at leadership level during crises.

### **Key Recommendations**

While it is ‘political’ with a small ‘p’ to focus on the success of a process and agreement, procedures and protocol also need to be put in place to help leaders cope with possible set backs, suspensions, and failures. The key issues mentioned here need to be taken into further consideration at the initial stages of any future peace processes. Consequently, practical policy recommendations relating to the key issues are suggested:

- **Political power:** maintaining a sense of balance when dealing with political power is necessary to preserve the process. An ‘Implementation Committee’ could be established as part of future agreements to examine whether the implementation of disputed issues is in accordance with the initial agreement. The establishment of such a committee could circumvent recourse to legal avenues.
- **Leading the party:** while trying to encourage opinion, argument, debate and discussion throughout the party, it is still important for the leadership to maintain control through some degree of ‘executive leadership’.
- **Delivering constituents:** the dislocation of leadership-constituent relations could be prevented through the active endorsement (where possible) of an open and transparent public consultative process prior to and following formal negotiations

to ensure that constituents are aware of the problem issues and concessions that may have to be made.

- ***Relating to other party leaders:*** crisis management protocol and the continuation if not acceleration of relationship building opportunities between leaders is both necessary and vital in the post violent phase.
- ***Civil service:*** a specific programme of transition could be developed to promote a joint understanding of the civil service and its roles and structures for the political players, and vice-versa.
- ***Imminent elections:*** the possible destabilising influence of ‘electoral politics’ at critical junctures in a peace process should be recognised. With this in mind, by-elections and other local elections could, perhaps, be circumvented by a prior agreed policy of co-option or delay for a determined period of time following the initial agreement. This process has been partially implemented in the case of Northern Ireland, through the Northern Ireland Assembly (Elections) Act 1998. Article 3 of the Act states that *‘the Secretary of State may by order make provision for the filling of vacancies occurring in the Assembly membership after the election under section 2’* and that *‘such provision may be made by reference to by-elections or substitutes or such other method of filling vacancies as the Secretary of State thinks fit’*.<sup>139</sup>
- ***Process management:*** a representative body much like the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) which was established in South Africa as *‘a multi-party council, which would manage the process once agreement on the constitution had been reached’*<sup>140</sup> should be developed as part of future agreements.

## **Adding to the Literature**

Much of the literature on leadership and conflict has been only two-dimensional in its construct. Burns' (1978) work on 'leaders versus power-wielders'<sup>141</sup> and Rejai and Philips' (1988) on 'loyalist versus revolutionary leaders'<sup>142</sup> are cases in point. While Rothstein's (1999) analysis of strong and weak leaders is useful, it fails to address the relationship of strong versus weak leadership on the same side of religious/ethnic divides, and does not question whether changes in the political dynamic are dependent upon this. For example, what changes could there have been in the political dynamics of Northern Ireland during the peace process if Adams (Sinn Fein) was considered strong while Hume (SDLP) was considered weak, or if Trimble (UUP) was considered weak and Paisley (DUP) considered simultaneously strong? The dynamic of two strong leaders may have still existed, but not among leaders that would ordinarily feel comfortable conducting business with each other. Furthermore, where does this particular dichotomy of strong and weak leadership leave the multi-dimensional nature of the South African peace negotiations, and the internal wrangling between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and others? Such analysis does not sufficiently take into account what makes for strong leadership in divided societies and in societies in transition. The research in this study has shown that both are relatively fluid concepts. Strong leaders can suddenly become weakened by a series of issues and challenges with which they are confronted, especially in the post-agreement phase.

Licklider's (1993) hypothesis that the decision to end war is a policy change which happens in conjunction with a leadership change, is not wholly applicable in two of the three case studies examined here. In Northern Ireland, the leadership has remained quite consistent for the duration of the conflict, peace process, and settlement, with the exception of Trimble's rise to power in 1995. In South Africa, there was the change in leadership in the National Party from Botha to de Klerk. In Israel, the leadership on the Israeli side has remained in a constant state of flux. In Northern Ireland

and South Africa, it has been a change in leadership on the side perpetuating the status quo, which may have been the catalyst, since the leadership on the side which was advocating change remained the same. Frequent leadership changes in Israel has meant that new leaders were not necessarily as committed to the previous leaders policies of peace, preferring to renegotiate such policies on their own terms.

Finally, while Darby and MacGinty (2000) argue that ‘during peace negotiations the primary function of leaders is to deliver their own people’, the research would suggest that during the transition period which follows successful negotiation, a secondary function of leaders is to help opponents keep their people engaged in the process, by not undermining the opponents leadership. The rationale for this is that undermining leadership leads to a weak leadership. A weak leadership further weakens the entire transition process. South Africa has successfully managed to carry out this secondary function during the period of the Government of National Unity. Both Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine continue to struggle with the dilemma of keeping one’s own supporter on board and simultaneously helping to keep opponents supporters on board.

### **Future Research**

It is clear that further research into the subject area of political leadership in divided societies and societies in transition is urgently required. There is some current research in the field that can be readily applied to a deeply divided society. Roberto Chene’s work on intercultural leadership and how dominance is the root of conflict is an appropriate example, since he argues that *‘we are not in conflict because of our racial, ethnic, gender, religious, linguistic, and other differences....we are in conflict because these differences are structured into relationships based on dominance. Dominance is the root of the conflict, not the differences’*.<sup>143</sup> Chene calls for training in intercultural leadership, since it acknowledges that ‘human reality is culturally diverse’. Margaret Hermann has recently discussed the concept of leadership and change and asks what kind of leaders

promote change, what kind of constituents support or push for change, does their mutual relationship matter, and what are the prevalent conditions?<sup>144</sup> Scholarship focusing on changes in divided societies will surely benefit from such research. More specifically, however, a number of areas have emerged from this research which would warrant further examination.

#### Political Leadership Training

During the open-ended interviews conducted in Northern Ireland many of the politicians referred to time spent in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Arniston, South Africa as guests of IDASA, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa. These were just two of a series of trips which took place at various stages of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Others included Airlie House, Virginia (1990), Grenoble, France (1990), Strasbourg (1993), and Des Moines (1994). Most of those interviewed regarded the impact of these trips as positive, although a few expressed negative views. Nevertheless, the *inference* to these specific trips did prompt consideration into researching their true value more closely. Did these learning exercises contribute significantly to the peace process in Northern Ireland? Is this also the case in other societies? How does the need for learning change in societies in transition? How are such needs met?

A plethora of study visits, programmes, and exchanges have arisen in recent months and years, which focus on, and are aimed towards political leadership in societies in transition. Stemming from this is the need to study, analyse and review the implications of such projects. Simple questions surrounding issues such as the helpfulness of the programmes, how the participants are targeted and selected, who nominates, who selects, who funds and why these projects are funded should be discussed. At a more complex level, questions which examine the programmes' overall contribution to peace processes, and progressing towards settlement warrant answers.

#### Political Leadership and Civil Service Dynamics

A number of those interviewed for the 'Protagonist to Pragmatist'

research project mentioned the challenges and issues which have arisen between politicians and the civil service. The dynamic of the relationship between them, the power struggle, and controls of information were all key issues raised. There seems to exist a lack of understanding about how a society in transition will impact upon the civil service, and how the role of the civil service evolves as societies move from violence towards politics. The impact of further research into this particular area could build upon possible strained relationships by promoting an understanding between the groups as to the needs for and validity of each contribution to the transition process.

#### Political Leadership and Political Prisoners

The phenomenon of political prisoners has created the emergence of new forms of leadership in societies where conflict is often related to the struggle for national independence, secession, self-determination or greater political accommodation. Reference was made to this particular phenomenon by interviewees in all three case studies, with Republican and Loyalist former prisoners having risen to political prominence in Northern Ireland, and much of the 'internal' leadership in Palestine having spent time in prison, as have many members of the ANC in South Africa. There is a need to analyse and discuss the transition of individual political prisoners to political leaders, as part of the peace processes and societies in transition. Research could focus on the 'prisoner perspective' and examine the steps taken by both those on the outside as well as the inside towards accepting the role of prisoners and former prisoners in the resolution of conflict. As such it could question the particular positive and negative features of aspects of leadership that political prisoners can bring to the process of peace making - through legitimating particular peace deals, the state-building effort, cease-fires, decommissioning and the transition to full democratic political practice. One can ask what sort of dynamic, if any, exists between this band of leadership and the more conventional band of leadership?

### Community Leadership in Societies in Transition

While the rationale for examining the role that political leaders play in societies in transition was to detail how their roles can change, so the same rationale can apply to community leaders. Community leadership played a vital role in building relationships among communities and copperfastening progress made in the political arena. An examination of the role of community leadership will lead to a fuller understanding of another key actor in facilitating the transition from violence to politics. What will their role be in the future? How will diminishing European funding affect such leadership at community level? Is it possible for a transfer from community leadership to political leadership?

### **And finally...**

It should be acknowledged that the key issues which the political leadership faces in the settlement phase, whether individually or collectively, do have the potential to derail the process. An awareness of these issues and the potential problems which the leadership may face as the society moves from violence to politics may diminish the potential for derailment. Thus far, the leadership has tended to conduct a strategy of fire-fighting, dealing with problems as they arise, rather than engaging in any type of preventative strategy. There is a need for further research into how political power, party leadership, constituents, other party leaders, the civil service, elections, possible party realignment and the acknowledgement of change may impact on peace processes and settlements. Even with such challenges, current research has shown evidence of changes from protagonism to pragmatism in many instances. Perhaps a pragmatic peace will evolve into a principled peace, and pragmatic leadership will become principled leadership.

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## **7. Appendices**

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### **Appendix I:**

#### **Political Leadership in Divided Societies: The Case of Israel/Palestine**

Professor Naomi Chazan  
Parliament Buildings, Stormont  
10th April 2000

*NB. This transcript was typed from a transcription unit recording and not copied from an original script. Because of the possibility of mis-hearing, INCORE cannot vouch for its complete accuracy.*

Before I begin I want to set out a basic premise. The basic premise is that in a society like Israel and Palestine, ongoing conflict is absolutely abnormal and everything should be done to achieve reconciliation because it is inhuman to live in what academics call low grade conflict. It is not right and therefore the purpose of leaders is, against all odds, to find away of living a normal life in the future. That is my starting point, my essential premise, and the objective of my work as a politician.

This conflict will not go away unless it is resolved and unless there is reconciliation. When one does not treat it, it just gets more complicated and new factors are introduced and it changes shape and form. But it will not go away unless we make it go away which means we will have more difficulty than we ever imagined. And each time one thinks one has gone as far as one can go usually it is not enough because of the emotional and psychological and historically baggage that we carry. But again it won't go away if it is untreated, it just gets worse. Those are my starting premises.

I want to talk about four things. I want to look at some of the characteristics of our leadership during the course of the peace

process. Next I want to look at the dynamics of the relationship between leaders and followers, party members and community members during the course of the peace process. I am talking really about back at the beginning of the 1990's but specifically about the Oslo process in 1993. So I will discuss the dynamics and then I want to deal with some of the factors that I think have influenced both the leaders and relationship between leaders and followers in Israel and see where we are going from here.

Let me start with 'Leaders in the Peace Process'. Israel has had some very well known leaders - Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Begin, Rabin, Netanyahu, and now Barak. And the first question one has to ask is what characteristic of leadership allows a leader like Rabin, who was elected because he was a Commander in Chief of the Army, a little bit better left of centre but not too much to take a move that none of his predecessors were willing to take? What allowed him to look the Palestinians in the face and say 'I as leader of Israel understand that unless there is a just solution, based on Israeli recognition of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people, through direct negotiation with PLO and Yasser Arafat'. What is inside a leader to (not the situation) allow for that to happen?

Israel was lucky that in the earlier 1990's we had two leaders that together had four traits that were indispensable. They had the courage to pull from existing policy and chartered influence. In fact, Yitzak Rabin was the penultimate pragmatist. That's one characteristic. And he had something which every political leader dreams of and that is trust. People trusted him on the most important thing for them and that was security. And so having brought to the political process trust and pragmatism, this makes for good leadership. He had good sense or he had not choose depending on how you want to see it, but he realised he needed Shimon Peres by his side. Now what did Shimon Peres bring, that Rabin was lacking?

Shimon Peres brings, and still to this very day, brings to the process vision. One does not move towards peace and one does not move

towards reconciliation without vision. And vision comes with dedication and commitment to a picture of the future, which is very different and much more positive than the present. So he aligned with a man of vision who had the second trait.

Shimon Peres has a second characteristic he is the pen-ultimate politician in the sense that he will walk into a room and say ‘How is your granddaughter? Is she feeling better today? Did your son find a job? What is it, do you have problems with the water here? I see there are potholes in the road!’ He is a politician!

Together we have two leaders with all the characteristics needed to make change. Pragmatism, trust, vision and a nose for petty politics. Put it together and you’re on a roll. After Rabin’s assassination the Israeli’s in their great wisdom decided they wanted something different and they choose Netanyahu, who was a pragmatist and still is, and he is a petty politician and he lacks vision and he did not draw trust. And now we have Barak. And I think he has three of the traits. He is a pragmatist but he is not a great politician. He still does manage trust and what is lacking is that ‘spark’, the ‘vision’, although he is learning.

So what characteristics do leaders need? I name four that are essential and not everyone has them, and if not everybody has them, then mix them. Secondly leaders at the beginning of the peace process need objectives. They have to understand what they are there for. There are few politicians elected to office who do. They have to make their own priorities and I can think of four priorities in a conflict moving to peace situation that are important.

In a peace process the top priority has to be to make peace, to resolve things, that’s an objective. It is not just a single objective because too many things interfere in that objective but the one priority is to make it work. And I have to say what is obvious because I think it is so important.

The second priority is to protect the interests of those who elected you and immediately there is the potential for conflict. Because if the result is to make peace and one does that, one loses the protection of the interests of those that elected you. There may be a conflict of interests right at the very beginning.

The third is one has to think of ones community, and ones community is not always ones voters. But it is a section of the community that sent you. Sometimes it is in order to let the other party representing your community get the best of you.

The fourth priority is that politicians have to respect their careers and their own egos.

Therefore the objectives are, a total commitment to the process and to the resolution and it has to be done in such away that it protects the interests of ones community and ones voters, and of one's self. What a balancing act is needed in order to pursue those objectives!

There is two ways of doing this. The way we lived in Israel was a result of all this complication of the objectives of leadership. We changed our leaders all the time. We know exactly what we don't like. Usually when we get something new we get tired of him very quickly. I am beginning to think that in Northern Ireland there is a different kind of pattern. You keep the leaders and want them to change the policies, to change themselves. Essentially the two options are; you either get rid of the leaders that aren't what one expected, or it is like a marriage, only in marriage, when for thirty or forty years you really believe you are going change your partner and he is going to change in the direction you want.

We have certain characteristics that enable certain leaders to come forward and lead others and each one has had different sense of priorities and that effects the outcome and we don't know what to do with it. We either change our leaders or try to change them. To be critical about ourselves one doesn't have to live with what one has.

One has to find ways to compensate for what is lacking at the crucial point in the process. One has to find ways to compensate and after one get over the fact that it is in negotiation the other side is always, if possible, moving forward. Nevertheless, I give tremendous amount of importance to the characteristics and style of leadership and the understanding of what is needed, what is lacking, and what one has to find via partners.

Leaders never act in a vacuum and those that do make terrible mistakes sometimes fatal ones. I explained too what allowed Prime Minister Rabin to shake Arafat's hand, something that many of us thought would never happen. Out of these prolonged peace processes there is a consistent dynamic between leaders and followers. The decision to shake Arafat's hand split Israel and forced every citizen and especially party members to take sides. Is it good, is it bad? There weren't any choices in the middle. They were forced to take sides. And such a courageous decision like Rabin's enforced the extremes, in a sense it divided the patriots, because one couldn't waffle. One had to make a decision and unfortunately Rabin did not have Peres by his side and because both extremes took over the situation blew up, and then came his assassination. And the greatest failure of Israeli society is that we did not learn. Rabin didn't nurture those in the middle enough. Israel became divided and violent and he was assassinated. The key beneficiaries was those that opposed him in the form of being of Netanyahu.

We don't often get to have a second chances but Barak was elected almost year ago on the peace platform and found that the divided society in the wake of the Rabin assassination had changed shape again, and now society and the party political scheme was fragmented. Do not compensate for splits or you will get fragmentation. Fragmentation is chaotic. Prolonged division leads to fragmentation, which makes ruling more difficult and therefore there has to be constant give and take, which we have not succeeded in doing in Israel. Between courageous policy and nurturing the followers, and when the followers take over, the leaders have to

step back and re-assert courageous policies, but it is a constant dynamic between leadership policy and follower influence. Don't lose your followers and don't let them control you. There is never going to be the possibility of moving seriously without maintaining this balance.

Let me move on to those factors that therefore influence the dynamics. And I will give you the four Fs. The four Fs are going to spell success, if handled properly, not failure. The first factor both in the dynamic between leader and follower, in leadership courage, and in capability is fear. Why? I think fear governs all our successes in Israel/Palestine, what I know and experienced in South Africa, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. But how do I divide it up? What pushes us to reconcile the fear of prolonging an impossible situation? What pushes us to stop negotiating? The fear of something we don't know and the fear of the future. So factor number 1 is fear and it works both ways and against the grain. When there is an improvement we let fear of the future begin. When there is no improvement we let fear of the future permit change. So factor number 1 is fear and we have to recognise this and have to make it work for us.

Factor number two is fatigue. But fatigue is not just physical, it's mental fatigue, it's historical fatigue, it's emotional fatigue, it's fatigue in every sense of the term. Fatigue is a tremendous capital for making things happen. Why? When things are really bad, we forget, we are tired, and one of the things that frightens me the most, I must admit, is that when things here keep moving forward we allow fatigue to overtake us. Because the nuts and bolts of implementing agreements are a task of drudgery in the extreme and drudgery allows us to get tried and when we are tried we are no good. So the second factor is fatigue.

A third factor is friction, personnel friction but friction also between external influences which tend to bring out the best in us not the worse. Most Americans and South Koreans don't love the US but when President Clinton intervenes it actually moves the process

forward. So the friction between the external and this creates domestic pressures which tend to be prosaic. Why? Because leaders like to do what we think and our people and our orders have to live everyday. And we will have the friction between external influence which moves us forward and the domestic internal prosaic pressure which helps to hold us back. We need the balance.

The fourth factor is failure, and in order to answer what failure is one has to know what power measures success. I can say to you today with the greatest belief of certainly that success for us is the completion and implementation of a full peace treaty with the Palestinian's and Syrian's and the Lebanese. What do I mean by that? Success by us is the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel. A full peace treaty along with Syria which involve a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a comprehensive peace. If that is success then why does failure happen? Failure means that we not achieved our goal, our specific detailed concrete goal that I just described. So I have suggested four factors here, fear and how to deal with it, fatigue and how to deal with it, friction and how to deal with it, and the definition of failure and how to be able define success with it.

I essentially said three things this morning; first I said that the relationship between leaders and followers and the possibly of forward movement depends on constant balancing on every part, that's number one.

The second thing I that I am saying is that prolonged processes of negotiations develop their own patterns and norms and problems and dynamics. And if one drags them out for too long, they become the new realities, and they aren't always positive realities. Therefore, I've become convinced that time is of the essence because of the setting down of the norms and patterns during the process. I am not going to talk about dead-lines because we live with deadlines all the time. We have Middle Eastern 'time', we have Irish 'time', and also Mauritanian 'time'. And the bottom line of all these 'times' is you never meet the deadline. But time is an essential factor, because of the fact that these new norms are laid down.

And the third thing that I am saying, is that I think leaders have a responsibility to make it work. And it's a responsibility that is very difficult for us to understand fully because this is a responsibility for future generations rather than facing problems and because present problems are so vexing. It's very easy to justify to ourselves periodically being racked about our own responsibilities to future generations but we can't shrug responsibilities because prolonged conflict in our society is unthinkable and it is unfair to our children and our grandchildren that if we don't do it we are going to lead them to a situation which is worse than the one we have received, because it is more complicated. In other words I believe very strongly that reconciliation is inevitable and we have to help it along. And because it's inevitable, it's not impossible.

Thank You very Much.

\* Professor Naomi Chazan was first elected to the Knesset on the Meretz (Democratic Israel) list in June 1992. She was re-elected to a second term in May 1996, and has just returned for a third term. Naomi Chazan is Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and serves on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (concentrating on issues relating to the peace process and Israel's foreign relations), on the Economics Committee and the Committee on the Status of Women. In the past two terms she was one of the top legislators in Israel's parliament, specializing in women's rights and consumer issues.

Born in Jerusalem, Naomi holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Until her election to the Knesset, she was Professor of Political Science and African Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem where she served as Chair of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. She has been a Visiting Professor of Government at Harvard University, and a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. She has authored and edited eight books on comparative politics and written numerous articles on African politics, Arab-Israeli relations, Israeli politics, and women and politics.

Naomi Chazan has been Vice President of the International Political Science Association and President of Israel Chapter of the Society for International

Development. Among the founders of the Israel Women's Network, the Israel Women's Peace net, the Jerusalem Link, and Engendering the Peace Process, she is active in a variety of professional, human rights and peace organizations.

## **Appendix II:**

### **Political Leadership in Divided Societies: The Case of South Africa**

Pravin Gordhan

Parliament Buildings, Stormont

10th April 2000

*NB \*This transcript was typed from a transcription unit recording and not copied from an original script. Because of the possibility of mis-hearing, INCORE cannot vouch for its complete accuracy.*

Unlike Northern Ireland we have overcome much of our problems and we have certainly a platform for future generations of South Africans to look forward to a situation where they can say they have an relative peace, they have an institutional foundation for their future, and all they have to worry about is how they build on the foundations that Nelson Mandela and others built for them. In South Africa today we have the emergence of a first generation of late teens and early twenties who actually don't know what the anti-apartheid struggle was about. They had actually never been participants in that process because they were either to young or they never quite remembered what happened. And so when we speak about the struggle, and we speak about the environment in which we had to work and the sacrifices which we had to make, it's nice news, but that is about it. They can't relate to it, in a way which our generation can relate to it. How much better would it be for Northern Ireland if that generation could begin to develop here? You would begin to find that the anxiety which we attach to our government, and political discourse, is one that is for now and one that can be overcome.

I would like to say a few words about the process here and because you are so involved in it you might not realise how important your contributions are to the conflict resolution processes elsewhere. In Northern Ireland you have come up with a fairly unique

constitutional formula and one that has not been exercised anywhere else in the world, and one that I am confident will serve as a precedent for many other parts of the world to resolve their problems. You have devised and refined the process of putting the Belfast Agreement together; a conception of the transitional process which hasn't applied anywhere else.

In South Africa we defined the transition process from 1992 to 1994 and then for the next five years that we had to have the so-called 'interim constitution' that we put together for that limited period. Your conception of the transition process is very different and one that is fully rewarded with negotiations and debate. You have actually left many questions answered and many questions unanswered and because of our own situation you could possibly leave some questions unanswered so that future generations could cope with them. Of course that leaves you in a process where you are uncertain. You have a current lack of clarity of what would be the final stage. I believe, unlike the South African situation and many others elsewhere in the world, you can't actually speak of the future, in a constitutional sense. You can only speak of a future vision in terms of a peaceful and reconciled society which continues to search for new formulas to find different generations of settlements, so to speak, building on the kind of foundations that you have in the current agreement before you. You certainly might want to ask how far have we gone? Have we set out a significant enough platform for further developments in the peace process in this part of the world? Have we significantly transcended the divides amongst leaders, activists and amongst our public?

From afar, it seems as if you have come along away in the last few years. It seems that the validity of your leadership to talk to each other, whatever strains there might be, whatever difficulties there might be, whatever pretexts you might have to create so that talking might actually happen, is a major breakthrough in the process of laying a platform for further discussions in the future. The ability of your public to say, and it seems that many are beginning to say, that

they want peace and they want the politicians to work hard at it introduces a very important dynamic. In our country it was the people who actually constantly kept up the pressure. Those that suffered under apartheid said they did not want to suffer any more, and those who didn't want to have a long winded anxiety of uncertainty attached to whether and when the apartheid would actual go wanted to force the politicians to come to some kind of understanding/answers.

Important in this context is the local business community and it's interesting that Belfast has a delegation in the US at the moment seeking investment and employment opportunities for your youth. Those are going to become important players in bringing the politicians to some sense of responsibility about the necessity to create a platform for the future.

But we must compliment your present generation of political leaders, because they have seized the opportunity for peace, they have shown tremendous flexibility in bringing the process where it is, up to this point in time, and as I said earlier, that you are stuck with this unique notion of the transition of the old Northern Ireland too the new Northern Ireland.

But peace is not easy and it cannot be sustained without winning the hearts and minds of supporters and contenders for the offices that a politician holds and with keeping the confidence of both sides together is never a easy task and is never accomplished in one move. It's a long and a tedious process of engagement, of debate, of discussion, of frustration, of persuasion, of apparent consensus late one evening, a breaking up at 4 in the morning and waking to find that you have to go back to the table trying to make sense of it again. It's the process and that view of this generation of negotiators have to undertake this because if we don't then we leave nothing for future generations.

And I also want to tell you what is interesting as we have this seminar today; Nelson Mandela is in London and is on his way to Dublin.

Because as the Speaker pointed out earlier on, he is the symbol of many things that you in Northern Ireland can actually learn from. He is symbol of determination, of extreme forms of wisdom, an insight into human processes and a vision of a future society. After 27 years of imprisonment, his ability to understand that humanity cannot only be fair if you yourself cannot be fair, and if you cannot reflect that humanity in your day to day practices. And he has given a number of demonstrations in South Africa to the world of what it means to move in that particular direction and perhaps his most important role was when he went to a small town in the northern part of the country and had tea with Betsy Verwoerd, whose husband, Hendrick Verwoerd, was responsible for creating the notion of apartheid, designing and actually implementing it, particularly in our education system. He brought together the wives of various apartheid Prime Ministers, and had tea with them as a symbol of reconciliation.

Rugby in South Africa is a white sport, it is an Afrikaner sport. On the occasion of the world cup in 1995 Mandela wore a Springbok jersey for the final match. He could well have been described as a traitor or as one who betrayed the passion for which we opposed the white reform in South Africa and yet he was prepared to make that move, under the glare of the tens of thousands of people in that stadium. We have to constantly ask how our leaders in fact ensure that we take those sorts of opportunity, which might appear to be simple, might appear to have no symbolic value but in fact it might have tremendous push in processes of searching for peace in that particular country.

The second issue that I want to talk about is this. You have achieved so much yourselves, what can we from South Africa talk about as lessons of political leadership? In the first incident the political leaders in South Africa have many, many different varieties. I was just describing Nelson Mandela, our current President. President Mbeki has a different kind of charisma, a tremendous intellect and a tremendous flexibility, and if there was a pragmatist he would be

the ultimate pragmatist in our situation. However we have others who died just before we got our freedom - Chris Hani was the leader of the military wing of the ANC, at that time, and up to 1993 before he was assassinated, and notwithstanding the fact that he came from a military background, he was willing to participate and support in the peace process at that time. In F.W. De Klerk, Roelf Meyer, and P.W. Botha, in the National Party, you had a generation of leaders who began to see that the road that they followed in the former apartheid, did not have a participator future. They realised that they had to find a new future.

And for a short while, between 1990 - 1992, they thought that they could engage in negotiations and yet not negotiate. They thought they could engage the ANC but not engage for democracy. They thought they could engage with the peace process and yet somehow keep their options open. In May 1992 that option of balancing but balancing the wrong way actually ended as an option. By September 1992 the Report of Understanding was signed between De Klerk and Mandela, which said the playing of games was now over. If we want to see a new constitutional future for South Africa, then it is absolutely right we start to discuss the real issues. And the real issues are, in our context, how do we have democratic majority control? How do we not deprive the black people of their God given right in the first place, to have a democratic future in their own country? You actually put the lesson at a different kind of political base, whose base was a provincial one, whose alliance was on traditional leaders within that particular area and had the wrong axes to grind in that context. But after many peaks and drops in that process of talks, today F.W. De Klerk is no longer in government of National Unity, Chief Buthelezi is, and his partnership with the ANC and with it all the strings that it still carries, still continues 6 years on 1994.

In the early 90's we had many homeland leaders. Each one was worried, and very accurately pointed out the question, 'What's my political future? Where is my standing going to be if I sign on the dotted line? Where do I align myself?' And in the negotiation

processes that we were involved in between 1991, 1992 and 1993 many of these leaders you could actually see moving between the two major parties. In 1992 most of these were with the National Party, by 1993 most of them were with the African National Party. Because they realised that was where the future was going and they have now found peace most of them, with the ANC and have become members of the ANC.

Some, of course, have wished to play no part in this process. One of those is Eugene Terrablanche. A couple of weeks ago he entered a non racial jail. His cell holds 38 people and is largely black and he is going to spend a year there, for criminal offenses he has committed. After two years propounding racists policies and philosophies, and now deserting his people and spending this time in jail. That's the future of one our political leaders!

In all these years in South Africa, we have seen all kinds of motives for being in political leadership. We have seen directive leadership, and a high level of participatory practices and sensitivity. And that's how I would categorise many of the leaders within the ANC and similar organisations. You have the South African leadership, who were leaders who believed they had a monopoly of wisdom and they have culture within their organisations which says that leader's door shuts and they're are many, in the debate, who thinks that the leader decides. And the National Party certainty has that sort of leadership, and it worked a lot of the time and it didn't work sometimes.

In addition, I have in my notes here, the question of leadership, image and people. There is no doubt that many leaders in the process does go back to play an important role and increasingly we need to talk about that in the politics domain. Political leader do not operate within a vacuum, they operate within a context. And its important that certain elements of that context are openly debated as well. Amongst those would be, what governs the forces within that particular country? In South Africa it was different, there it was

quite clear that the African minority was in the majority, that is, we talked about them to see that they would remain beneficiaries of what was a democratic future. Whites were in a minority when there was no situation when they would be able to become the majority. But at the same time there was the fundamental principle that all South Africans are South African. That they belong to South Africa and they have a future in South Africa. But those numbers and that demographic configuration does influence how we actually see things.

Secondly, notions of power sharing, or dual power, or governments of National Unity, can only be crafted on an understanding of what is this balance of forces? But in South Africa, we demonstrated that in the majority party within the ANC there was the capacity to understand that whilst one carries the numerical superiority, in many other areas we didn't enjoy that superiority. For example in the economic plane, our economy is largely controlled by the whites. In the military at that time, a lot of the military power belonged to the State. The police was controlled by the white minority at that particular point in time. The Civil Service was 1.2 million people and was largely white, and largely Afrikaner, and those realities had to be taken into account when trying to shape the future of South Africa.

What were the issues which leaders had to bend minds around? What were the issues that challenged whether political leadership was exercised in the right kind of way? Were there creative options being developed and sufficient pragmatism of which an ability to use would be exercised from time to time? In the case of the majority party, the ANC as early as 1990 - 1991, we had to answer questions from the business sector 'Do sanctions still apply in South Africa?' Before the 1990's sanctions played a very important role in advancing the anti-apartheid struggle. The second question at that time was 'When do you suspend the Armed Struggle?' In respect of the first, it was a leadership driven resolution. At a Congress of the ANC 1991, Mbeki, then a senior member of the National Executive, stands up and pressured thousands of delegates that the time has

come for us to drop sanction and to suspend them. Finally, after enough debate it was accepted. With the suspension of the arms struggle on the 6th of August 1990, with the second major round of talks begin, between the ANC and the National Party government. The ANC voluntarily put on the table a resolution, which said that ‘we have now accepted to pro-actively suspend armed action as the negotiation process advances’.

In 1992-1993, the ANC had to battle around the concept of ‘Interim Government’. In the late 1980’s period when the negotiation process was being fashioned, the ANC believed that you would have a government, with some from the existing National Party government and some from the outside, and that the Interim Government would create the conditions for elections to actually take place, and then the Legislature and the National Party Government would be suspended. By the time you come to this, in 1993, what emerged? We emerged with a transitional Executive Council; emerging from all the parties that were negotiating. This had a checking and balancing power, and could veto certain things that the government could have put through. The National Party Government continued to remain in office. We set up a number of independent institutions; an Electoral Commission, a Media commission and several others, and put up a unilateral act, and those were responsible for creating the conditions for the election themselves. So we had moved, from an earlier notion of Interim Government to a new notion of Interim Government.

In November of 1993, as we were beginning to package the interim constitution as the embodiment of the South African settlement, several issues had to be resolved. The first was, do we give the five opposition parties a role in the National Executive of the country? And so emerged the concept of the Government of National Unity. Secondly what do you do about this balance of forces around the public services, the police, the military and so on? Well, ‘Sunset’ Clauses were introduced into the constitutions. In one set of instances, 36 died last year, in terms of the fact that no public servant could be fired from their resource. The third was, how could we

craft the provincial-government system, so that it does not fragment South Africa? The fourth was the local government system, an issue on which the National Party was the most resistant in terms of change. You might not be aware but although we have democracy in South Africa, we still today carry a formula agreed in the 1993 negotiations, where in any city 50 percent of the wards are assigned to the white community and 50 percent of the wards are assigned to the blacks. It is only when new elections take place, sometime between November of this year and February of next year, that we will have a totally democratic local government system.

In the 1996 negotiations for a new constitution, there was ‘property clause’ the national anthem clause and the education clause and the position of traditional leaders, but I do not have time to go into these in detail. I will pick one of these; the ANC notwithstanding its majority status, had to reach compromise in order to enable the negotiations, around the new constitution to be completed.

As leaders challenging the chairperson and operating in a particular type of conflict, we have to deal with particular set of historical contradictions. They have to resolve particular political issues in a conflict in which they find themselves either majority or minority. Whether they can actually exercise their influence, or whether they can actually persuade people to buy into their sense of vision and their sense of strategy, or more importantly their sense of tactics, depends on a large extent to the kind of political culture you have within.

In the ANC there was a long history of participation, of debate, of discussion, of persuasion but in other political parties there may not have been that. Equally you might have a culture where if the leader speaks, then that become the policy of that organisation.

In answer to the question is ‘how do you exercise leadership’?, one can be mindful of the kind of political culture that prevails in a particular society and more importantly a particular political organisation. The type of leadership is important. Nelson Mandela,

for all his strength of his character and strength of views, is very strong. He would be adamant about point A. You could actually have a tough debate with him, on a one to one level, or in a meeting like this. And if he is finally gets persuaded by you, and he thinks that you have a point he will change his mind and tell you he was wrong. Therefore, he has the capacity of a leader who for 27 years showed that he had to have a single-minded determination to survive, on the one hand, and on the other he has the ability to be sensitive to his constituency, to the memberships of his organisation and to people outside. And also to receive ideas in a particular way and if need-be to adapt these ideas to a new way of thinking.

I believe that leadership does not operate outside of external influences. In South Africa the bureaucracy played quite the hero in getting the negotiations off the ground. The military/security establishment also played the hero, enabling negotiations to take place. These should be brought into the public debate as well in order for us to understand the kind of role that they are likely to play or may want to play.

The South African situation was that political leadership was demonstrated through several types of decisive steps that leaders had to take. One of the first was that South Africans decided that we wanted to solve our problems ourselves. We did not want someone from the UN to come in and negotiate for us or mediate our own situation. Therefore, in our negotiating environment we had people like myself, who had to chair sessions of 20 - 26 parties and listen to all their views. Despite the fact that I came from the ANC, I had to have the capacity to be objective and neutral in deciding where we would go or how sufficient consensus needed to be declared.

Secondly we designed an individual process; there is no model that I am aware of. But at the same time, we were very aware in designing our constitution that there was many models available to us in many parts of the world. Lets look at all of them - Canada, United States, Nigeria, India, Australia etc. We looked at all of them and chose

what we thought was appropriate to our own situation and we adapted the models that were applicable for our own situation.

I think leaders require the ability to be allowed to make mistakes and acknowledge those mistakes. And how we create opportunities for them to do so, is as important as their ability to concede that they have made mistakes. Often, the way in which the media plays a role and with the way that the political leaders play with the media, we end up backing ourselves into a corner, and then we spend more time getting out of that corner than ever solving the problem.

In your current impasse, we might want to ask the question how do we get rid of the corners, if that's possible, so that you can never paint yourself into it. The importance of course is keeping lines of communication open amongst the various protagonists is crucial. In May 1992, the talks collapsed and we had to agree that the talk's negotiation process had ended. But as a result of the majority of all sides, that we needed to keep talking the umbilical cord remained between the ANC and the National Party. As a result of that, talks between Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa took place and by September 1992 the Accord of Understanding was signed and the process was back on track. You will have breakdowns; the question is how will you keep lines of communication open?

There is also the difference between leadership and different phases of the negation process. In the pre-settlement period there is no doubt that leaders tend to be highly principled and fairly rigid and dogmatic. They have a policy and they want to stick to it, they will not denounce it. During the settlement period you will see a new form of pragmatism arising, a new personal set of relationships begin to emerge, a new understanding of the dynamics on all sides, and an appreciation of what are the constraints each of the sides has and what they have to work with. In the post-settlement period, there are plans for the questions that Naomi asked. And that is 'Where is my future? Where am I going to work? How am I going support my family? Do I really want to be made a full-time politician?'. Those

questions can have a major impact on how a leader behaves, from time to time. Lastly of these is, how do we carry supporters with us? There is always a leader sacrifice in the relationship between the leaders, supporters and member of an organisation. There are times when leaders are away ahead, and there are times when members are away ahead. There is also times when the leaders think they understand and do understand the dynamics, but there are times when the public and the membership understands better than the leader. What is quite critical is to open room for debate and in ensuring that the leaders can in fact pursue the supporters to move.

Clearly, what is also important in many political parties is the level of competition for the top position. Whether the competition is tough and while many people believe that they should in fact be the leaders in that political party, any individual in that situation in a political party has less space for maneuver. Those factors play a clear role in determining what kinds of space the political leader has, in meeting the other side's goals. What was quite crucial in our situation, was the ability of the ANC leadership to be about 80% transparent and to continuously communicate downwards, to keep people informed of the debate and developments, to ensure that the whole concept was publicly shared about how negotiations happened, what the nature of compromises would be, and the necessity for compromises. Leaders do not often want to say we have to compromise. Nelson Mandela would go out publicly and say that we are only negotiating and meeting with each other because we need each other to move from where we are. And he would go out and say, 'don't expect us to solve all of South Africa problems all at once. It will take time to solve the housing and water problems'. conflict. Equally, the relationship between leaders and their followers can be fought with all sorts of problems. I do not believe there is a single formula which you can apply. One could say that for the unique organisational cohesion, you need frankness, you need a sufficient level of preparation for people to follow you when you start from nowhere and you have not a plan. Don't expect them to be able to follow the snake like maneuvers that you will have to undertake when you are in the middle of the negotiation process.

**From Protagonist to Pragmatist 102**

The last point I want to make in that context, is the importance of operational trust. I believe South African leaders from all the different parties were able after that 1992 period, to develop a level of trust where they couldn't agree on the subsistence of the issues but they could agree on the process. And sometimes when you cannot start agreeing on the process this becomes a substitute for the fighting on the substance itself. It is very important in order to move the process forward that we try to establish an operational trust, when we say 'we will not attack each other publicly', well lets do it. But if we say that we are going to attack each other publicly, then we should give notice to the other side. That often happened in South Africa. Mr. De Klerk would say to Mr. Mandela, 'I am going to attack you in parliament tomorrow'. There was an awareness and necessity in that environment to do so.

In conclusion let me say that it is very interesting that in your situation what you have is a settlement, or rather you are in agreement to settle rather than settlement. Therefore, you have to begin to understand that there is still a long road to travel. You have made tremendous process and I can only appeal to you not to loss all the advances that you have put together for yourselves just because there appears to be a hiccup of one sort or another. And the second point is that the future is in the future, in other words let us try to get things right now. Let the future build its self as we begin to get the fundamentals in place. The third is emphasis on the importance of civil society organisations like INCORE and I am sure you have others here. They play a vital role in enabling us to open our minds and hearts to different ideals and to seeing things in a different way. And they should increasingly become a powerful force in influencing political leaders in terms of the direction they go. You still have unfinished business, your community certainty wants peace, your business sector wants growth and your youth want jobs. And I believe that if your political leaders put their hearts and heads together it is possible that the protagonists of conflict can become pragmatists of solutions, but more importantly pragmatists of peace.

Thank You

**From Protagonist to Pragmatist 103**

\*Pravin Gordhan joined the South African Revenue Service in March 1998 as Deputy Commissioner. He was appointed a Commissioner in November 1999. Before his days as a tax and customs administrator, he was elected as a member of Parliament of the Republic of South Africa as a representative of the African National Congress (ANC). As a member of Parliament, he was appointed as a Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Constitutional Affairs. In his capacity as Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Constitutional Affairs, he had the onerous task of overseeing the implementation of the New Constitution, the Local Government transition as well as the Provincial System.

Prior to 1994, Pravin was an integral part of South Africa's struggle for and transition to democracy and played an important role in this negotiated process. He participated in this negotiation process from the very beginning and was a delegate to the multiparty negotiating structures. He held several key positions in the multiparty negotiating structures e.g. Chairperson of the Daily Management Committee and management Committee of CODESA (Conference for a Democratic South Africa) (1992), co-chairperson of the Planning Committee and Negotiating Council of the Multiparty Negotiating Process (1993) and Co-chairperson of the Transitional Executive Committee (1994).

He was also integrally involved in the development of South Africa's new Constitution as well as in drafting thereof as a member of the Constitutional Committee of the Constitutional Assembly, and as chair of the subcommittee dealing with provincial powers, the National Council of Provinces and Local Government. During 1997, he lead a team of political representatives and experts in the formulation of the South African governments new policy for local government.

Pravin was born and bred in Durban, Kwa-Zulu Natal Province, and obtained a Bachelor of Pharmacy degree from the University of Durban-Westville. During this time, Pravin was already an active and important member of the anti-apartheid movement, with involvement in community-based mass organisations, a number of development bodies and political organisations.

## **Appendix III**

### **Leadership for Peace-Building: Closing Remarks**

Dr. Kennedy Graham  
University of Jordan, Amman  
13th November 2000

Your Royal Highness, Prince Faisal bin Hussein, representing Her Majesty, Queen Noor al-Hussein, Chairperson of the Advisory Committee, it is an honour to report to you on the Academy's course on Leadership for Peace-building.

The Course was held from the 2nd to the 13th of November. It was convened by the Academy working in partnership with its UNU partner organization, INCORE - the Initiative for Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity, of the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland. It was a pleasure to work so closely and effectively with a sister organization of the UN University.

The theme, leadership for peace-building, had been chosen as a sequel to the theme of last year's course - leadership for conflict resolution. For the judgment was made that, following a period of conflict, and then peace-making, the critical process of peace-building gets underway. These conceptual stages, of course, reflect the theoretical constructs in 'Agenda for Peace', the seminal document of the United Nations on the subject, prepared during the 1990s.

The thematic questions posed before the course concerned the leadership dimension of peace-building. The circumstances prevailing during conflict compared with the period of post-conflict are clearly very different. To what extent does this require a change in mind-set on the part of leaders? Is that change a paradigmatic one from, as INCORE put it, protagonism to pragmatism? Does the leader's mind-set change, from exclusive pursuing the interests of a

smaller band of followers in a zero-sum relationship marked by mutual violence, to serving the needs and aspirations of a broader constituency - not only one's own followers but also those of the former adversary? And to the extent that this is the case, what does that signify for the different qualities and skills required of our contemporary leaders?

The group of participants spent some two weeks exploring these questions. Participants were drawn from selected areas around the planet where peace-building is a critical challenge to societies and their leaders — South Africa, Northern Ireland and East Timor. Participants were drawn from these societies and also from Indonesia and Jordan -nineteen in all. They were primarily members of the major political parties nominated by their party leaders, as having potential for future positions of leadership. Some were researchers in conflict resolution and peace-building.

Your Highness, the course was, I believe, the most successful to date, most particularly in two respects. First, the pedagogy employed is beginning to show maturity, borne from the experience of the various courses held in recent years. We reviewed the history of leadership over the ages - its changing nature, its sources of legitimacy, its circumstantial challenges from one millennium to another. Organized human society is some five millennia old and the historical record offers us a glimpse into the leadership challenges faced by the ancients, many still of relevance to modern times and contemporary theory.

Secondly, we studied briefly the current theories of leadership, the theory of peace-building, and the relevance of the former to the latter. And the distinction between party leadership, political leadership and leadership in statecraft, and the frequent strains between them.

Thirdly, we heard about the ethics of leadership in peace-building, from a colleague who has had insight on this complex and

contentious subject through his years working for the former UN Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros-Ghali. How the institutional limitations of politics at the global level distort the art of ethical leadership practised by our world figures. How cultural variations around the world can further confront the pursuit of legitimacy in initiatives for peace-building. How the steady, incremental process of norm-building and legal codification is the only way forward.

With the theoretical module completed, the group focused on the personal dimension of leadership. Participants completed, with the assistance of a professional consultant, a personality identification profile, and received personal tuition on self-development. The thesis underpinning this approach is that individuals wishing to contribute to society should learn to identify and promote their strengths rather than rectify their shortcomings - which is, it seems, somewhat counter-intuitive for most of us. Some thirty-four behavioural characteristics are analysed, and the top five for each person identified. As a group, it appears, our colleagues are strong on relating, achieving, analyzing, strategizing, critical thinking and self-assurance. In other words, they are political men and women.

Participants were then invited to reflect on a set of questions pertaining to their individual career experiences and aspirations. The course design did not allow in-depth pursuit of this, and the Academy intends to develop this further in future courses.

The third module was comprised of experiential learning. It took three different forms. First, a simulation exercise concerning peace-building in an African society was undertaken, which required former protagonists to move to a position of pragmatism and compromise in reaching agreement over the siting of a medical clinic for two former combatant tribes. Four groups of participants experienced four different runs of the same scenario, and it was intriguing that all four differed as to the outcome.

Secondly, the group underwent a vicarious experience in leadership, through viewing an Academy video of a leadership exercise

undergone by the last course group, the Jordanian civil defence officers. Their task had been to make a square from a 60-metre rope while blindfolded. This ‘blind exercise’ resembles an emergency situation to a surprising degree. The civil defence officers had completed the task within 50 minutes. Our current group’s job was to analyse the leadership behaviour of the previous group, and the ‘followership’ behaviour as well. Given that the language used by the officers had been Arabic, 80% of our course participants could not understand what was being spoken, and were required to analyse the behaviour through visual sense and body language. The results were, let us say, highly informative.

Thirdly, the group examined the three case studies - South Africa, East Timor and Northern Ireland. Leaders of antagonistic or rival political parties came from their countries for one day for the relevant case study. The policy aspects of each case were explored, but more so the successes and failures of leadership and leaders in each case.

The fourth module was intended to be a field study of peace-building into Palestine and Israel. For obvious reasons this was not possible. Instead, the group visited the UNRWRA camp at Baqaa in Jordan, and was exposed to the sparkling eyes of the Palestinian young and the burning intensity of their elders — the passion and pain of the dispossessed. So to a satisfactory extent a field study was done, albeit in local surroundings.

Thus, the course has combined theoretical and experiential learning with personal self-development and practical field study. I believe that the Academy has a proper insight now into what is required to engage in leadership development as it pertains to global issues, and we are looking forward to developing this more in the future.

Your Highness, we are also looking forward to keeping in contact with our new alumni seated before us. I mentioned earlier that the course had proved particularly successful in two respects. The second one had to do with the personal relationships that have developed .

Of the five courses in which I have been involved since my arrival at the Academy eighteen months ago, this was the most cohesive and harmonious group of participants. I mention this because it has, I believe, special significance. For we are, after all, speaking of mid-career members of political parties who have, in essence, been at war with one another in recent history. They, or their fathers or brothers, have been enemies, or at least violent adversaries. When maiming and killing is involved, passions run deep and memories are long.

As a result, we heard, during the course, some emotional and rather harrowing personal tales. Some of our colleagues had spent time, perhaps a very long time, in prison. Others had lost a relative in combat. Losing an elder brother as a young man plunges the soul, as it were, to new depths of reflection and analysis. Does it harden the hatred and enmity for a lifetime, or does it spawn a yearning for peace and reconciliation? If you reach out the hand to your brother's adversary, are you betraying his memory? If you strike agreement through compromise on a long-held political goal for which many have sacrificed themselves, are you betraying them in death? Or are you implementing their posthumous hopes, fulfilling their silent dreams? Throughout the course, we were witness to some private testimonies of a deeply personal, and moral, kind.

You will know, Your Highness, better than most, the significance and seriousness of this kind of experience - the soul-searching that accompanies loss and tragedy. Our group participants had, in so many cases, experienced this. Coming from a personal and professional background that knows no such bitter experience, I have to say that there were times when the moment of truth surfacing in our group discussions was almost overwhelming. They brought home with full force, with an unexpected ferocity of meaning, what conflict-resolution and peace-building are about, what the seriousness of the undertaking of leadership development is about, why the Academy exists, why it strives to serve people of such calibre and potential.

The issues of peace-building are, of course, complex and the goal elusive, as we are seeing so tragically across the Jordan Valley at present. The image of Mohammed al-Durra will, I believe, continue to haunt humanity for as long as we aspire to peace and justice - which is to say, forever. We did not expect to find magic wands to resolve issues of failed peace-building. To be sure, many insights were discovered on leadership - the importance of horizontal and vertical trust, of being a good listener, of keeping faith with one's followership, helping one's opponent, allowing time for healing before moving on a policy shift though not always, distinguishing between what the people need and what they might say they want, and showing courage and a readiness for political sacrifice for the collective good. But despite these insights into leadership, we do not pretend to have emerged with full-blown answers to the problems that confront and confound Gaza, and Belfast. These problems will remain entrenched as long as individuals care about their fortune and fate, so long as passions last and linger.

And yet if a course such as this can achieve two things, then I believe it has served its purpose properly. If participants emerge with some insight into leadership qualities and skills for the arduous and delicate task of peace-building, they will have benefited in terms of their career development. And secondly, and equally importantly, if they have succeeded in the complex art of simple human bonding. Bonding across party rivalries, across bitter memories, across policy disputes and personal misunderstandings such that, as individuals, they can embrace and search for a better world for their children - their own children whom they so frequently cited in our discussion and debates. If this has occurred, and Your Highness, it was clear to me that it did occur in this course, then we have succeeded with these two past weeks. Not the Academy, not myself or my colleagues who have worked so hard to prepare and execute this course. It is the participants themselves who have succeeded. For it is their course, it is their challenge, it is their future, it is their children.

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## **9. Endnotes**

1 See Appendix I, II, & III for further details. Additional papers from the conferences are available on our conference web pages at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/publication/conference/index.html>

2 John Darby & Roger MacGinty eds., *The Management of Peace Processes* (London: Macmillan, 2000) p. 252

3 Tamar Hermann & David Newmann in Darby & MacGinty eds., *The Management of Peace Processes* pp.107-149

4 Darby & MacGinty eds., *The Management of Peace Processes*, p. 97

5 INCORE undertakes, commissions and supervises research that is multi-disciplinary, comparative and international. Major on-going Research Themes are: Peace Processes, Dealing with the Past, Policy in Transition, Governance and Diversity and Methodologies of Researching Violent/Divided Societies. Further information on all of the research is available on the INCORE web site at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/research/>

6 See Appendix I & II for texts from the conference as delivered by Professor Naomi Chazan (Meretz Party, Israel) and Pravin Gordhan (ANC, South Africa).

7 See Appendix III for the International Leadership Academy's Conference Report. Selected papers from the conference are available on the INCORE web site at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/publication/conference/ptp/ila/index.html>

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14 The definition used here is taken from Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (1998). ‘Conflict Management, like the associated term conflict regulation, is sometimes used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conflict handling, but is used here to refer to the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflict.’ p.21

15 Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Harvard: Center for International Affairs-Harvard University, 1972) p. 40

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17 Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p.43-51

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20 The definition used here is taken from Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Conflict transformation ‘implies a deep transformation in the parties and their relationships and in

the situation that created the conflict...we see conflict transformation as the deepest level of change in the conflict resolution process.' p.21

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23 Harvey Waterman, 'Political Order and the 'Settlement' of Civil Wars' in, Roy Licklider ed., *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* ( New York: New York University Press, 1993) p.292-302

24 Robert L. Rothstein ed., *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999) p.9

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26 Darby & MacGinty eds., *The Management of Peace Processes*, p.257

27 The timing of the field research in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in July 2000, coincided with the impromptu Israeli/Palestinian peace summit, at Camp David in the US. Many of those who had provisionally agreed to be interviewed left for Camp David just as the field research began. Informal discussions were held with Israeli and Palestinian academics to supplement the formal interviews as it was difficult to arrange alternative appointments at such short notice.

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29 See Appendix I and Appendix II for remarks made.

30 See Appendix III for conference closing remarks by Dr. Kennedy Graham.

31 For a more in-depth analysis of the various changes made, see Darby & MacGinty eds., *The Management of Peace Processes*, p.62-66

32 The main protagonists of the conflict in Northern Ireland were seen as the British and Irish governments, nationalists, unionists, republicans, loyalists, and at a later stage, the US.

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29 Of the four largest parties in Northern Ireland at present, three of the leaders have held their leadership positions for at least 19 years - John Hume (SDLP), Ian Paisley (DUP), and Gerry Adams (Sinn Fein). The largest party in Northern Ireland at present, the Ulster Unionist Party, has only had two leaders in a similar time frame. David Trimble became leader of the Ulster Unionist Party in 1995, having succeeded James Molyneaux who had led the party since 1979. Despite leading the party into the current peace process, it is generally accepted that Trimble was elected in 1995 from the right wing of the party due to his stance on the parading issue at that time.

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The Pomeroy incident began when the Duchess of Abercorn was scheduled to visit a small school in the village of Pomeroy in Northern Ireland to award prizes for the Pushkin Creative Writing Awards. The local Sinn Fein Councillor, Finbar Conway, had informed the local headmaster that the visit should be stopped on account of the fact that some of the parents were unhappy that a member of 'British Royalty' was to come to the school. The visit was postponed while the dispute was discussed. The issue proved to be an embarrassment for the Sinn Fein leadership on many fronts. While the party was calling for equality and inclusivity on the one hand, they were perceived as acting totally irrationally and exclusively on the other. The irrationality stemmed from the fact that the same Duchess of Abercorn had actually visited the only Irish language Secondary School in Northern Ireland, the Meanschoil Feirste, which is situated in the heart of West Belfast. On that occasion it would appear that there was no controversy regarding her visit.

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