




Community Policing in Berlin.

Background Paper.

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ABSTRACT:

The end of the Cold War brought together two Germanys that had been separated for more than four decades. However, the aftermath of jubilation showed up an entire new list of matters which were to be resolved, especially those related with policing issues. This paper compiles information about how Germany dealt with those issues and best practices. Moreover, it attempts to present a snapshot of the current policing situation in Berlin nowadays: main issues, police structure, ongoing projects and its relation with civil society.

KEYWORDS: Community Policing, Germany, Unification, Civil Society.

COMMUNITIES AND POLICING IN TRANSITION PROGRAMME:

The Communities and Policing in Transition Programme which is funded by the European Regional Development Fund and which is being launched in September 2009 is an innovative and groundbreaking project which will roll out across the North and the Border Counties. It comprises a number of key training opportunities as well as workshops and seminars on best practice with regard to the interface between policing and communities across the island of Ireland. A number of key partners have come together including both police forces, Tyrone Donegal Partnership, INCORE, ICTU and led by Intercomm Ireland.

The objective is to target key areas and also to target key issues including cultural perceptions, conflict resolution, sectarianism and racism. It is hoped that the outcome for participants will be enhanced understanding and the development of key skills in peace building, conflict resolution and best practice.

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BERLIN BACKGROUND PAPER.

Section 1: General Background.

1.1 Introduction:

On October 3, 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) absorbed the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany), thus the union of contemporary Germany was completed. This lawful accession of territory was the outcome of a treaty negotiated between the FRG's government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the GDR's government under Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière. Subsequently, the freely elected national legislative bodies of both countries ratified the treaty. Further, the four allied powers from World War II (France, Great Britain, USA, and the Soviet Union) relinquished all residual occupational rights for the city of Berlin.

To better understand policing issues in the unified state we must examine the environment and history of both police forces prior to unification.

1.2 The occupation:

When armed hostilities ended, Germany was both a defeated and devastated nation. The government had collapsed, the infrastructure was in ruins, food supply non-existent, millions of displaced persons at large. The allies established Military Government (MG) in their respective jurisdictions. Pursuant to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 approximately 25 percent of Germany's 1937 territory was transferred to (that is incorporated into) Poland and the Soviet Union. The remaining 75 percent of Germany's 1937 territory was divided into four occupation zones (Great Britain, France, USA, and the Soviet Union) (Forster, 1967). For purpose of this examination the Soviet Union's zone of occupation will be referred to as the *East Zone*, while the Western Power's area will be as the *West Zone*. Furthermore, one of the stated goals of the Potsdam Agreement was the decentralization of the German police.



1.2.1 East Zone - German Democratic Republic (GDR):

By October 1945 the Soviet Military Administration Germany (SMAD) had authorized the five German states under their authority to integrate all municipal police into state forces. In less than a year SMAD authorized the central control of the *Volkspolizei* (VP, People's Police) to be established in East Berlin. The cadre of the VP were primarily former military officers who had spent several years in the Soviet Union as POWs. Prior to the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, in October 1947, SMAD conducted its

first purge of the VP membership. All members of the VP who had been POWs in the West, had Western German relatives, or themselves came from the former German territories that had been acquired by either Poland or the Soviet Union were to be dismissed. Again, after the East Berlin rebellion on June 17, 1953, over 12,000 members of the VP were dismissed for “*unreliability*.”

The German Democratic Republic was a highly centralized national state. The security of the state was entrusted to two governmental departments. The *Ministerium für Innere Angelegenheiten* (MfIA (Ministry for Internal Affairs) was the command authority for the *Deutsche Volkspolizei* (VP – German People’s Police). The other guardian of the state was the *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (MfS, Ministry for State Security (*Stasi*)). Prior to unification the MfS was abolished by the first freely elected legislature of the GDR. On June 30 1955 The GDR became a sovereign state.

1.2.2 West Zone - Federal Republic of Germany (FRG):

The allies in the West were determined to make two significant changes in the German Police. First, they proposed to decentralize the police operations. Second, they intended to eliminate the ever present *Verwaltungspolizei* (Administrative Police) from police organizations. The Administrative Police were charged with enforcing a myriad governmental regulation: building codes, trade and commerce, health, fish and game, truancy, public concerts, etc.

The second major change – *decentralization* – was focused on the *Vollzugspolizei* (Executive Police). The Executive Police were and still are charged with public order, crime prevention, crime investigation, etc. However, each occupying power in the West Zone had a different notion on decentralization; therefore, simultaneously three different concepts were put into play:

- *French area*: decentralization through the different *lands* (states).
- *British area*: through police organizations, similar to county constabulary.
- *American area*: the most radical plan. It introduced political democracy into public safety while also ensuring the police would not become an adjunct to the military.

In 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in the territory of the West Zone. In November 1950, the Allied High Commission decided that state governments should be allowed to centralize their police forces at the state level.

The FRG on June 30, 1955 became a sovereign nation.

1.3 The unification:

The unification of the German nation on October 3, 1990 was the direct result of the Unification Treaty entered into by the governments of both the GDR and the FRG on August 31, 1990. To facilitate the continuation of public safety in the soon to be incorporated territory of the GDR, their legislature (GDR) on September 13, 1990 enacted a new police-task law for the VP. This law included the FRG’s democratic principles into the public safety function but, at the same time, the remainder of the VP organizational structure was left largely intact. Further, the law established a central *Ländes Kriminalamt* (LKA, Criminal Office) for the new territories, until each of the new states could assume responsibility for this function.

The principal goals of the government of the FRG were threefold. First, organize the police in the former GDR along the organizational principles of the FRG. Second, both equip and modernize police operations in the former GDR, and finally, create a citizen-friendly police.

Members of the western state forces were recruited to fill senior positions in the new eastern state forces. Problems relating to the modernization of equipment and technical support in the East were more or less easy to correct. The principal problem encountered by the FRG was the issues in staffing the new state forces. Many members of the VP had quit on unification. Those who remained had to submit to an extensive background investigation and if they were retained they were placed on probationary status. Consequently, there was no motivation to act and minimum risk taking was the evolving standard. At the same time, former members of the MfS (the former *Stasi*) were not eligible to apply for any law enforcement position. The result was a shortage of qualified staff.

Section 2: Socio-economical context.

2.1 Politics of Germany:

The Federal Republic of Germany is a federal parliamentary republic, based on representative democracy. The Chancellor is the head of government and federal legislative power is vested in the Bundestag (the parliament of Germany) and the Bundesrat (the representative body of the regional states).

2.1.1 Federal legislature:

Federal legislative power is divided between the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat*. The *Bundestag* is directly elected by the German people, whilst the *Bundesrat* represents the regional states (*Länder*). The federal legislature has powers of exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the states in areas specifically enumerated by the constitution.

The *Bundestag* is more powerful than the *Bundesrat* and only needs the latter's consent for proposed legislation related to revenue shared by the federal and state governments, and the imposition of responsibilities on the states. In practice, this means that the agreement of the *Bundesrat* in the legislative process is very often required, as federal legislation often has to be executed by state or local agencies. In the event of disagreement between the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat*, a conciliation committee is formed to find a compromise.

2.1.1.1 Bundestag:

The *Bundestag* (Federal Diet) is elected for a four year term and consists of 598 or more members elected by a means of mixed member proportional representation which Germans call "personalised proportional representation." 299 members represent single-seat constituencies and are elected by a First Past the Post electoral system. Parties that obtain fewer constituency seats than their national share of the vote indicates they ought to have are allotted seats from party lists to make up the difference. In contrast, parties that obtain more constituency seats than their national share of the vote indicates they ought to have are allowed to keep these so-called overhang seats. In the current parliament elected in 2009 there are 24 overhang seats, giving the *Bundestag* a total of 622 members.



A party must receive either five percent of the national vote or win at least three directly elected seats to be represented in the *Bundestag*. This rule, often called the "five percent hurdle", was incorporated into Germany's

election law to prevent political fragmentation and strong minor parties. The first *Bundestag* elections were held in the Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany") on 14 August 1949. Following reunification, elections for the first all-German Bundestag were held on 2 December 1990. The last election was held on 27. September 2009, the 17th Bundestag convened on 27. October 2009. The number of Bundestag Deputies was reduced from 656 to 598 beginning in 2002, although under the additional member system, more deputies may be admitted if a party wins more directly elected seats than it would be entitled to under proportional representation.

The Parliament of Germany, the Bundestag, has a plural multi-party system, with two major parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), with its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) in the same parliamentary group, also known as CDU/CSU or the Union. Furthermore, Germany has three minor parties, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), The Left, and Alliance '09/The Greens. The federal government of Germany usually consists of a coalition of a major and a minor party, most typically CDU/CSU and FDP, or a 'red-green alliance' of the SPD and Greens. From 1966 to 1969, and again from 2005 to 2009, the federal government consisted of a Grand Coalition

Coalitions in the Bundestag and state legislators are often described by party colors. Party colors are the Social Democratic Party being red, the Alliance '90/The Greens green, the Free Democratic Party yellow, the The Left dark red or purple, and the CDU/CSU black.

- President: *Christain Wulff* was elected as Germany's 10th post war president in July 2010 to replace Horst Koehler, who resigned due to remarks he made concerning the military while speaking before the troops in Afghanistan. The post of president is largely ceremonial.
- Chancellor: *Angela Merkel*, Germany's first female chancellor (*first East German, first scientist as well as the youngest post-war chancellor*) swept back to power in general elections in September 2009. Mrs Merkel, leader of the Conservative Christian Democrats (CDU), first took office in 2005. As a result of the votes close result, she became chancellor in a "grand coalition" involving the CDU, its Christian Social Union (CSU) allies and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

In 2009 her party secured another four years mandate with enough votes to dump the previous coalition with the SPD in favour of an alliance with the smaller, pro-business Free Democrats (FDP). The coalition faced the tough challenges of dealing with the fallout from the 2008 global economic crisis. Mrs Merkel won plaudits for her calm handling of the situation, and in 2009, Forbes magazine put her at the top of its list of the world's most powerful women for the fourth year in a row. However, clouds began to gather in early 2010, when Greece's vast debt burden sparked fears for the stability of the Euro. Mrs Merkel persuaded the parliament to approve a 22.4bn –euro German contribution to an EU loan for Greece, but observers abroad accused her of acting too slowly.

Many German voters were angered by the perceived need to pay for another country's debts, and soon after that, Mrs Merkel's coalition lost a key regional vote, and with it her majority in the powerful upper house of parliament, the Bundesrat. The setback meant she would have to rely on deals with opposition regional leaders to pass some legislation. She suffered further embarrassment when her favoured candidate for the presidency, Christian Wulff, failed to win an absolute majority in the first two rounds of voting, securing only the post in the third round.

2.2 Political Culture:

The political culture of Germany as of the early 21st century is known for the popular expectation for governments to ensure a degree of social welfare, business and labour corporatism and a multiparty system dominated by conservative and social democratic forces, with a strong influence of smaller Green, liberal and socialist parties. Coalition governments are predominant on both the federal and the state level exemplifying the German desire for consensus politics instead of one party majority rule as in democracies that follow the Westminster model. Although this consensus culture is beneficial insofar as it enables minority groups to take part in political discussions and decision making it often leads to situations in which different interest groups blockade each other resulting in political gridlocks. Political decision making is further complicated by the powers held by the German states and the presence of a judicial branch with the power to review and dismiss legislation. Therefore political power in Germany is not concentrated in the hands of one or a small number of individuals but spread thinly. Even the Chancellor can only set general guidelines for federal policies (Richtlinienkompetenz) and has to negotiate with many other politicians and interest groups when there is a need to take concrete measures. In contrast, the country is uneasy with its central position in European integration and is struggling with integrating immigrants, mainly from Muslim and eastern Eurasian countries, and the continued gap between the wealthier former West Germany and the former East Germany.

An ongoing debate in the German political landscape within the last several years has been the adoption of the Hartz reforms, based on the Hartz concept. These reforms have begun to change the social welfare state and have brought complaints from the populace.

Germany is also historically uncomfortable with nationalism and militarism after the First World War and the Second World War which left the nation occupied, in ruins, and divided. Although in

News Update:

German hosts were outraged by a speech delivered by Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Dusseldorf on Sunday 27th February 2011 before a huge crowd of Turkish immigrants. He accused Germany of seeking to forcibly assimilate its estimated 3m strong Turkish community. *"Nobody will be able to tear us away from our culture... our children must learn German, but they must learn Turkish first,"* he thundered. Not so, riposted Guido Westerwelle, who said German had to come first.

Mr Erogan was taking aim at Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who drew Turkey's anger when she declared that multiculturalism in Germany had "utterly failed". She appeared to be echoing the views of Thilo Sarrazin, a German central banker, who last year argued, in a bestselling book, that German culture was at risk from "parallel" Muslim Societies.

recent years this trend has changed quite a bit, with German army deployments in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Patriotism itself is much more visible in Germany now, noticeably since the 2006 World Cup.

2.3 German Economy:

The German people have emerged stronger from Europe's economic crisis and the country now enjoys its lowest unemployment rate since reunification 20 years ago despite the worst crisis in more than sixty years. German unemployment, which had been approaching 11 % as recently as 2005, was below 7% in October (2010). The average unemployment rate for the EU as a whole in October (2010) was close to 10%.

Despite concerns about high level debt in the eurozone, the German economy has been driving the region's economic recovery. The German economy grew by 0.7% between July and September (2010) compared with an eurozone average of 0.4%

2.3.1 Germany Trade, Exports and Imports:

- Germany's economic success since World War II is to a large extent built on its potent export industries, fiscal discipline and consensus driven industrial relations and welfare policies. It is particularly famed for its high-quality and high tech-goods.
- Germany's export- dependent economy was initially hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2008-09, which triggered the worst recession since 1949. But by 2010, its exports had helped the country more robustly than most other EU countries.
- However, an aging population has led to concern over the continued viability of Germany's high welfare and health spending. There is also a debate about how to improve integration of the many post-war immigrants whose labour helped fuel the economic boom.
- Germany has been one of the most active trading countries in the world. Its trading relationship spans almost all the major trading countries in Europe and around the world. For these reasons, Germany trade remains the largest in European Union and in the top 5 countries in the world for its trade volumes. Germany's trade is further helped by its innovation in solar power research and development. In fact, Germany is the largest producer of wind turbines and solar power technology.
- In 2009, Germany exports were \$1.187 trillion. The amount was lower than the previous year's figures of \$1.498 trillion. The country ranked 3rd in the world in exports and continues to prove its strength as the world top economy.
- Germany's main exported commodities are: Machinery, Vehicles, and Chemicals
- The main export partners of Germany are: France, US, Netherlands and the UK
- Germany imports amounted to \$1.022 trillion in 2009 and ranked 3rd in the world. The figures, understandably, were low due to recession. In 2008, the figures amounted to \$1.232 trillion.
- The real strength of Germany trade has been its productive workforce which according to 2009 figures amounted to 43.51 million. The manufacturing industries employed

almost 29.7% of the work force and the growth helped Germany trade in terms of automobiles and machinery.

- Germany comes under high-income OECD group economies as to the classification made by the World Bank on the basis of income and region for the year 2006.
- Germany is not only the largest economy in the European economy, but also one among the most developed and industrialized economies over the world. The economic system of the country is "Social Market Economy" structure. The services sector contributes a lot to the country's GDP followed by the industrial sector. Presently the country is a member of the European Union, World Trade Organization and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

2.3.2 Economic Links with Northern Ireland:

- Germany currently sources a wide range of products from Northern Ireland. These include meat and dairy products, precision engineering components for both the automotive and aerospace industries, as well as healthcare items.
- Germany is currently Northern Ireland's biggest export market on the continent, purchasing manufactured goods from local suppliers totalling almost £240 million in 2006/7.
- Northern Ireland-based companies have been boosted by almost £2million of German business during 2010. Invest Northern Ireland office in Dusseldorf, which has been a trade development centre since July 2007, has provided advice and lead generation for such companies looking to represent Northern Ireland in Germany.
- Londonderry-based Maydown Precision Engineering is one of the companies that have managed to benefit from Invest NI's work to conduct significant business in Germany. Empowerment Quality Engineering (EQE) an Omagh based specialist in quality assurance and software testing have also secured business in Germany as a result of Invest NI's efforts.
- Germany is a very important European market for Northern Ireland tourism. Despite the economic recession German visitors to Northern Ireland in 2007 increased by 46% to 59,000.

2.3.3 Economic Links with Southern Ireland:

- While the Irish economy has significant debt problems in 2011 exporting to Germany is a success with export value standing at 6.9%.
- Germany is the island's largest tourism-generating market to the island of Ireland from Mainland Europe. According to Tourism Ireland (2010) 422,000 German visitors came to the island of Ireland in 2009.
- Tourism in Ireland has kicked off its 2011 promotional drive in Germany with the launch of a €2.5m TV ad campaign. The all-island tourism body said the campaign will

be seen by more 25 million potential German holidaymakers. The ads will air on prime time TV across seven top German stations.

Section 3: Policing during the unification.

3.1 Principal Issues:

The fall of the Wall created a chaotic situation; while familiar structures were discredited almost immediately, no new ones emerged to take their place, leaving a sort of anarchic vacuum. The police and other security forces were no exception. The fear they had nourished for decades disappeared; a liberated but confused citizenry took "*freedom*" to mean "*anything goes*." When the public was not openly hostile to the police, it simply ignored them. At the same time, the psychological difficulty of dealing with the sudden, complete breakdown of a familiar social order increased the overall level of tension in the East German population, leading in turn to an increased level of violence.

Reports in the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* on the function of the police, and public administration in general, focused primarily on two principal issues in the five new states: administrative chaos and staffing problems.

3.1.1 Administrative chaos:

The LKA created by the former GDR's legislature to facilitate criminal investigations in the new states reported that they had received totally unusable files from the GDR's *Zentrale Kriminalamt* (ZKA, Central Criminal Office), for example, file cover pages (file identification data) did not correspond to the remainder of the file. There were a number of reports of missing public agency (not just the police) data, which made a difficult situation more so. Officials from the West who were assigned administrative duties in the new states found that they did not have office support personnel to assist them or for that matter, no office. Furthermore, most of the DRG's security personnel were regarded by their new western colleagues as the former enemy, not comrades. And there was a reciprocal attitude in the former GDR; its expression went from passive aggressive behaviour through sabotage of files and in most of the cases a huge lack of communication.

But perhaps most difficult of all was the psychological effect of the East German "*revolution*." Its major consequence for the police was a fundamental disorientation and insecurity that continued long after unification. The government they had served had forfeited its legitimacy; in the eyes of the population the police, as representatives of that government, no longer possessed any authority. Police behaviour over forty years, and particularly in the recent past, was condemned everywhere; officers very much felt their unpopularity and literally feared to enforce the law. In many cases they could no longer even be sure which laws continued to apply and how those that did were to be enforced. A large number of old structures and rules had clearly lost their validity since the "*revolution*," but no new ones took their place in the governmental and administrative uncertainty that reigned. In addition, no new police law was passed to define the police's changed responsibilities and duties. In the period beginning in November 1989 and continuing past

the March 1990 East German elections, a "*legal vacuum*" existed in East Germany that would not end (at least formally) until unification on October 3, 1990.

3.1.2 Dealing with the chaos:

Unlike other East-Central European countries, East Germany was generally not in a position to restructure its society, including its police force, to suit its own needs. Instead, for better or worse, West German structures and laws were essentially superimposed onto the East. This was most obvious in Berlin, where the East Berlin police were completely absorbed by the West Berlin force. It has been observed that the states in the former GDR were denied the ability to modify their own police organizations. Rather, the adoption of the West German system meant the new federal states did not carry out their own reform. However, the situation changed throughout East Germany, as control of the police was decentralized and passed over to the states.

When in October 3, 1990, East Germany ceased to exist, the former West Berlin police officially took over responsibility for enforcing the law in all of Berlin. The East Berlin police had lobbied for the creation of three new "*directorates*," or precincts, in East Berlin, but the West Berlin hierarchy refused to do anything that would give the former East German police independent control of police activity in eastern Berlin. Instead, West Berlin directorates divided the former East Berlin precincts among themselves. Thus former East German police officers were kept out of the new police leadership for all of Berlin. This decision was just one of many that reflected the West Berlin police's strategy to take over the entire New Berlin police structure, justified with the argument that the new laws would be those of the Federal Republic and the assumption that many high East German police officials had been involved with the secret police and its crimes.

While in the new East Germany states both police-task laws and police organizational laws were enacted over the next 32 to 37 months respectively, in the state of Berlin it became effective immediately on unification in East Berlin. Basically, the territory of East Berlin was incorporated into the FRG's existing city-state of Berlin.

Despite this chaotic situation, some changes did occur. East Berlin's chief of police was replaced early in 1990, and the "*Round Table*" that acted as a de facto East German legislature until the March 1990 elections began investigations into the behaviour of the police.

3.1.3 Staffing problems:

Following unification, East German police were required to fill out long, probing questionnaires concerning their political and professional history before being accepted conditionally onto the "*new*" police force. All members of the VP who desired to remain with the police had to submit to an extensive background investigation that included questions about violation of human rights, membership in the SED, MfS, and their informant status with the MfS. Those accepted only slowly received the status of civil servants; their pay remained low compared with the past and with their Western colleagues. Further, their training in the East was generally not recognized, meaning that

those who had held higher rank were forced to move farther down the career ladder. In any case, the force would not take on all of the East German police who wished to keep their jobs. Older officers had little chance of retaining their positions held in the East and were presented with no opportunities to reach the higher ranks in the West German system.

This situation created a significant morale problem, and many East Germans simply quit; those that remained lived in fear of losing their jobs at a time when the East was facing mass unemployment. There were complaints that fear of making a mistake which could result in them losing their jobs led police from the East to hesitate before enforcing the law.

For those former East German members of the force who remained, the introduction of the West German system required massive retraining. Suddenly, the entire corpus of West German law had to be learned from scratch. In Berlin, retraining was offered by the police department itself, but particularly in smaller cities and towns officers essentially had to teach themselves, occasionally with the help of a West German. On the other hand, however, West German police forces quickly created partnerships arrangements with East German cities and regions, offering training and helping build up local forces.

A significant issue among those concerned with crimefighting, particularly in the East, was how to "*teach*" the principles of democratic policing to officers trained in an undemocratic system. East German criminologists themselves admitted that the process would be difficult, certainly more difficult than many in the West at first comprehended.

Finally, in general there was a tremendous loss of personnel within the ranks of the police in the former GDR. Many quit the VP at the time of unification. Others were terminated by the FRG because they either revealed the truth about their SED/MfS connections or it was subsequently found out that they had lied about it during their background investigation. This situation led to a major a shortage of qualified staff in a time when enforcement of the law was vital.

3.1.4 Dealing with staffing problems:

This situation slowly improved as former East German police underwent the necessary background checks and were accepted onto the new force. By 1993 over 1.2 million Civil Servants had submitted to a background investigation. However, the administrators in the East were asking the following rhetorical question: *What do you do with those informers; they do not think they did anything wrong?* Many in leadership positions still viewed officials of the GDR as either the former enemy or the enemy. There were FRG police officials complaining about the inadequacy of the screening process on former members of the VP who had been SED members or *Stasi* informants.

After the unification, reports continued to be published that there were still many former *Stasi* members in the new states within the ranks of the *Kripo* (VP's Criminal investigation police). It was reported that many were highly trained investigators who

had been assigned to the VP. Further, it was stated that a number of the VP had arranged to have their personnel files altered prior to unification.

On the other hand, civil servants in the West in general did not seek out assignments in the new states. Therefore, the FRG had to provide substantial inducements for individuals to accept a four year assignment in the new states. The inducements included a salary supplement that was tax free and a special promotion track

Thus following unification, the entire police leadership in Berlin became West German. With limited knowledge of the psychological, political and social situation within East Germany, West German police were sent into what was essentially a foreign country, bringing with them attitudes developed over many years in a very different West German setting. East Berlin police also carried out their duties on the western side of the city, but there they were clearly in the subordinate position of trainees in a foreign environment

Section 4: Policing in Berlin today.

4.1 Germany's Police structure:

The federal and state police forces employ a total of about 266,000 law enforcement officers. The federal constitutional system of the Federal Republic of Germany in principle gives the states (*Länder*) the authority to maintain their own police forces within their own territory. However, the Basic Law provides for ordinary federal authority in central areas of law enforcement. This applies in particular to cooperation between the federal and state governments on criminal matters, and to international crime prevention. In addition, the federal level is responsible for maintaining security at the national borders and in rail and air transport. To carry out its tasks, the Federation may legislate and maintain independent police authorities.

Below the federal level, police forces are organized by the *Länder* and are collectively known as *Land* police (*Landpolizei*). The forces are organized by cities, towns, or rural communities, but all are integral components of the police forces of the *Land* in which they are located. The *Landminister* of interior supervises police operations in his or her jurisdiction.

Due to this division of authority, Germany has 16 state police forces and two federal law enforcement agencies: the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, or BKA) and the Federal Police (Bundespolizei, or BPOL, formerly called the Bundesgrenzschutz, or BGS). Both lie within the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

Although the *Land* police are regulated by sixteen different legislatures and are, in fact, different police forces, there has been an increasing tendency toward standardization of police activities nationwide. Concerns about terrorism and the growth of organized crime have strengthened the movement to centralize police procedures and operations.

4.2 Internal challenges:

4.2.1 Women in the police force:

The police was, for a long time, regarded to be the classic domain of (heterosexual) men and a rather homogeneous organisation. One reason for this perception was probably that it was one of the last state organisations, to recruit women. It was not until 1978 that women were employed in the uniformed police of Berlin and up until the 90ies special conditions existed for the employment of women. Since the mid-nineties the Berlin police have intensified its efforts to recruit more heterogeneous staff by publicity campaigns, some of which address women particularly.

Today there are officially no gender specific jobs or special treatment of women in the police. Due to laws to promote women, the employment rate of female officers has reached almost 40 % (data from 2007), even though it has to be stressed that this high percentage of women can only be claimed for the minor positions within the police. As with most organisations it is still remarkable how few women are working in leading positions.

4.2.2 East – West integration:

Long accustomed to a compliant society, police forces of the eastern *Länder* have been described during the last decade as understaffed, undertrained, poorly equipped, and woefully unprepared to cope with the challenges posed by the growing numbers of skinheads and neo-Nazis engaged in violent hate crimes against foreign workers and refugees.

For many Westerners, mentally the boundary between "*civilized West*" and "*foreign*" or "*wild East*" still exists: what begins behind Alexanderplatz to them is not Friedrichshain, but *terra incognita*.

4.2.3 Immigration and the police:

Since 1993, according to a ruling of the Conference of the Ministry of the Interior, "*the employment in the police service of candidates from immigrant families is the right path to controlling specific forms of crime particularly by young non-integrated members of the foreign population and to reach more normality in this population group*". On the basis of this resolution, conditions were created that not only Germans in the sense of the Basic Law and members of other EU states, but also persons of other nationalities could join the police force, assuming they have the necessary qualifications. The aim is to get more police officers with, for example, a Turkish or ex-Yugoslavian migration background to join the organization for a better use of their linguistic and cultural skills.

In fact, crime among migrants has become a major issue in the city: Crime among non-German teenagers is disproportionately high, especially in violent crimes, such as sexual crimes and robbery in public. The suspect incrimination number is 18.15 (18.2%) among non-German youth, while being 9.686 (9.6%) among German youth (data from 2004 Berlin Crime Report).

However, the integration of the immigrants in the security forces and to the police specially remains as a slow and complicated process. Due to various factors, it is very difficult to have any kind of real effect beyond mere political symbolism. Because of the conditions of employment in the police forces, where only high school graduates and specialized high school graduates with very good German skills are accepted, which means a representation of the foreign resident population is by no means attained. At the same time, struggle has arisen between German candidates and the Police Union against any kind of “reverse discrimination”.

4.3 External challenges:

4.3.1 Human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation:

In 2008, 676 victims of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation were identified (in the whole Republic), which represented a slight decrease of 2% compared to 2007. However, in 2008, the number of investigations concluded rose most significantly in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg (+ 21), Berlin (+ 17), which means an increasing tendency of human trafficking in both cities, making the issue of trafficking a great challenge for Berlin’s police. Furthermore, apart from the number of German victims (28%), the majority of foreign victims now come from EU member states and thus have legal residential possibilities in Germany. This fact requires a review and adjustment of current strategies.

4.3.2 Terrorism:

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 as well as the attacks that were staged and/or failed in London, Madrid and Germany in the years thereafter demonstrated that the security agencies need to focus their efforts on the possible causes of terrorist violence. For this reason, in 2003 the *Bundeskriminalamt* already reacted by setting up the interdisciplinary-structured Terrorism/Extremism Research Unit.

The city of Berlin responded to the alert warning of a heightened threat of terrorism across Europe issued by the U.S. State Department on October 2010 by heightening police presence in public places such as airports, train stations, and some tourist sites and public buildings.

4.3.3 Immigration and integration:

The persistent, historically- and spatially-grounded cultural difference between the eastern

	Number in 2004	Percentage
Europe (total) of which:	328,043	72.75
Turkey	118,732	26.33
Poland	35,842	7.95
Vietnam	10,858	2.41
Other Asia	55,560	12.32
Africa	17,443	3.89
America (North and South)	22,661	5.03
Australia and Oceania	1,391	0.31
Stateless/no entry	14,944	3.31
Total Registered Foreigners	450,900	

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006

and western sectors of the city is not the only important cultural cleavage in Berlin. Indeed, religious diversification is inscribed on Berlin’s urban landscape. Between 1991 and

2003, while the Jewish community of the “new” Berlin increased 39%, the Muslim community also grew 35%. Of Berlin’s Muslims, 70% are Turks; the rest come mainly from Bosnia and Lebanon. Religious tensions spill into the open whenever Muslims propose to build new mosques that would allow longstanding congregations. German authorities often complain that divisions among Muslim organizations make it difficult for the government to find a legitimate *Sprachpartner* (interlocutor) on the Muslim side, allegedly impeding the integration of organized Islam in Germany.

Berlin’s nearly 450,000 foreigners comprise a 13.3% of the city’s population, with a clear majority of Turks among them. Foreigners are unevenly distributed across districts, and different nationalities live in different parts of the city. Consequently, the eastern and western sides of the city also have different experiences with non-German immigrants. Furthermore, ethnic concentration and the spatial concentration of multiple disadvantages have given rise to German fears of “ghetto” formation. Both issues are currently challenging police’s efforts to deal with immigration.

In 2005, 44.2% of non-German citizens in Berlin versus 19.2% of German citizens were unemployed.

4.3.3.1 Germany’s Turks:

The relationship between Germany’s largely Turkish Muslim population and the German national community was until recently conditioned by the political class’s refusal to acknowledge that the “*guestworkers*” were there to stay. German rather than Turkish attitudes were the primary factor precluding effective integration. Turks’ own uncertainty over whether they would eventually return “home” and a tendency toward linguistic and social segregation were reinforced for two generations by German administrative practices. Since 2000, however, German outlook and policy have changed; the reality of immigration and permanent settlement is now recognised and a new willingness, in principle, to extend citizenship has developed.

However, this has been accompanied by increasingly demanding conditions for full participation, from ideologically driven civic loyalty tests to intensified surveillance of Muslim associations. This apparent contradiction – paying lip service to integration while making practical aspects difficult to achieve – reflects the fundamental tension between an ethno-cultural vision of Germany that predominated until recently and a genuine, new desire to address the realities of a diverse society.

This tension has long characterised German policy debates. Integration has always been tied to giving up Turkish citizenship. Granting full rights and equal administrative recognition to Muslim organisations in state-religion relations (e.g. for teaching Islam in public schools) is conditioned upon religious leaders’ public repudiation of putative socio-cultural characteristics, such as inequitable gender relations. Formulating such demands as the price for entry into the German polity appears to presuppose an inherent incompatibility between Islam and the German republic which, in turn, has provoked a general defensiveness

Furthermore, the long refusal to acknowledge a diverse society has not been without costs. Educational and employment statistics make clear the makings of a parallel society or underclass. The disadvantaging of immigrant-origin children in secondary schools should be redressed. Difficulties with language and low socio-economic status are key factors in Turkish children's below-average educational performance and limited opportunities to attend the best schools. There are worrying consequences to educational segregation, as a high school diploma is needed to enter not only to the university but to the police too. This situation leads to an underrepresented Turkish community within the security forces, what provokes distrust within both (see 3.2.3 *Immigration and the police*, page 8, for more information).

4.3.3.1 Racism:


Shortly after unification, violent racist attacks on asylum seekers and immigrants shaped the domestic and international perception of Germany. The failure of the political system and police forces to cope with the challenge was a major factor in the rise and success of the particularly wide-spread and especially violent grassroots rightwing extremism in the East. Moreover, racism and right-wing extremism still happens today. Attacks on immigrants, religious places (mosques and synagogues) and extremism demonstrations are reported every year. According to the report on the protection of the Constitution, there were 168 extreme rightist organisations and alliances in Germany in 2004. As a response, in early 2007 the Berlin government launched a campaign to combat right-wing extremism and racist violence, which combines new police concepts with other comprehensive government programs and policies.

Section 5: Police in the eyes of citizens.

As we will see in the next section, the relationship between the police and the community/citizens are of utmost importance for the development of community policing.

5.1 Confidence of the citizens in the police after the unification:

A survey conducted by IPOS (Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung) in 1995 about citizens' trust in the police (figure 2) showed the following results:



While West Germany citizens showed a high and rather stable level of confidence in police (though slowly but steadily decreasing), citizens from East Germany answered quite differently. During the first year after the unification there was no level of trust recorded. No other German survey had ever produced negative police rankings. So this particular result can be taken as a sign of the deep seated distrust in that type of government agency which in effect was part of the monopoly of legitimate force of the State. However, the same survey gave positive results next year (1992) and by 1995 the increasing tendency was consolidated. This is easy to understand once we know that after the German unification the police force in the new States (the former DRG) was completely restructured and re built along the Western democratic model, as discussed earlier. On the one hand, the citizens had after the unification a very high level of insecurity and expressed a need for a strong police force, but on the other hand they could not easily overcome their generalized distrust in any kind of police force given their experience with the repressive aspects of the old regime. Furthermore, most contacts between police and the population instigated by the public when asking for police help. However, the traditional East German police force barely sought contact with the citizens. There was a tendency to regulate state affairs quickly and there was no understanding of how to communicate with the citizens, even less of how to work in partnership.

Thus, the East German police had feelings of great insecurity when dealing with the public. The reason for it was found in their vulnerability due to their collective and not their personal past. After the unification most police officers felt personally burdened with the new situation: they were more frequently exposed to life threatening situations, the perpetrators were more brutal and using weapons (circumstances they were not used to) and showed great fear of becoming victimized. Therefore they tend to avoid any contact with the population, which goes beyond the necessary measures and the police forces in the five new States will have to come an even longer way as the counterparts in the old States to incorporate the principles of community policing. The same was true for the citizens in the new States of Germany which took them some time to learn that the police could be trusted and was "*friend and helper*".

5.2 Confidence of the citizens in the police today:

The general picture has completely changed since the unification. A recent survey conducted by GfK Group in 2010 shows that the reputation of the police and judges has improved significantly. In fact, Germany (along with Italy) is the country where this professional group enjoys the highest levels of trust (86% in each).

However, memories of the past still remain in Berlin. A local paper recently observed that a clash between Berlin's riot police and protesters during this year's February 2nd "*revived memories of fights that brought down a local government in 1990*". Another press release, from the German magazine *Der Spiegel* (*There Is No Such Thing as Perfect Police Tactics - 06/05/2007*), emphasized the huge debate created around riot police's tactics during and before the G-8 summit, that were believed to have started the wave of violence and unrest that took place over Germany at that time. *Der Spiegel*, again, in an article named "*Merkel's water cannon politics*" poses the question "*Are things returning to the bad old days?*" after massive confrontations between the police and rioters in Stuttgart.

Moreover, regarding the immigrant – Muslim collective, the situation is totally different: around half of Muslims and non-Muslims immigrants surveyed (SOROS' initiatives report) did not trust the police. Both groups expressed low levels of satisfaction with police services. Instances of discriminatory behaviour from the police towards Muslims were reported. However, very few respondents officially reported these incidents. We should remember that this collective comprises more than a 13% of Berlin's population.

For these reasons, we can conclude that the current situation is much better than it was 20 years ago, however, the police and security forces of Berlin still have challenges to face. Moreover, all major challenges described above (gender, integration, terrorism, extremism and racism) must be addressed from a *community policing* perspective, as simplistic security approaches cannot deal with issues deeply enrooted into a given society. Thus, civil society is called to play a very important role here, working hand by hand with the police. The different Community Crime Prevention programmes have been (and still being) a story of success, but are needed to be expanded so they can face and cover new and emerging issues that, for the moment, remain in a vacuum.

Section 6: Community Policing.

6.1 Concept:

Community policing is, in essence, collaboration between the police and the community that identifies and solves community problems. With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighbourhoods. It combines an expanded outlook on crime control and prevention, new emphasis on making community member's active participants in the process of problem solving, and patrol officers' pivotal role in community policing. The philosophy of problem solving plays a significant role in community policing. Solving problems has to begin with the causes of the problems, and must stem from a balanced ratio between primary and secondary crime prevention, and though not excluded, repression does not become the main element.

This approach was also widely accepted and applied in Germany. From the middle of the 1990s there was a boom in the creation of crime prevention councils, round table organisations, security networks and law-and-order partnerships who participated in the local security work. Also, German states have tried out various policing theories or working philosophies over the past two decades, including an early form of Community Policing resembling the U.S. first attempts in the late 1980s, called "*citizen-friendly policing*", which slowly evolved into today's "*Community Crime Prevention*", or *Komunale Kriminalprävention*.

6.2 Community Crime Prevention in Germany:

Crime prevention involves much more than criminal law, police investigation, prosecution, sentencing and punishment. Crime prevention follows a three-step model: primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.

- *Primary* prevention measures attempt to involve large segments of the population to counteract conditions conducive to crime, for example by seeking to teach children and young people how to resolve conflicts without recourse to violence.
- *Secondary* prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for crime, for example through the use of technical devices such as alarm systems or immobilizers to prevent car theft.
- *Tertiary* prevention is directed at those who have committed crimes and seeks to keep them from becoming repeat offenders, for example by teaching them occupational skills in prison.

But crime prevention is not only the responsibility of policy-makers and police at federal and state level; it is also the duty of society as a whole – public and private agencies, the private sector, the media and the population – to take responsibility and do its part to prevent crime.

6.2.1 Community Crime prevention in Berlin:

Communal Crime Prevention describes the efforts of municipal and city citizens, of municipal institutions and of the police, to reduce crime and crime fear. Many German cities, as well as Berlin, have founded committees during the last years – in total nearly 2000 all over Germany.

Actors of municipal crime prevention are often organised in to committees. These committees can be known by a number of names such as the Preventive Council, Round Tables or Security Boards. The integral social orientation is given shape by the participation of different actors. The main aspect is bunching and linking of resources. Active citizens and local officials as well as experts are brought together to consider the complexity of prevention programmes and the multiplicity of reasons for crime. With these forums participants develop strategies aimed at reducing crime.

Section 7: Civil Society: just Policing?

This emphasis of this paper so far has been on the ‘police’ and ‘policing’. The following sections of the paper will focus on civil society. As stated earlier, civil society has to play a major role when dealing with Berlin’s current issues. Furthermore, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are expected to become a key piece in the general puzzle: there is consensus that certain issues like poverty, intolerance or inequity have detrimental outcomes such as marginalization, lack of integration and social cleavages, respectively. We have also reviewed some of the major external challenges for Berlin’s security forces. Then, we can suggest that working on the root of the problem may be more appropriate than simply punishing the problematic attitude, and, since the security forces are not able to do so, civil society emerges as the necessary piece. But, what it is being done currently in Berlin under this approach?

7.1 Promoting values:

7.1.1 Democracy:

7.1.1.1 Democratic Practices within CSOs:

How much influence and control do members of CSOs have on organisational decision-making processes? How are leadership positions filled? Democratic aspects in the structure of CSOs are regulated in Germany to varying degrees, depending on whether participation-oriented organisations (such as associations) or non-participation-oriented organisations (such as foundations) are considered. In a survey conducted by *Civicus*, 18% of the organisations regarded the dismantling of hierarchies as a priority, when asked what changes they would like to see in their organisational structure, even though they did not rank this area as a high priority in terms of organisational change. In general in some estimations CSOs (with the exception of small associations and civic action groups), as well as public institutions, are regarded as not sufficiently oriented towards enabling internal participation.

Nevertheless, as a general rule, only those associations which comply with the constitutional order and the basics of international law are permissible in Germany (Constitution, Art.9, II).

7.1.1.2 CS Actions to Promote Democracy:

Their common goal is the strengthening of civil society and of civic involvement. The key objective is the improvement of the general legal, organizational and institutional conditions for civic involvement, to encourage and support concrete projects for actual practice in civil society, the state and business as well as raise and activate political awareness. There are numerous examples of CSOs which are directly devoted to promoting democracy:

- *BBE* (http://www.b-b-e.de/index.php?id=bbe_english) aims at promoting civic participation, regarded as a prerequisite for a democratic body politic.
- *Aktion Gemeinsinn e.V.* (<http://www.gemeinsinn.de/>) works on political education issues, in particular on promoting public spiritedness, personal responsibility, tolerance and cross-cultural understanding.

7.1.2 Tolerance:

7.1.2.1 Tolerance within the CS Arena:

This indicator deals with the extent to which tolerance prevails within civil society. This includes issues such as: the extent of media reporting on issues like racism, discrimination and intolerance by CSOs; the significance of CSOs, which have an explicitly racist, discriminating or intolerant outlook, and the extent of “public opposition”, such as public condemnation of opinions or actions characterised by intolerance, by other civil society actors.

The issue of tolerance is attributed very little importance in the media, only 2.1% of all articles were concerned with this issue (*Civicus* report 2005 – 2007). Extreme right-wing

tendencies could be considered one possible form of intolerance, and the share of right-wing extremist groups among the overall number of CSOs and volunteers is indeed giving cause for concern, but in fact only represent a marginal portion of German civil society.

7.1.2.2 CS Actions to Promote Tolerance:

In contrast with the little media coverage, we found a large number of CSOs and networks can be cited as aiming to promote tolerance in German society, such as FAIRSTÄNDNIS, an information campaign against xenophobia and right-wing extremism. Other examples are:

- *Gesicht zeigen! Aktion weltoffenes Deutschland* (<http://www.gesichtzeigen.de/>), an association actively opposing right-wing violence.
- *Amadeu Antonio Stiftung* (<http://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/eng/>), which amongst others promotes projects with teachers, the police and victims of racist violence.
- *Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz* (Democracy and Tolerance Alliance: <http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de>).

7.1.3 Non – Violence:

7.1.3.1 Non-Violence within the CS Arena:

This indicator analyses the extent of violence within civil society by looking at the extent of media reporting on this issue, and by examining the frequency of the use of violence by CSOs and the response from the rest of civil society. Only 1.2% of the articles examined in the media analysis dealt with this indicator (*Civicus* report 2005 – 2007). Violent actions include politically-motivated crimes (left-wing and right-wing extremist-motivated crimes and politically-motivated crimes against foreigners). In Germany, the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation registered 21,178 politically-motivated crimes in 2004, of which 56% were propaganda offences and 8.5% could be attributed to politically-motivated violent crime. Of these, 12,553 had a right-wing background and 3,521 a left-wing background. 603 can be attributed to “politically-motivated crime against foreigners” and 4,501 offences cannot be attributed to any particular motive.

7.1.3.2 CS Actions to Promote Non-Violence and Peace:

Overall, acts of violence can be described as marginal phenomena. Numerous organisations and networks can be quoted which not only commit themselves explicitly to non-violence in the pursuit of their objectives but have also made it their task to get involved in this respect. Some organizations are:

- *Mut gegen Rechte Gewalt* (Courage against right-wing violence: <http://www.mut-gegen-rechte-gewalt.de/eng/>) Internet platform.
- *Das Bündnis gegen häusliche Gewalt* (alliance against domestic violence) developed by the Berlin City Council. (http://www.berlin.de/bamitte/org/praeventionsrat/haeuslg_start.html)
- *Arbeitskreis Frauen und Gesundheit, Abteilung Gesundheit und Soziales im Bezirksamt Mitte der Stadt Berlin* is a public campaign, supported by a wide range of associations and initiatives (<http://www.berlin.de/ba-mitte/>).

- The KOK, the nationwide *Koordinierungskreis gegen Frauenhandel und Gewalt an Frauen im Migrationsprozeß e.V.* (Co-ordination group to combat trading of violence against women in the migration process, <http://www.kok-buero.de/>) is opposed to violence against women, to which organisations such as *Ban-Ying e.V.*, *Hydra e.V.*, *In Via e.V.* and *Terre de Femme* also belong. Projects and local advice bureaus of KOK attempt to help victims of violence or to exert political influence with regard to this issue.

Nonetheless, some of these organisations are also faced with financial problems, with the result that a many safe houses for women, for example, are threatened by closure

7.1.4 Gender Equity:

7.1.4.1 Gender Equity within the CS Arena:

This indicator deals with the extent to which gender equity prevails in civil society. There is no open, direct discrimination of women in German civil society. But men and women participate in civil society to differing extents in differing fields, focusing on different activities, and being active in different function. According to the Volunteer Survey made by Civicus, 80% of voluntary social work is undertaken by women. Men are involved in more formal, hierarchical contexts and therefore fulfil more administrative tasks while women are more active in a less formal context and are therefore involved in more direct social work. Although not exclusively, these differing forms of involvement mean that functional and leadership positions are far more often performed by men than women.

7.1.4.2 CS Actions to Promote Gender Equity:

Organisations promoting the interests and rights of women have a long tradition, going back more than 100 years. However, the media appears to have little interest in these issues, as only 1% of articles examined dealt with actions by CSOs to promote gender equity. The range of organisations is wide and includes:

- *Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen* (Association of social-democratic women, <http://www.asf.spd.de/>)
- *Terre de Femme*, a human rights organisation for women and girls. (http://frauenrechte.de/online/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=201&Itemid=384)

These organizations are typically heavily financed by the public sector and as a result, have recently experienced financial problems due to cuts in public expenditure.

7.1.5 Poverty Eradication:

7.1.5.1 CS Actions to Eradicate Poverty:

In the context of fighting poverty, a whole range of social services are available, e.g. for families, children and youth, the unemployed or households in debt. One basic function of charitable care is also represented by advocacy activities for those in need. Apart from the crucial role of charitable organisations, there are other organisations also involved in combating poverty:

- *Tafeln* (<http://www.tafel.de/>), which aim of to distribute edible food which can no longer be sold according to statutory regulations to people in need.

7.2 Group visits:

7.2.2 Kreuzberg:

Kreuzberg, a part of the combined Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg borough located south of Mitte, is one of the best-known areas of Berlin. Kreuzberg has emerged from its history as one of the poorest quarters in Berlin in the late 1970s, during which it was an isolated section of West Berlin to one of Berlin's cultural centers in the middle of the now reunified city.

Berlin's Kreuzberg district has a reputation for vibrancy, creativity and multiculturalism. Yet in the public imagination there is often a flipside to the area's cultural diversity with a perception that its large Turkish and Muslim populations live in "parallel societies," cut off from their ethnic German and non-Muslim neighbours and enclosed within their own communities. Muslims make up roughly one-third of the population in Kreuzberg, nonetheless, a report published by the Open Society Foundation (*At Home in Europe*) found that most share very similar concerns with their non-Muslim neighbors, that the groups have frequent contact with each other, and that the district experiences a high level of cooperation between local politicians and Muslim organizations. However, members of the Muslim communities do continue to suffer from discrimination despite a plethora of projects and initiatives.

7.2.2 Naunyn Ritze youth project:

Naunyn Ritze is an Open House for children, young people and also adults in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg. The organization describes its philosophy as "no violence and show respect for different cultures and different ways to see the world".

Naunyn Ritze organises different workshops and leisure activities in a wide range of areas, such as: music, computers, theatre, sports, family, education support for Turkish, dance etc.



Picture of the Berlin Wall: Erich Honecker and his Soviet counterpart Leonid Brezhnev kissing.

Section 8: Further Readings.

Due to the lack of information in English on this matter, we might end here. However, we would encourage any German speaker to continue researching within the following sites:

- *Berlin's Commission on Violence*: <http://www.berlin.de/lb/lkbgg/>
- *Berlin Police website*: <http://www.berlin.de/polizei/index.html>
- *Bundeskriminalamtes website*: <http://www.bka.de/>

References in English:

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<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,691840,00.html>
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- *A Walk on Berlin's Wild Side* – Time Magazine 13/04/2010
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901030421-443145,00.html>
- *Soziale Stadt: Berlin-Kreuzberg – Kottbusser Tor*
<http://translate.google.es/translate?hl=es&sl=en&tl=es&u=http://www.sozialestadt.de/en/veroeffentlichungen/zwischenbilanz/2-berlin-english.shtml&anno=2>
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